COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy Volume III COMMITTEE PRINT U.S. House of Representatives COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Off v.; Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy ^■■■» r- = p-^ S r-q s rri = zr r □ i ^ m o olume III v;iOO COMMITTEE PRINT U.S. House of Representatives U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1977 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, B.C. 20402 (3-part set ; sold in sets only) Stock Number 052-070-04350-4 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LESTER L. WOLFF, New York JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts LEO J. RYAN, California CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey DON BONKER, Washington GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ANDY IRELAND, Florida DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas GEORGE E. DANIELSON, CaUfornia JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, lUinois PAUL FINDLEY, IlUnois JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas BENJAMIN A. OILMAN, New York TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff George R. Berdes, Staff Contultant Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant Forrest R. Frank, Subcommittee Staff AnocicUe La Verne Still, Staff Atsittant (II) Contents — Volume III Organization of the Study v Introduction to the Analysis and Findings: Chapter 15 — Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Meth- odolog}^ of the Study 1505 Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues: Chapter 16 — Anal3^sis of the Cases 1517 Chapter 17 — Analysis of the Issues 1595 Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications: About the Essays to Follow 1705 Chapter 18 — Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy . 1713 Chapter 19 — Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Re- lationships 1737 Chapter 20 — High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low- Technology Diplomacy . " 1757 Chapter 21 — Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International Technology 1783 Chapter 22 — Independence Versus Interdependence . . . 1805 Chapter 23 — Long-Range and Short-Range Planning . . 1847 Chapter 24 — Concluding Observations 1885 Bibliography 1909 (III) ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY Volume I Introduction to the Study as a Whole Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientific Age The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy Part 1 — Six Cases The Baruch Plan Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year The Mekong Project Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed United States-Soviet Commercial Relations Volume II Part 2 — Six Issues The Evolution of International Technology The Politics of Global Health Beyond Malthus U.S. Scientists Abroad Brain Drain Science and Technology in the Department of State Volume III Introduction to the Analysis and Findings Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues Analysis of the Cases Analysis of the Issues Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications About the Essays to Follow Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International Technology Independence Versus Interdependence Long-Range and Short-Range Planning Concluding Observations Bibliography (V) INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Chapter 15 — Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study CONTENTS Page Scope of the Study 1510 Methodology of the Study 1511 Organization of Parts 3 and 4 1512 An Anticipation of the Findings 1512 Opportunities for Institutional Reform 1512 Importance of Science and Technology for Diplomacy 1514 Problems and Opportunities Facing the Congress 1515 (1507) CHAPTER 15— RECAPITULATION OF PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY Parts 3 and 4 present an analytical summary of the findings of a 7-year study by the Congressional Research Service of the problems and functional interactions of science, technology, and American diplomacy. The study had its origins in congressional concern with science and technology that had been steadily mounting since World War II. The prospectus for the study, attributing to science and technology "an ever-increasing influence on domestic public policy," added that they "also appear to have a growing effect on the content and conduct of American foreign policy." ^ The general purposes of the study, as stated in the prospectus, was "to provide Congress with background material useful in strengthening the resources that support the conduct of American diplomacy." For this purpose it would "describe and analyze the formulation and administration of American diplomatic policies having significant science and technology components." More specifically, the study was designed to examine six "cases" and six "issues" in recent diplomatic history in order to — 1. characterize processes and problems involving the interac- tion of science and technology with diplomacy; 2. define organizational requirements for the effective formula- tion of important policies to direct and control activities involving this interaction; 3. identify ways in which the capabilities of agencies serving at this interface can be strengthened legislatively or administra- tively ; 4. discover ways in which science and technology can better support foreign policy objectives of the United States; and 5. discover ways in which the conduct of diplomatic activities can better support the healthy growth of national and interna- tional science and technology.^ As noted in chapter 1, Lloyd V. Berkner posed two questions in his 1950 report for the Department of State on "Science and Foreign Relations": 1. How can the potentialities of scientific progress be integrated into the formulation of foreign policy, and the administration of foreign relations, so that the maximum advantages of scientific progress and development be ac- quired by all peoples? 2. How can foreign relations be conducted in such a manner as to create the atmosphere that is essential to effective progress of science and technology? ^ 1 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Toward a New Diplomacy in a Scientifio Age," In the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Con- gress, Washington, D.C.. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, 28 p. (Committee print.) Chapter 1 is a current version of tliis prospectus, updated to .luly 1977. See vol. I. pp. 1-.35 ; see p. .5 for the specific reference. ^ Ibid., p. 8. ^Ibid., p. 10. (1509) 1510 The 12 completed studies in the series, and the analysis that follows, are intended to suggest answers to Berkner's two questions. However, much has happened in the 27 years since the questions were posed. It is unlikely that the participants in the Berkner report had in mind the vast scope of the impacts that science and technology would impose on the world of diplomacy. Space exploration, the use of satellites for communications and remote sensing, the ballistic missile deterrent impasse, the Green Revolution, the technological dedication to petroleum that made the oil embargo effective, supertankers, nuclear proliferation, and the technology transfer activities of multinational corporations have emerged as important diplomatic concerns since the publication of the Berkner report. Even the International Geo- physical Year, in which Berkner was a leading participant, postdates by some years his scheme to bring science and technology into the Department of State. The purpose of part 3 of the extended study is to sift through the 12 chapters in which the 6 cases and 6 issues are analyzed, in order to present a summarization of the entire project. However, unlike most summaries, this publication contains new material ■ further thoughts by the authors of the 12 individual studies, and by the present authors (the project codirectors) , and assessment of the performance of the governmental decisionmaking apparatus in relation to the outcomes of these studies. The extended study ends with a comprehensive an- notated bibliography prepared in January 1976 with a supplement updating it to August 1977.* Scope of the Study The supporting studies of six cases and six issues summarized in part 3 are as follows: CASES ISSUES 1. The Baruch Plan for international- 1. International impact of technology ization of atomic energy. on diplomacy. 2. The Eisenhower proposal for peaceful 2. The politics of global health. use of the atom. 3. The International Geophysical Year. 3. Food and population. 4. The Mekong regional development 4. Temporary placement of U.S. scien- proposal. tists abroad. 5. Efforts to reach international agree- 5. The "brain drain" of technically ment on exploiting the resources of trained people, the seabed. G. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade treaty and 6. Bringing science and technology into technology transfer. the Department of State. A decision was made at the outset of the project to exclude considera- tion of all subject matter that involved security-classified information. Accordingly, no military or intelligence topics were considered, and arms control was dealt with only to a limited extent in two of the papers which examined unclassified aspects of atomic energy cases. Several studies were abandoned with regret: those tentatively pro- jected on the use of the social sciences in the U.S. Information Agency, the computer and information management, scientific research in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Treaty on Outer Space. * Both were prepared by Genevieve Johanna Knezo, analyst in science and technology of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service. 1511 The project director and associate director also regret that it was not possible to extend the study series to cover some other important areas: for example, research and development in the U.S. foreign aid program, global allocation of material and fuel resources, and science and technology activities in the complex of United Nations organizations. Indeed, one of the difficulties in undertaking a broad policy study in the field of diplomacy is the richness of the subject and the attrac- tiveness of the issues it presents. What was attempted, therefore, was the selection of a representative and manageable list of topics that were judged to yield instructive guidance to the Congress and to policy analysts in the executive branch. Perhaps it will be possible for the academic community to extend the analyses begun with the present series in 1970 into the topics neglected. It was a part of the plan for the project that each of the 12 separate studies should perform 2 functions: It should stand alone as a useful account and analysis of an issue containing important policy questions and legislative values; and it should be an integral part of the total project on the managing of the interface of science and technology with diplomacy. As observed in chapter 1, there is evidence that the first purpose has already been served. The analysis that follows represents the effort to achieve the second purpose. Methodology of the Study The six cases and six issues examined in the total study necessarily bear some substantive relationship to each other. However, there is no intention of presenting them as a time sequence. This is not in any sense a chronology of science, technology, and American diplomacy since 1945, when the atomic bomb gave the subject a permanent urgency, or since 1950, when an early effort at serious appraisal was made in the Berkner report. Each separate case or issue is presented in its own time frame. The focus of the study as a whole is on the nature of the problem of relating technical problems and opportunities to diplomatic methods, processes, and philosophy. Each case or issue is presented as a study complete in itself, but the series of these studies taken together provides a longitudinal report on the subject prepared during the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive, and covering selected events over a much longer timespan. The order of the summaries is determined by the topics and substantive matters rather than by the chronological order of theix original issuance. To eliminate some of the awkwardness that this methodology introduces, each author reviewed his or her contribution to the study to bring it — more or less — up to date.' Questions that have emerged since first issuance are indicated and comments on the original studies are responded to. But to repeat: The purpose of the entire project is not historical but analytical; it is intended that the project as a whole will provide a coherent and reasonably comprehensive set of observations for use by the Congress in surveying the broad canvas of science, technology, and American diplomacy. Is the subject as crucial to the welfare of '• The reassessments by authors were made In 1975 or early 1976 ; some of them, as noted In each instance, have been updated to mld-1977. 1512 humanity as it is sometimes allep:ed to be? If so, why, and in what ways? What are its major areas of concern? What are its institutional and procedural problems? W^hat possibilities are offered for leo^islative strengthening of the institutions and the processes involved? In imposing some degree of uniformity on the separate cases and issues it was hoped that from each separate study it would be possible to draw insights and evidence that could be presented in a coherent fashion in this summary report bearing on the outstanding policy aspects of the science-technology-diplomacy interrelationship. These policy aspects would also be identified, and confirmed or qualified, by the cases and issues themselves. Options for congressional consideration to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic apparatus, and possible ways to strengthen congressional participation in the foreign policy process, are identified from an exam- ination of all the cases and issues, taken together. In the concluding chapter of the overall study, these findings are offered and discussed, as are a number of questions of fundamental policy. Organization of Parts S and 4 Following this introduction, in part 3, the six cases and the six issues are recapitulated, subjected to further analysis by both in- dividual authors and project codirectors, and, where appropriate, brought up to date. In part 4 the report offers 6 essays of a more extended nature on policy alternatives that have emerged out of the 12 studies as important questions governing future direction of the diplomatic aspects of science and technology, and of the technical aspects of diplomacy. Whereas the recapitulations — which might be termed abstracts to which have been added observations from a broadened and more current perspective — involve focusing on the circumstances of the 12 studies, taken individually, and their im- plications for the general theme, each of the essays examines all 12 of the studies from the perspective of one major aspect or dimension of the general theme. An Anticipation of the Findings In the concluding chapter, a number of separate products ought to emerge, properly documented and defined. One is a set of general conclusions as to the need for reform of the institutional arrangements for dealing with the broad scope of the subject. Another is a better appreciation of the importance of the relationship between diplomacy and both science and technology — but especially the latter. A third is the particular set of problems and opportunities that challenge the Congress to provide for their legislative solution or exploitation. OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM Many illustrations appear, in the individual studies of the project' of the need to eliminate institutional gaps and deficiencies in the U.S. diplomatic machinery that result from the emergence of technology as a major force, if not the primary force, compelling diplomatic change and adaptation to change. Among these illustrations are the following: — The United States is preeminent in technology and admin- istrative management but neither of these great attributes has been effectively mobilized by the Department of State for pur- poses of U.S. diplomacy. 1513 — ^Virtually all the great problems facing the United States today have a large technological content. Yet those most knowl- edgeable about the generation, management, and utilization of new technology are not being inducted into the U.S. diplomatic machinery; conversely, too few of those who are part of the machinery of diplomacy are equipped by education, training, and experience to communicate effectively with the technologists or even to recognize when a technological/diplomatic problem exists. • — Multinational corporations are recognized as the primary mechanism for international transfer of technology, yet the United States has no policy for enlistment and coordination of this great organizational resource to advance the purposes of U.S. diplomacy. — In its development of large technological systems, American engineering has led the world in its ability to deal with an in- finity of variables, design options, and interfaces. Apart from mainly military initiatives of the Department of Defense, systems approaches congenial to technologists have not been exploited to develop technological initiatives beneficial to U.S. diplomacy. — In the murky field of national security the emphasis has been on the design of nuclear weaponry and high-precision sub- nuclear weapons, to the neglect of the broader aspects of national security such as: vulnerability of external sources of materials essential to the U.S. economy, vulnerability of U.S. transport indispensable to heavy industry, and the economic health and innovativeness of basic materials industries. — In the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, preference is given to bilateral agreements and programs. Science and technology are major ingredients in these activities but the resources of people with both diplomatic and technical expertise to serve these agreements — numbering 28 as of early 1976 — are seriously deficient. Moreover, resort to multilateral programs — which, though difficult, might be a more efficient and diplomatically more acceptable way to use these resources — is largely neglected or downgraded. Engineering support for the United Nations and its family of associated agencies is feeble. — The style of American diplomacy contrasts sharply with that of American industry, in that engineering moves from the establishment of goals to the design of programs to achieve them while diplomacy waits for crises to appear and then attempts to cope with them. Thus, the study reveals the need for a greater emphasis on long- range planning of diplomacy, with particular emphasis on its tech- nological aspects. There needs to be a sustained and systematic search for future trends in the world outlook, a sustained effort to formulate U.S. goals, and a broad-gauge effort to discover organizing principles to bring a greater coherence to U.S. foreign policy. Better and more accessible information is needed about all aspects of the global diplomatic scene and about the forces that technology brings to bear on it. All signs seem to ])oint to the need for a mobilization and coordina- tion of the enormous intellectual resources of the United States in academic institutions and other nongovernmental centers of intel- 1/514 lectual analysis whose contributions are insufficiently available to diplomatic decisionmakers today. At the same time, in the formu- lation and furtherance of diplomatic goals, every effort would be worth consideration to bring technological skills into closer con- junction with those of political and economic policy. Finally, the role of technology could usefully be studied for op- portunities to design international institutions to reverse the all-too- evident trend toward disaffection of the "Third World" toward the United States. IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DIPLOMACY Studies of war and diplomacy up to 1945 assumed that either of these two modes of international relationship was the extension of the other. The further assumption was implicit that no technology of warfare could ever dissolve or destroy the necessary interrelation- ship of war and diplomacy. At one stroke the atomic bomb transformed the relationship and made the avoidance of total war the prime goal of diplomacy; subsequent refinements and delivery systems confirmed the new order. At the same time, the nations of the world came to recognize technology itself as a principal foundation of national power and diplomatic influence. The achievements of technology since World War II have done nothing to contradict this assessment. Technology has moved to center stage in the world diplomatic scene. The United States, as the principal national exponent in technological achievement, ought therefore to be recognized as diplomatically preeminent, but ought also to accept the responsibility for leading the way in the application of technology to the achievement of goals shared with the other nations of the world. Thus, the theses emerge from the study of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy that — (1) In a rapidly changing world, the business of the Federal Govern- ment is increasingly the governance of relations with other States, working with them in rational and controlled ways toward global development and the betterment of the human condition. (2) The historical role of violence or the threat of violence as the measure of diplomatic effectiveness has been considerably superseded by competitive excellence in technology. (3) Domestically, the United States is foremost among world powers in technological excellence. (4) Exercise of this preeminence for purposes of achieving world progress and harmony is both a moral imperative and a requirement of national security. As technology brings peoples closer together, these two motivations — national interest and international morality — tend more and rnore to reinforce each other. To the extent that they do not, the result may be chaos and, ultimately, failure of the human race, or at least of the present great civilizations of the world, to survive. (5) There are difficulties, not yet susceptible of evaluation as to their relative importance, but certainly including — (a) The sheer numbers of contacts and agencies concerned with technology on the international level, for multiple purposes having an infinite variety of sponsorship, affiliation, and structure; 151.5 (b) The grossly inadequate resources allocated by the United States to the analysis of its technological resources, with particular reference to their applicability toward global objectives of the United States; (c) Diffusion of effort, both because of the number of interna- tional claimants for attention and because of the absence of clearly defined foreign policy in technology — in particular, policy as to the proper relationship of U.S. efforts to those of other countries and of international organizations; (d) The tendency of less-developed nations to identify the U.S. mix of moral purpose and technological superiority with colonialism; (e) The fact that too much has been expected of American mone}^ and skills to 3'ield quick results through sheer volume and technical virtuosity, and that too little has been said of the need for patience, perseverance, and acquired insights to accommodate to the psychologies of other cultures and to solve large problems of development by tackling the innumerable small, everyday problems. PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING THE CONGRESS In the 12th study in the series, the importance was stressed of the diplomatic role of tlie Congress: "In the last analysis the Constitution vests in the Congress of the United States a large share of decision- making power on foreign as well as domestic affairs. Senatorial assent is the sine qua non of treatymaking. The power of the purse defines congressional control over all positive actions and programs of the Federal Government, foreign as well as domestic. The control of foreign trade and international transfers of persons, no less than the regulation of Armed Forces and the right to declare war, rests in the Congress." '^ Also, the congressional need was suggested for strengthened insti- titional means to provide assistance in the following ways: — Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with congressional intent in the area of scientific and technological impacts on foreign policy and international relations — and vice versa ; — ^ Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic environment as changes occur in response to the global spread of technological innovation; — ^Assessing the secondary impacts and interrelationships of "international" technological issues; — Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions in the face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting from the global spread of technological innovation; — Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy interactions with science and technology; and " U.S. CoiiRress. House. Committee on International Relations. Science and Technology in the Department of State, in the series Science. Technolojiy. and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1073. See vol. II, p. 1500. — Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an extended institutional memor}^ and an assistance cadre for major studies for "international" committees concerned with S. & T, questions, S. & T. committees concerned with foreign policy questions, and committees monitoring major technological missions with significant international implications/ The interest of the Congress is inevitably — and more and more demonstrably — drawn to the importance of technology in its influence on the U.S. world posture, both directly through the diplomatic process and indirectly through the contributions of technology to U.S. economic health and vitality. Other congressional interests include the development of specific diplomatic initiatives employing tech- nology for national and international benefit; and the evolution of sound policies for the sharing of U.S. technology abroad and for the mutually beneficial exchange of technology with other countries. From these preoccupations, it would seem to follow that the Con- gress has a strong justification for considered action to supply (a) the best possible mechanism for long-range diplomatic planning in the Executive Office of the President; (b) means to strengthen orga- nizational resources of the Department of State at home and abroad relative to science and technology; (c) positive guidance to the Department of State in the use of nongovernmental intellectual resources and institutions bearing on the relationship of diplomacy with science and technology; and (d) means to strengthen the resources supporting the Congress itself in making its own independent decisions on all these matters. 7 Ibid., p. 1467. PART 3 — ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AND ISSUES Chapter 16 — Six Cases Illustrating the Interaction of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy CONTENTS Case One — The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age: Pag« Statement of the Case 1521 Importance of the Case 1522 How the Case Developed 1522 U.S. Involvement 1523 Role of Congress 1524 Outcome 1524 Assessment 1524 General Lessons From the Study 1526 Author's Reassessment 1528 Need for Congressional Involvement 1528 Some Illustrative Questions 1529 Case Two — Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Interaction of Diplomacy With a New Technology: Statement of the Case 1529 Importance of the Case 1529 How the Case Developed 1530 Purposes of the IAEA 1531 European Regional Organizations 1531 Non- Proliferation Treaty 1532 U.S. Involvement "1 1533 U.S. Support of IAEA 1533 U.S. Relationship to Euratom and NEA 1534 U.S. Position on Safeguards 1535 Role of Congress 1536 The Congress and Agreements on Nonmilitary Uses 1536 Outcome 1537 Assessment 1537 Author's Reassessment 1540 Relevance of Study Themes Today 1541 Some Lessons From the Study of Commercial Nuclear Power 1542 Legislative Implications 1542 Some Illustrative Questions 1543 Channeling of U.S. Technical Assistance in Nuclear Power 1543 The International Atomic Energy Agency 1544 The IAEA as a "Testbed" 1544 Euratom 1545 Joint Euratom-U.S. Research 1545 The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 1545 U.S. Nuclear Fuel Services 1545 The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Safeguards 1546 Case Three — The Political Legacy of the International Geophysiaal Year: Statement of the Case 1546 Importance of the Case 1547 How the Case Developed 1547 IGY Concept Replaces That of TPY 1548 Scientific Results of IGY 1549 U.S. Involvement ; 1550 Role of Congress 1550 Outcome 1551 The Space Program 1551 Congressional Responses 1553 Other Domestic and General EflFects of IGY 1553 International Impacts 1554 (1519) l!520 Case Three — The Political Legacy of the International Geophj^sical Year — Continued Page Assessment 1555 Author's Reassessment 1557 Global Scientific Cooperation 1557 Improved Transfer of Knowledge 1557 Remaining Obstacles 1558 The Emigration Problem 1 558 A Summing Up 1558 Some Illustrative Questions __ 1558 Case Four — The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism : Statement of the Case 1559 Importance of the Case 1560 How the Case Developed 1560 U.S. Involvement 1561 The Wheeler and Ford Foundation Reports 1562 The Mekong Project's Broad Base of Support 1563 Role of Congress 1564 Outcome 1565 Assessment 1566 The Momentum of Nonpoliticized Regionalism 1566 Geography as the Binding Force 1567 Advantages of Multilateral Regionalism 1567 Author's Reassessment 1568 The Mekong Project in Perspective 1568 Some Observations and Conclusions 1569 Some Illustrative Questions 1571 Case Five — Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed : Statement of the Case 1572 Importance of the Case 1572 How the Case Developed 1573 U.S. Involvement in the Case 1574 Role of Congress 1574 Outcome 1575 Assessment 1576 Author's Reassessment 1576 Policy Proposal by Secretary Kissinger 1578 Some Illustrative Questions 1579 Case Six — U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy: Statement of the Case 1579 Importance of the Case 1580 How the Case Developed 1581 Accelerated Movement Toward Detente 1582 U.S. Involvement 1582 Barriers to Trade Expansion 1583 Role of Congress 1584 Outcome 1 585 Assessment 1585 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Prospects 1586 Political Consequences 1587 Risks*Versus Potential Gains 1588 Author's Reassessment 1 588 East- West Trade in Perspective 1588 Expansion of Trade as Element of Detente 1589 Past U.S. Legal Restrictions 1589 Recent Moves Toward Liberalization of Trade 1590 Carter Administration Policy 1591 Some Illustrative Questions 1592 CHAPTER 16— SIX CASES ILLUSTRATING THE INTER- ACTION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY In chaptere 1 and 15, reference was made to the original plan to present a number of cases and issues to illustrate the interaction of science, technolo^', and American diplomacy, and in doing so to adopt a conmion format. Despite the widely differing circumstances of the 12 separate studies which followed, it did prove possible to achieve sub- stantial structural parallelism in treating them. This parallelism is evident in the fact that virtually all of the studies contribute illustra- tions and insights to each of the 6 major operational issues presented below in chapters 18 through 23 even though the topics of the 12 studies were not selected with these operational issues in mind. On the contrary, the operational issues were suggested by the independent analyses of studies as the series progressed., -- - - The parallelism "is also evident in the ease with which the com- mentaries on the various studies fit the somewhat arbitrary formats circumscribing all of them — one format for the six cases and a varia- tion of it for the six substantive issues. The format for the six cases is given herewith, followed by the commentaries on the cases themselves: Statement of the case Importance of the case How the case developed U.S. involvement Role of Congress Outcome Assessment Author's reassessment Some illustrative questions CASE ONE— THE BARUCH PLAN: U.S. DIPLOMACY ENTERS THE NUCLEAR AGE « Statement of the Case The proposal to internationalize the control of atomic energy presented by U.S. negotiator Bernard M. Baruch on June 14, 1946, at the opening session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Com- mission, was the first major postwar step toward coping -w-ith a foremost technological threat to future world security. Despite wide- spread recognition of the dimensions of the threat,^ the negotiations 8 U. S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nu- clear Age. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Le- neicc N. Wu, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. See vol. I, pp. 53-122. » Two Americans whose reaction to the threat when it first became known was essentially optimistic may have been representative of many others. One, a military officer who was present at the Alamagordo test of the first atom bomb, was heard to remark, with pardonable rhetoric: "At last war has devoured itself." The other, the associate director of this study— then a U.S. Navy Japanese Language Officer assigned to military government duties on Tinian, near the airfield from, which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (August 6, 194,5) was flown— wrote to his wife on August 8, 1945, that the development of "this terrifying new weapon" could be seen as strengthening the prospects for world peace, because of the strong possibiUty that "when a certain point was reached in the degree of devastation that war is capable of causing, that knowledge would act as a deterrent to war and would do so increasingly as modern weapons increased in power. The debut of [the atomic bomb] seems to me to mark that tiuning point." To tlie extent that this reaction of characteristic American optimism may have been shared by those mak- ing policv, however, it seems clear in retrospect that it was a hazardous one which took for granted the dif- ficult negotiations, spurred by a supreme sense of urgency, upon which the achievement of a reliable state of deterrence would have to depend. Thirty years later it is by no means certain whether "that turning point" has actually been reached. (1521) 1522 on the Baruch proposal ended in failure and the threat continues to grow. Importance of the Case The arrival of atomic power was a technoloo;ical event of unparal- leled significance for international affairs. It raised the cost of all-out v>\arfare to an intolerable level and substantially altered the basis for the positions of diplomats at the bargaining table. The problem of how to establish control over both military and peaceful uses of atomic energy posed an unprecedented challenge to world diplomacy. At the outset, the technological necessities of effective international control were politically unacceptable, especially to the Soviet Union. For U.S. diplomacy the problem, seen in retrospect, was a test of ability first to establish an atmosphere of confidence despite differing political goals, then to fashion a step-by-step control program, keved to common interests, which could serve as a basis for productive negotiation. From the perspective of the Science, Technolog}^, and American Diplomacystudy series, it was a major test of the capacity of the United States to use its scientific, technological, and diplomatic expertise in concert to solve a crucial world problem. How the Case Developed Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been demonstrated to the world, the Truman Administration acted to create public understanding of the bomb and its significance for the United States. The Smyth report, containing a great deal of previously classified, basic scientific information, Avas released in August 1945; the President took initial steps toward enunciation of U.S. atomic energy policy in two major addresses in October. On November 15 the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom laid a foundation for international action to control atomic energy in the Three Nation Agreed Declaration. In December the Soviet Union was made a party to the endeavor in the signing of the Moscow Declaration. Earlier that month Assist- ant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed to liead a committee to report to the Secretary on U.S. policy for international control. In January 1946, the United Nations Atomic Eneigy Com- mission (UNAEC) was created, and a Board of Consultants headed by TVA Chairman David Lilienthal was formed to assemble technical advice for the Acheson committee. The findings of the Acheson com- mittee and the Board of Consultants (which came to be known as the Acheson-Lilienthal report) were released in March 1946. In the same month, Baruch vcas appointed to represent the United States in the UNAEC. The plan which Baruch presented to the UNAEC on June 14, 1946, was a combination of his own ideas on international control of atomic energy and the proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal report. A central feature of the plan was an international organization to which would be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. The plan also called for inspection and for making violations of the control agreement subject to punishment, and a proposal that the veto power in the Security Council would not apply in voting on sanctions, in a counterproposal on June 19, the Soviet Union rejected the idea of waiving the veto and urged a total prohibition of atomic weapons, promotion of peaceful development of atomic energy, and agreement on international control but with retention of full sovereign 1523 freedom of action. Ilowevei-, Soviet neo;otiators stopped short of suggesting an actual procedure. There was thus from the outset a wide gulf between the U.S. plan and the Soviet approach, a gulf that never appreciably narrowed. The work of the UNAEC proceeded for less than 4 years; a majonty plan based on the U.S. proposals was accepted, 40-6-4, in a nonbincl- ing U.N. General Assembly resolution, but rejected (by Soviet veto) in the Security Council; by November 1949, the work of the UNAEC had waned to the point where the General Assembly agreed to suspend its activities. U.S. Involvement As suggested above, President Truman sought at the outset to develop a broad base of understanding and participation in the process of achieving international control of atomic energy. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, asked by Truman to appoint a group to consider both domestic and international control needs, brought leading scientists together with key Government officials in the Secretary of War's Interim Committee in May 1945. Vannevar Bush, eminent scientist-engineer-administrator, and General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan project which had developed the atom bomb, were members of the Acheson committee formed in December 1945, along with Har\'ard President James B. Conant and former Assistant Secre- tary of War John McClo3^ The Board of Consultants appointed to advise the committee consisted of TVA Chairman David Lilienthal, New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. president Chester Barnard, Manhattan project participant Harry A. Winne (an engineer and a vice president of the General Electric Co.), and physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, who had directed the Manhattan Project weaponry installation at Los Alamos. The Acheson-Lilienthal report which resulted from meetings of these two groups identified the basic technological factors that would affect the development of an international control system antl outlined a control plan governed by those factors. The delegation named to present the U.S. position to the United Nations was of a different character. With financier Baruch were three leading bankers, the head of the New York State Racing Commission, and a scientific adviser who had served in that role with General Groves. Baruch contributed a reputation for political acumen: it was apparently hoped that he could help enlarge the administration's freedom of action in international negotiations because he had the confidence of Congress, which was concerned about giving away secrets and thereby undermining the U.S. strategic position. There appear to have been significant diflferences in perspective between those who developed the recommendations for a policy of international control of atomic energy, representing mainly a technical approach, and those who were responsible for conducting the diplo- matic negotiations to implement the emerging policy. In any case, con- tact between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups ended after a few meetings. There was fault on both sides: Baruch resented open pubhcation of the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he asserted that he would introduce his own ideas into the negotiations and con- duct them in his own way; the members of the Acheson committee and the Board of Consultants declined to serve under Baruch, partly on the grounds that they wanted to retain the right to speak out in opposition if Baruch pursued policies with which they disagreed. 1524 Role of Congress Congress played no direct role in the negotiations but exercised a restraining influence. At the time of the December 1945 conference which resulted in the Moscow Declaration, Senator Arthur Vanden- berg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other Members of Congress repeatedly sought and received assurances from the President that the United States would not release atomic energy information before adequate safeguards were established. This pro- tective attitude was heightened by the revelation in early 1946 of evidence of espionage activities in Canada involving the transmission of atomic energy information to the Soviet Union. Outcome The collapse of the Baruch plan negotiations was a costly diplomatic failure. It would be idle to speculate on the consequent diversion of resources from peaceful uses to armament expenditures. More con- sequential still is the question of how the pattern of cooperation established through a diplomatic success in this critical problem area might have altered the course of postwar political developments. Decisive agreement on an international control system might have put an end to the uncertainty which has prevailed ever since: the paradoxical uncertainty of escalating military power in conjunction with waning security.^" Further, an early agreement might have laid the groundwork for the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy almost a decade earlier than it in fact occurred, and on a wider scale — thereby, among other things, possibly heading off or making more manageable the present complex economic, energy, and diplomatic situation with respect to oil. But apart from the uses of nuclear power itself, a successful conclusion to the Baruch plan negotiations could have provided an influential precedent — somewhat as the IGY did a decade later, but in a more direct iatergovernniental context — for the acceleration of international cooperative activity of many kinds. It is conceivable, in short, that it might have averted or mitigated the course of the Cold War, Assessment What were the reasons for the failure? One way of summmg them up is to concede that the American political leaders and scientists involved did not bring to bear the vision and persistent effort de- manded by a problem of this extraordinary nature and magnitude. In more specific terms, some of the elements of the failure were the following: — There was a basic contradiction in the U.S. negotiating position. The United States had demihtarized in haste after World War II, whereas the Soviet Union had maintained very sub- stantial forces in combat readiness. This factor argued for retention of the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons as long as ID Various oljservers have commented on this paradox. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 26, 1973, Dr. Herbert York— Chancellor of the University of California at San Diego, and previously Director of Defense Research and Engineering— noted that "ever since shortly after World War II, the military power of the United States has been steadily increasing; over the same period the national security of the United States has been rapidly and inexorably diminishing." (Technical Information for Congress, p. 220.) On May 14, 1968, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown declared: "There can be no successful aggression Ijy means of strategic war today." (Thf Kvolutinn nf Inlinmlional Tcchnolngti, \ ol. II, p 630) Earlier, in lO'i", Dr. Henry Kissinger liad written in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policji: Ihc destructiveness of modern weapons dei)rives victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. {Iliid., p. 629.) 1525 ]:)Ossible — a consideration that was as much in tlio minds of t]io Soviet leaders as it was a concern of the administration and the Congress. Yet the American leadership realized, and stated ])ublicly, that the secret could not be kept for long. Therefore, it was necessary to move quickly and comprehensively to estab- lish international controls. Paradoxically, the U.S. approach — in particular, the fact that the United States repeatedly asserted its intention of relinquishing atomic weapons but never reached the point of defining the conditions and timing of what it would consider acceptable controls — apj^ears to have underlined the U.S.S.R.'s suspicion that it was the American purpose to retain essential control while giving the appearance of vesting it in an international body. — There was calculated ambiguity in the Soviet position. Gen- uinely suspicious of the United States, the U.S.S.R. substituted statements of principle for concrete plans while it continued its own atomic weaponry i)rogram which was to prove much further advanced than most American scientists and diplomats sus- pected at the time. In retrospect, the fact of understandable — and at least partly justified — Soviet suspicions may argue that the United States should have adopted a more conciliatory, patient, and persistent negotiating posture. — Certain features of the U.S. proposals which some considered essential to an effective control system — notably those concern- ing limitation of national sovereignty, inspection, and waiver of veto in the Security Council in matters of punishment for violations of a control agreement — were totally imacceptable to the Soviet Union. The question arises as to whether these points were in fact essential to a control plan and as to the extent to which they prevented meaningful negotiation. A i)ossible alternative approach in the U.S. poHcymaking process might have been first to determine what among the basic technological and political requirements of an effective control system each side would accept, and then try to estabhsh some common ground between the two positions. A willingness to proceed on this basis might at least have emphasized good faith and signaled an under- standing that each side had its special political problems to resolve.'^ — There were conflicts in the relationships and respective roles of the American scientists and diplomats. Although the diplomats carried the action, with the scientists in a limited advisory role, it was the technology of atomic energy which set the scope and tone of the negotiations. Disagreements were couched in tech- nological terms. Actually, they reflected political differences, but the diplomats failed to deal with them accordingly. At the same time, scientists who were in a position to influence policymakers in the United States and in the UNAEC failed to recognize the problems of feasibility of control in the context of emerging post-war political relationshiDS. " On the other hand, it is of course possible to speculate that nothing could have induced the Sd viet leaders to compromise on what they considered key issues, as long as (a) the U.S.S.R. lacked atomic weapons and therefore remained in a weak bargaining position, and (b) the leadership believed it either certain or strongly possible that the U.S.S.R. would soon develop its own atomic bomb. 1526 One of the factors which set the stage for faihire was the over- estimation by U.S. leaders of the tactical advantage which monopoly possession of atomic weapons gave the United States. ^^ As the author, Leneice N. Wii, observes: While pxclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a scientific discovery may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear energy, the principal disadvan- taged country was able to duplicate the discovery of fission and to create a rudimentary initial technology sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device while the negotiations were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators apparently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a comfortably long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus [one] lesson from this study is that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once the application of a new technology has been forcefully demonstrated before the world as in the case of the atomic bombs, to prevent other nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. i' Whatever the reasons for failure of the Baruch plan negotiations, they were characterized by insufficient teamwork and discontinuous involvement of technologists in the diplomatic process. Possibly Presidential and congressional encouragement of a continuing dialog between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups could have helped to shape a U.S. position capable of contributing to a successful conclusion of the negotiations. But existing procedures and impetus were inadequate for dealing with the impact of a tech- nological development of this size and complexity. GENERAL LESSONS FROM THE STUDY This study of the Baruch plan negotiations suggests some general observations about the interrelationships of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. Among those noted by the author are the following: ^* — The creation and application of new technologies may so change relations among nations that a system of international control becomes desirable. Although probably the most dramatic example to date, nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last example of a technological innovation which suggests the need of international machinery and procedures for controlling it. (Some others are aviation, warships, supertankers, and communications satellites.) — Intense riv^ahies among different national interests may nevertheless tend to prevent the achievement of an appropriate international control system. ''Not even an awareness of the awesome destructive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient incentive to nations to agree on a secure form of control over atomic energy." '2 Anothfir contributing factor was the pervasive lack of understanding of the facts of atomic technology which prevailed at the time. The project director of this study series observes that after 30 years of exposure to atomic technology it is hard to recall how little was generally known about the subject in 1915. For even aliterateobserver of the political, military, and technical developments of that time, it took several readings of the Smyth Report to get the full import of the technology. It is unlikely that many Washington bureau- crats gave it as muoh as a single thorough reading. An informal random poll of 30 Washington professionals — mainly government— taken a few weeks after the Smyth report had been released and at a time when it had been much in the news, yielded only one person— a chemist— who had read it. This same source remarks that in a conversation he had at this time with General Groves, the director of the Manhattan District expressed complete confidence that the Soviets could not possibly produce an atomic weapon for at least 20 years. " Wu, Thv Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomaci/ Kritirs the Nuclear .Xgc. \o\. T, p. W'h i< Ibid., pp. 118-122. 1527 " — While exclusive possession of a new technology . . . may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage is likely to shrink quickly." Once a new technology has been demonstrated it is unrealistic to sup])ose that the secrets of how it is created can be kept for more than a very short time. — For scientists and technologists to work effectively with di})lomats toward the solution of complex political problems \vith important technical components, "the members of each field must express their respective j)oints of view fully and in terms which can be understood and api)lied by members of the other field. At the same time, there must be a special receptivity by members of each field and a special willingness to accommodate to the outlook of the other, in order to attain the ultimate goal." — Where the technological and political reahties which must be harmonized are in sharp conflict, a special effort is required of negotiators to see that all of the requirements to be reconciled are fully anal3'zed and taken into account. In the Baruch Plan negotiations, the dominant political reality was that an assurance of the end of the serious threat to Soviet military security posed by U.S. possession of the atomic bomb would have been necessary in exchange for renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of its own efforts to develop a nuclear weapon and accept international control. The dominant technological reality was that the processes associated with the ])eaceful and military uses of atomic energy were ap- l)roximately the same. "And it appeared from the outset that the security of a control system would have to be maintained through inspections of an exceedingly intrusive character. The Soviet Union was faced with this peculiar attribute of the technology of atomic energy which weighed heavily on the choices of a control system and which seriously challenged the closely guarded society of that country. To the United States, a major consideration . . . was how to penetrate the rigid secrecy of the Soviet Union in order to prevent or detect its expected violation of the control system . . . The negotiations neglected to reconcile [the respec- tive national security requirements of the two countries] with these dominant technological and political factors of atomic energy in order to attain adequate and acceptable international control." ■ — ^Perhaps a guiding assumption among policymakers and negotiators alike was that the technological necessities of effective control would force acceptance of that control. But in reality, the drive to devise effectiveness in the control system seems to have ignored, if not to have defied, the need for special diplomatic efforts to achieve acceptability. "The area of acceptability re- ceived little if any consideration in U.S. policy discussion." Underpinning the U.S. approach were "a moralistic attitude which characterized the U.S. negotiating technique, arrogance generated by the notion of U.S. leverage, or prejudice toward Soviet science and technology. . . ." — In summary: "It is clear that while science and technology alone could devise a control system which would be efficient in its task, and diplomacy could provide the fundamentals for an effective system to protect national securit}^, only a combination 1528 of tlie elements from science, teclmology, and diplomacy could be expected to devise a workable system for control which would be acceptable to the leading nations of the world." Anthor^s Reassessment The author of the study made the followins: comments 3 years after the study was completed (summer 1972) : There appears to have been a general acceptance b}^ Congress of Baruch as a competent negotiator in this area, an acceptance which might not be as forthcoming today. The question is still relevant: to what extent does Congress have a voice in, or can it effectively raise questions regarding, the selection of a chief arms control negotiator? In retrospect, and in light of developments since 1946, it would seem appropriate for Congress to intensify its efforts to insure that persons nominated for such critical diplomatic assignments as the negotiation of arms control agreements were not unduly subject to a particular professional, bureaucratic, special-interest, or other bias. NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT Although Congress had expressed an anxious determination to retain the "secret" of the atomic weapon — a goal which has since proven impossible — there was little congressional involvement in the Baruch plan negotiations. Was the reluctance in Congress during 1974 ^* to transfer peaceful nuclear technology similarly based on the notion that blocking this action would prevent the spread of weapons technology? There is a greater need now than ever for Congress to become intimately familiar with facts of nuclear technology, its military and peaceful uses, and the vital question of accelerating proliferation versus international controls. However, the issue of controlling nuclear energy presents a much more complex set of circumstances now than it did in 1946. Congress is called on to understand defense needs in the field of increasingly complex and costly strategic weapons. Current arms control negotia- tions, especially SALT, require congressional decisions to support or reject a specific arms control program. In the face of growing demands for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to overcome the energy shortfall in many parts of the world, and with the offers of U.S. nuclear assistance to Egypt and Israel last year and the addition of India to the nuclear club, Congress has seen the need for, and sought, solutions to the problems of nuclear proliferation. Further, in relation to such developments as the Vladivostok accords,^® Congress will increasingly be called on to make timely " As Wu states in a chapter on Arms Control and Disarmament in Congress and Foreign Policy: 197^ (prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service; Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 15, 1975, p. 23): "A major issue in the Congress [in 1074] arose over the offer of U.S. assistance in the field of nuclear technology to both Eygpt and Israel, during President Nixon's visits there in Jime. The primary concern in Congress was the arms control implications: whether safeguards were adequate to prevent diver- sion to weapons use, and whether such moves might contribute ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuclear device m May by India, using nuclear material provided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful uses." The author adds that congressional concern for control was eventually translated into a number of different pieces of legislation. '• I.e., the agreement in principle signed by President Ford and Soviet party leader Brezhnev at Vladi- vostok in December 1974. The two leaders agreed to numerical ceilings on the offensive weapons systems of each country. The S A LT teams of negotiators of both countries were to attempt to translate the statement into a treaty by late 1975, when Brezhnev was scheduled to visit the United States, an event which had b^n postponed several times. (As of niid-lOTV neither the treaty nor (he visit had materialized, but the negotia- tions were still in progress.] 1529 political and technical judgments contributing to U.S. decisions to accept or reject successive international arms control agreements. Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Congress is doing all it could and should do to come to grips with this greatest of con- temporary problems of the interface of science, technology, and diplomacy. Some IlhiMrative Questions Cases One and Two of the Science, Technolog}^, and American Diplo- macy study series both deal with the question of control of nuclear energy. The foregoing anal^'sis of Case One poses important questions for Congress. However, because The Baruch Plan deals with an early stage in American diplomatic experience with nuclear technology, and because the basic issues and their implications were more fully ex- plored in the decade between the Baruch Plan negotiations of 1946 and President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" initiative and related legis- lation of the mid-1950s, the questions suggested by this study are combined with those following the analysis of Case Two, (See Vol. I, pp. 536-539.) CASE TWO— COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER IN EUROPE : THE INTER- ACTION OF DIPLOMACY WITH A NEW TECHNOLOGY " Statement of the Case A second major U.S. diplomatic initiative in the post-World War II effort involving foreign policy and atomic energy was President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal, conveyed in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953.'^ This time the emphasis was on nonmilitar}^ applications, but the underlying goal remained the same: to avert atomic military buildup by diverting nuclear materials to peaceful uses, and to provide a forum for some cooperation between the United States and Soviet spheres of influence. The new initiative was successful in furthering the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, thereby serving a secondary U.S. policy objective. Whether, on balance, it contributed to the primary aim is less evident, for the nuclear arms race continued at a frightening pace. At best, it ma}' be said to have helped establish patterns of international cooperation and formal agreement on controls and safe- guards which might some day carry over into the area of military applications. At worst, it may be judged to have encouraged nuclear technology transfer, without first achieving reliable international safeguards, to the point at which responsible nations adhering to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may one day — perhaps soon — be subject to pressures to withdraw and make their own bombs as defense against nonadhering nations. Proliferation of nuclear power technology and industry also increases the possibility that outlaw groups will come to possess nuclear arsenals. Importance of the Case The Baruch Plan of 1946 had failed to achieve agreement to arrest the development of a nuclear arms race before it could get started. By the time of the Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace" message the " U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe: The Inter- action of American Diplomacy With a New Technology, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- ments by Warren H. Donnelly, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. See Vol. I, pp. 123-292. "8 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 1530 Soviet Union had assembled its own stockpile of Hiroshima-type atom bombs and had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile, several "People's Republics" had been established in Eastern Europe and China, South Korea had been invaded, attempts to form a European Defense Community had not worked out, and international disarmament negotiations were deadlocked. ^^ Moreover, the Kremlin had pressed a vigorous and considerably successful diplomatic and propaganda offensive to persuade the world that nuclear weapons were not decisive, that they nevertheless were especially horrible and should be banned, and that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the lead in developing nonmilitary applications of atomic energy. ^^ The principal U.S. reaction to the frustrations of this period of strategic setbacks and declining nuclear advantage was to threaten massive retaliation with nuclear weapons against Communist aggression. Another reactive policy was the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. "With- in the United Nations, the response . . . was instantaneous and favor- able. The speech was scored as a victory for the United States in international affairs by undercutting a persuasive Communist propa- ganda offensive. . . ." ^^ Historically, the proposal represented a unique and constructive attempt to shift the emphasis in utilizing a significant new technology away from its military potential and toward its peaceful applications: It signaled the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts to create an international atomic energy agency; American encouragement to two European regional, multinational agencies for nuclear energy; establishment of a network of bilateral agreements between the United States and individual nations for technical assistance in nuclear energy; and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of nuclear energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes for research and for diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demonstration of nuclear power for the generation of electricity. Underlying the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing U.S. nuclear science and technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of advantages to the United States.22 "o'- In the most consequential way, probably, of any of the 12 studies in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy series, this case (together with the preceding one on the Baruch plan) raises questions as to what diplomatic courses of action in fact are, in the long run, most advantageous to the U.S. national interest in dealing with a potent new technology. How the Case Developed The international activity most directly associated with atoms for peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was established July 29, 1957, as an international organization within the framework of the United Nations. It continues to report annually to the U.N. General Assembl}^ and, on occasion, to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. i« Ibid., p. 150. 20 Henry A. Kissinger, Nudiar Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York, published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Bros., 1957: pp. 363-364. 21 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 151-152. 22 Ibid, p. 150. 1531 PURPOSES OF THE IAEA In his December 1953 message, President Eisenhower had proposed an international body with four main purposes: encouraging worldwide investigation into peaceful uses of fissionable materials; cutting back on atomic weapons stockpiles; advertising to all nations the desire of the great powers to satisf}^ human aspirations rather than build up armaments; and opening up a new channel for peaceful discussion of the many difficult problems facing the world. What resulted after more than 3 years of negotiations was an international statute which specified the following qualified goal for the IAEA: The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall insure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its super- vision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. Dr. Donnelly comments: "As 'military purpose' is nowhere defined m the statute, the mission of the International Agency is general enough to accomplish as little or as much as the member nations might desire ".^^ The IAEA was expected to develop a system of international safe- guards for nuclear materials. This most difficult issue posed the dilemma of satisfying the general demand for a credible system of inspection and control in the face of the reluctance of the nonnuclear nations to surrender any sovereign rights to permit inspection by an international agency. The Soviet Union took the side of sovereign rights and has since continually opposed international inspection.^* The final compromise reached was to restrict safeguards to IAEA projects and projects voluntarily placed under the IAEA safeguards system, EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The two European regional organizations directly and indirectly influenced in their origins by the Atoms for Peace initiative were the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (The latter, originally known as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation or OECC, includes in its membership the United States, Canada, and Japan.) Euratom was established by the Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, to further development of nuclear power in the European Economic Community — France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. An underlying broader goal was economic integration of Europe. Setting out ambitiously to create a European nuclear technology and power industry, the Community sought the advice of outstanding European technologists. The result was a report, "A Target for Euratom," which "combined the factors of energy and economic policy into a compelling argument for European atomic integration." 23 Ibid., p. 178. 2< Departing from this position only briefly in 1963 at one stage of the negotiation of the Ir>ort of flip Pro'^iflpnt of tlie Conferoncp, Swpdi=h TTnrior Spprntary of State Tnia Thoi-sson, as inserted by Senator Edward Kennedy in the Congressional Record for July 30, 1975, p. Sl44*)2- "Wl^.at vas a failure was not tliP conferenee. but the way in which the superpowers proved them- spIvps unable to show the world not only their genuine will but also their capacity for disarmament. They did notmakeacontributionof slrenKtheningtheNPTreginie." (2) Letterfrom Colgate University Professor of Peace Studies Alan Geyer to Senator Hnliert H. Humphrey as inserted by the latter in the Congrrssinnal Tlrcord for Jnup 3, 197.5. p. S93S3: ". . . it is painfully clear that the ioint United States-Soviet line here (in Ceneva, May 10, li)7.'i] is to downgrade the conference and to stonewall any pressures to reverse their own mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race." (3) Arms control and disarmament specialist Thomas A. HalstPd's "Rpport from Geneva" in .4r)».<: Control Todnri, June 1975. p. 1-3 ". . . the Gonfereni-e undpr- scored the fact that for the most part the Treaty has been an effective instrument for facilitating access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where the Treaty— and the R^'view Conference— continue to fall short remains in the harder questions of security. . . ." 1538 — Despite the importance of a nuclear safety function for the IAEA, radiation safety guides are confused and apparently over- lapping. In Europe there are standards issued by both the IAEA and Euratom. The United Nations has continued its Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation rather than transfer the committee's functions to the IAEA. Meanwhile, the latter's role in setting standards for the construction and opera- tion of nuclear ])ower])lants is dormant. (Vol. 1, ]>. 194) ■ — Euratom's nuclear supply function has not grown as origi- nally expected. The safeguards function, in contrast, has been per- formed effectively and has demonstrated the practicability of international inspection. (Vol. T, p. 216) —The Safeguards Committee which the IAEA created in 1970 was open to all member states of the Agency, in recognition of the general interest in safeguards and the desire of nonweapons mem- ber nations to participate directly in developing safeguards agreements. The committee met intensively over many months and issued three reports covering all aspects of the proposed agreements. Nearly 50 delegations, very different in character, were involved. A British member of the IAEA Board of Gover- nors who participated commented on the moderate, compromising spirit and friendly atmosphere which prevailed: "Informal con- sultation came to count for more and more in our work; and when we got back to the Board room even the intractable problems had been [more or less worked out]." (Vol. I, p. 272) — ^Atoms for Peace has been unique as an example of inter- national cooperation in scientific helds, in that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy came about as the result of deliberate decision of governments rather than of scientific communities. Among its other accomplishments, it has provided mechanisms for working on health, safety, and en- vironmental j)roblems which cross national boundaries. (Vol. I, pp. 156-157) — Assuming that it is in the best interests of the United States and of world peace to see the Nonproliferation Treaty operate at full effectiveness, and granting that the bilateral agreements have provided the United States with certain benefits, it may be time to reexamine the respective roles of bilateral agreements and the IAEA with a view to possibly channeling more aid through the latter as a means of strengthening it. (Vol. I, p. 175) — Altliough the IAEA evolved out of the discovery of fission by scientists, the scientific community had relatively little part in the negotiations. An eminent European nuclear scientist complained in 1960 that "Scientists do not generally know what an enormous effort lies behind the creation of a full-fledged in- ternational agency. They also do not know what an irresistible momentum lies in international organizations ... it is practi- cally impossible to terminate one [and it i^^] therefore onl}' a question of the degree of usefulness of these indestructible giants which can be influenced . . . the scientists and technologists of the world . . . have not as a group realized the potential power of the instrument created, and have failed to follow up with . . . speaking or writing about the duty of scientists . . . we have not even tried to influence the selection of representatives of our countries for' important j)ositions in the Agencv organs." (Vol. I, p. 179) 1539 — If the IAEA had evolved in tlie direction indicated by the Atoms for Peace proposal, it could have had a major influence on development of commercial nuclear energy in Europe as a channel for technical assistance and nuclear materials. However, because of cold war tensions, the United States chose not to promote the Agency as a distributor, or custodian of a pool, of nuclear materials; neither did it support an international regula- tory role for the Agency in the design and operation of nuclear powerplants. On the other hand, the Agency provided a forum in which United States and Soviet representatives could meet in a relatively friendly atmosphere at a time when most contacts between the two countries were strained and formal, if not hostile. (Vol. 1, pp. 201-202) — The experience of Euratom illustrated a diplomatic reality: the poUtical cohesion of members of an international technologi- cal undertaking is a prerequisite to its success, not simply a desirable byproduct. As a corollary, the troubles of Euratom's R. & D. programs illustrate also how the cohesive force of inter- nationalism in science may not be strong enough to withstand the divisive forces of national commercial interests. (Vol. I, p. 214) — A tenet of modern management, private or public, is that an organization must plan ahead, particularly organizations that seek to create and apply new technologies. (Vol. I, p. 214) — The Treaty of Kome is silent on the issue of environmental protection. Euratom has no statutory functions of ascertaining and controlling the environmental effects of nuclear power and fuel reprocessing plants. (Vol. I, p. 221) — Euratom and the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency overlap in many of their interests and activities. Euratom's usefulness appears to be handicapped by the dispersion of human and financial resources of its member states between its own pro- grams and those of the NEA and IAEA. (Vol. I, p. 222) — Moves toward European unity such as the establishment of Euratom have been eroded by a wave of nuclear nationalism. Euratom's successes have come in activities which were linked to the competitive status of the national nuclear industries of France, Italy, and West Germany. Inability to form a common European approach to nuclear technology has proved advan- tageous to the U.S. nuclear industry [but perhaps at the expense of long-range U.S. national goals and interests]. (Vol. I, p. 224) — The lessons of the diplomatic effort of organizing joint U.S.- Euratom programs for nuclear power production could point the way toward future joint ventures to develop other new power sources, such as large-scale use of solar energ}^ (Vol. I, p. 2.38) — From World War II to Sputnik, U.S. world technological leadership went unchallenged and was sustained in large part by advances in nuclear science and technology. Rather than seek to monopolize this leadership, the United States offered and supplied technological assistance to many countries, especially in Europe, to develop their own use of nuclear power. During the late 1960s, U.S. world leadership was challenged by other nations. Looking to the 1970s and to an era of greater peaceful rather than military competition, there are several fundamental 1540 issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with future U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort, or would the required financial and other resources be more profit- ably dedicated to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S. technological leadership be more than offset by economic losses through competition from other countries receiving U.S. tech- nological assistance? Most important of all, are there any sig- nificant risks and dangers from the standpoint of U.S. national security in continued U.S. support of foreign nuclear power development? (Vol. I, p. 286) Diversity of outlook and experimental approach can lead to weak- ness or vulnerability when the danger is either unclear or not imminent. The potential for extreme danger in nuclear proliferation has been clear enough to American diplomatic and congressional leaders from the outset, but not the imminence of that danger. Reaction to this threat has been slow in coming. Although man}^ voices compete in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, there is relatively free play for influential expression of the views of strong individuals (as Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, for example) unchecked by sustained and sober analysis of the technological miplications of any given proposal regarding nuclear energ3^ There is, in short, no central governmental machinery for technology assessment in the nuclear field comparable to the Office of Technology Assessment with its mandate in other areas, Further- more, OTA is a mechanism of the Congress. There would appear to be a compelling need for centralized institutional machinery and procedures in the executive branch to provide impartial, measured, and long-rang-e assessments of all nuclear energy developments or proposals (or needed initiatives) affecting U.S. national interests and international security.^'^ It would follow that development of counter- part oversight machinery, possibly involving in part an extension of the OTA mandate, should be considered by the Congress. Author's Reassessment Author Warren H. Donnelly comments retrospectively as follows: Beginning with the explosion of the atom bomb over Hiroshima in August 1945 U.S. diplomac}^ was doubly affected b}^ the discover}^ of nuclear fission. The military use of atomic energy became a mainstay of U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the mid- 1950s the civil uses of nuclear power appeared promising enough for U.S. diplomacy to back efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy to create international and regional atomic organizations for this purpose. With the late 1960s and early 1970s the imperatives of nuclear weapons led to international treaties and agreements and to the strategic arms limitations talks. During these years, U.S. diplo- macy also assisted the domestic development of nuclear power by helping to open markets for the infant U.S. nuclear industry and to provide opportunities to demonstrate nuclear power abroad before ^''^ Dr. DonneUy comments (July 1977) that executive branch machinery for policy and management relating to civil uses of nuclear energy remains fragmented. The Department of State negotiates agreements for cooperation but the Energy Research and Development Adinlnstratlon (ERDA) administers the arrangements under them; the Nuclear Reguatory Commission regulates safety and some environmental aspects of nuclear energy, as well as exports of nuclear materials and equipment. ERDA regulates exports of some, but not all, nuclear technology. ERDA Is also developing new or Improved nuclear technologies but Is not supposed to promote them. The Environmental Protection Administration is expanding its regulatory role for nuclear power, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Is trying to promote development of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles. 1541 its introduction in tlie United States. On the whole, the discovery and use of atomic energy has afforded the United States new sources of leverage for its diplomacy, complicated the conduct of that diplomacy^, and in many ways fmidamentally changed relations between major world powers. By mid- 1977, however, foreign progress in nuclear technology and the inability of the United States to sign new contracts for enrichment service had begun to erode U.S. influence. RELEVANCE OF STUDY THEMES TODAY The main themes of the study of this case appear to be as relevant in mid-1977, or more so, than at the time of writing in the latter half of 1972. Events and factors influencing today's themes include: — The oil embargo of 1973-74, followed b}^ the enormous price rise in Middle East oil, which reawakened foreign interest in nu- clear power, particularly in the United Kingdom, Europe, and Japan. Conventional wisdom (which a healthy skepticism may temper) now assumes that by the year 2000 as much as half of the electricity used by these countries will come from nuclear power- plants. Their development of strong nuclear industries will have implications for future U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. — The detonation of a nuclear explosive device by the Gov- ernment of India on May 18. 1974, which provided a strong reminder that countries other than the leading industrial ones can, if they wish, acquire a capability to make a few nuclear weapons. There is some concern, for example, that South Korea may try to make nuclear weapons if the United States withdraws its ground forces. — The congressional concern expressed in 1974 over the ade- quacy of nonproliferation conditions for then proposed bilateral agreements between the United States and Iran, Israel, and Egypt to help them acquire and use the technology for nuclear power . production ; over arrangements between AVest Germany and Brazil for the former to supply the latter with nuclear powerplants and a factory to recover plutonium from used fuels ; and over a French contract to supply fuel reprocessing plants to South Korea and Pakistan. — The May 1975 NPT review conference in Geneva, which stim- ulated interest in many of the subjects covered in the study. — The 1974 cutoiT of new enrichment supply contracts by the Atomic Energy Commission (functions now assumed by ERDA), which revived foreign interest in nuclear enrichment plants and damaged the credibility of the United States as a reliable source of enrichment services. — President Carter's early nonproliferation initiatives to dis- courage world use of plutonium as a fuel and to provide terminal storage of spent fuel without reprocessing. With the benefit of 5 years of hindsight, Dr. Donnelly says that if he were to rewrite this report he would give more attention to : — The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in international nuclear safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and U.S. support of that role. — The interaction between the IAEA and Euratom in the carrying out of nuclear safeguards, because of the anticipated importance of regional international organizations in the future. 1542 ^—Extension of the concept of safeguards from simply detecting and announcing diversion or theft of nuclear materials to in- clude the prevention of theft and recovery of stolen materials. — Whether the influence gained by the United States' long- standing but now diminished role as the principal free-world supplier of enriched uranium has justified the cost, and whether it is in the U.S. interest to expand the Nation's capacity to make enriched uranium sufficiently to maintain a free world monopoly. — The effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic efforts to persuade nu- clear supplier countries to limit their exports of dangerous nu- clear products and technology. — International or multinational organization and operation of nuclear fuel service facilities. — Whether commercial use of plutonium is inevitable and, if so, the implications of a plutonium economy for national and international safeguards. SOME LESSONS FROM THE STUDY OF COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER The subject of commercial nuclear power in Europe continues to be particularly illustrative of the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy. This interaction is highlighted by such matters as the further favorable development of the gas centrifuge, the new prospects of laser enrichment of uranium, the possibility of transfrontier pollu- tion from nuclear powerplants, demands that international nuclear safeguards be strengthened, and prospects for more vigorous inter- national cooperation to develop the breeder reactor. Further prolifera- tion of weapons-making ability, as well as attempts to halt such proliferation, will place great strains upon American diplomats and their diplomacy. Another complication is the congressional quest for a greater influence in the negotiation of international agreements for cooperation. American experience suggests that international cooperation in energy production and similar high-technology enterprises should give less attention to technologies approaching commercial application and emphasize longer-term ventures in their early stages — as nuclear energy was until recently and as solar energy, fusion, or ocean heat research are now. The author also states that he would now give much more attention to the impact of nuclear safeguards upon diplomacy, in anticipation of commercial use of the breeder reactor. The long-term future of nuclear power may depend upon success of the breeder reactor. If the breeder succeeds, it will greatly increase the amount of energy re- coverable from world uranium and thorium resources. But it will also introduce great quantities of plutonium and uranium-233 into inter- national commerce; the control of which will pose many new problems for diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts view these problems as so un- solvable that they favor barring use of the breeder both in the United States and elsewhere. Legislative Implications The study identified a number of issues for congressional considera- tion, most of which have legislative implications. Slightly updated, these include: 1543 — Sustaining U.S. international leadership in nuclear tech- nology in the 1970s. — Reducing United States, European, and Japanese depend- ence upon imported oil. — Controlling the possibilities for nuclear proliferation. — Demonstrating the practicability of international inspection for arms control. — Improving the U.S. position in world trade. — Assessing the implications of domestic opposition to nuclear energy upon U.S. diplomacy. — Maintaining a competitive position for the United States in the world market for nuclear goods and services. — Cooperating in international efforts to control environmental effects of nuclear power. — Developing international safety and environmental protec- tion standards for nuclear powerplants. — Protecting the U.S. position in uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing. — Establishing criteria for export of U.S. nuclear products and technology. — Establishing sanctions for violation of non-proliferation commitments. — Establishing multinational or international organizations to enrich uranium and to store spent fuel. Finally, the study identified two main lines of thought that the Con- gress might wish to pursue: the use of nuclear technology in U.S. diplomacy; and the use of diplomacy to advance nuclear technology. While separate, these lines do interact and that interaction should be systematically taken into account. The study also indicated a close interaction of U.S. domestic and foreign interests in commercial nu- clear power, which suggests that if recent efforts by Mr. Nader, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and others, to persuade the Congress to enact a moratorium on nuclear power reach the stage of legislation, the implications of such an act upon U.S. diplomacy would require analysis. Further, the study sought to highlight present and coming issues of international safeguards for nuclear power. To strengthen interna- tional safeguards would necessitate treaty changes, with attendant Senate advice and consent; both Houses would be involved with legis- lation to authorize and fund new or 'expanded U.S. agency activities to this end. Some Illustrative Questions Cases One and Two suggest an extensive catalog of questions which appear to warrant congressional concern. Because of the special ur- geny of the problems of nuclear energy utilization and control, they are given in some detail. CHANNELING OF U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR POWER In the light of current concern over risks of theft of nuclear materials, should the United States seek renegotiation of the NPT to deemphasize this commitment and deliberately slow down technical assistance for nuclear power? If U.S. technical assistance should continue, would U.S. interests be best served by channeling this assistance through bilateral agreements with recipient countries, by supplying it through the IAEA? Conversely, which approach would seem most favored by the recipient nations? 1544 To what extent should U.S. technical assistance be limited to installation and operation of nuclear powerplants, with assistance for other parts of the nuclear power cycle to be avoided or withheld? To what extent should the United States unilaterally proceed to reserve exports of nuclear materials, products, information, and assistance to those nonweapons nations that agree to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards? What should be the i)articipotion of the private U.S. nuclear industry in negotiating and carrjing out bilateral arrangements — in particular, extension of present agreements on commercial u^e of nuclear power? How satisfactory is the present interworking of the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA). the State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration in nego- tiating and carrying out bilateral agreements? How consonant with national foreign policy have past bilateral agreements been? What shou'd be the I\S. jjosition in offering technical aid and assistance to Arab nations for nuclear power? To what extent should commercial exports of nuclear products, services, and technology by private organizations be required to conform to U.S. foreign policy, and how should this be done? What sht)uld be the role of Congress in review and appraisal of major ventures in nuclear cooperation or in export of nuclear powerplants and associated goods and services? THK INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY What should be the U.S. diplomatic position on proposals to establish and enforce international standards for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear i)owerpl:ints and other facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle that may present risks to the environment, to public health and safety, and to national and inter- national security? To what extent would channeling U.S. assistance exclusively through the IAEA strengthen that agency in general, and in its capabilities to provide effec- tive safeguards for nuclear materials? What should be the U.S. position on establishing and enforcing international regulations for transportation of fissionable and radioactive materials? What should be the U.S. position on extending international control of atomic energy to include location, design, construction, and operation of facilities that could cause transfrontier pollution in normal operations or in case of an accident? What would be the implications of U.S. participation in such arrangements for domestic regulation of nuclear energy? What would be the expected roles of the State Department, EIRDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and ADC A? If the United States abandons its position as the sole supplier of enriched uranium to the free world nuclear i)owerplants, would U.S. self-interest be served better by establishing additional production facilities in the IAEA or by encourag- ing national or regional ventures? To what extent would U.S. interests be served by having the IAEA locate, build and operate facilities to reprocess spent fuel, recover plutonium and depleted uranium, and store or manage long-term disposal of radioactive wastes? Considering questions about safeguards being raised by domestic critics of nuclear power, what would be the comparative benefits and drawliacks of U.S. diplomatic efforts to revive the Baruch-Lilienthal plan in part and make the IAEA the sole proprietor of fuel reprocessing plants and all facilities for making plutonium into nuclear fuel elements for use in domestic nuclear powerplants? The United States has offered voluntarily to place its domestic nuclear power industry under IAEA safeguards once hold-out nations have ratified the NPT. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of fulfilling that offer now without waiting Icmger for nations such as France, India, Israel, and mainland China to ratify? What would be the pros and cons of a U.S. policy to promote consolidation of various regional nuclear organizations into the IAEA? THE IAEA AS A To what extent is the idea of tlie IAEA as a testln-d for arms control inhiliited by tiie presence in tlie Agency of the Soviet Union V To what extent and in what ways eonld diplomacy protect IAEA operations from ideological contests? Is this a realistic goal to postulate? 1545 What has been learned from U.S. experience with the IAEA that could apply to other fields such as aviation, transfrontier pollution control, communications, or disease control? EURATOM To what extent should the United States seek to discourage Euratom and its member states from reprocessing spent fuel and recycling plutonium? To what extent should the United States encourage Euratom to build and oper- ate a uranium enrichment plant in Europe? To what extent should the United States attempt to recoup some of the national investment in nuclear energy through licensing fees, royalties or other charges, or exports of nuclear products and technologies? How long should the United States continue its commitment to supply nuclear power in Europe with enriched uranium? What would be the effects on U.S. foreign policv of a decision to end this commitment? What participation should the United States seek in the setting of standards by Euratom governing nuclear power plants and related facilities? How much of such participation should be assigned to the Department of State and ERDA? How much should be left to voluntary efforts of the U.S. nuclear industry? Should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand Euratom work in radioactive waste disposal and broaden U.S. participation in such work? To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to influence the Euratom breeder program, particularly towards developments that could provide a fallback if the U.S. breeder demonstration program should fail? How should available U.S. resources be divided among Euratom, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and the IAEA? What benetits would" accrue from U.S. diplomatic efforts to expand Euratom's programs and laboratories from nuclear energy to fuels and energy in general? JOINT ErRATOM-U.S. RESEARCH What did the United States learn from the Atomic Energy Commission's participation in the joint U.S. -Euratom research program? What were the strengths and weaknesses of the joint venture? What are the implications of these lessons for other joint ventures : for example, in fusion, solar energy, or synthetic fuels from coal? To what extent should and could joint ventures with Euratom be revived for radioactive waste management and disposal, development and demonstration of nuclear safeguards technologies, and development of new and improved ways of finding and enriching uranium? THE OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY Should U.S. diplomacy seek to combine Euratom with the NEA? What conclusions can be drawn from the comparative success of NEA relative to Euratom? U.S. NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES Should the United States seek to preserve its position as the sole supplier of enriched uranium to the free world? If so, what are the financial and other implica- tions of such a decision? What would such a decision imply as to demands on U.S. fuels to supply electricity for enrichment, and as to the environmental consequences of supplying such fuels? If the United States is prepared to relinquish its monopoly position, what al- ternatives would best suit U.S. interests: — National construction of enrichment facilities? — Regional organization to build and operate enrichment facilities? — International (IAEA) construction and operation? — Encouragement to the Soviet Union to expand its enrichment services? In retrospect, how useful and effective were U.S. efforts to hold back develop- ment of the centrifuge method of enrichment? To what extent are new enrichment technologies — for example, centrifuge, laser, nozzle, and other methods — likely to present a technological surprise and open the way to easy proliferation of foreign enrichment capabilities? What diplomatic options are open to the United States should the Soviet Union seriously enter the world market for supply of enriched uranium and reprocessing of spent fuels? 1546 THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SAFEGUARDS How close is the point of no return in the worldwide use of nuclear power bej'ond which it will not be possible to halt, slow down, or contain further growth? What are the potential implications for U.S. diploinacj- of: — A substantial theft or diversion of nuclear materials? — The successful use of stolen materials for purposes of terrorism, extortion, or foreign policy? What, if any, preparations should the United States be making now to respond to the situations of question (2)? What arc the potential implications for U.S. diplomacy' of: — An accident in a nuclear facility at home or abroad that causes large offsite injur}^ and contamination? ilffective safeguards will require extraordinary measures to learn about, pre- vent, or intercept thefts of nuclear materials, or to recover stolen materials. What is the U.S. assessment of the need for a world protective or police force with j^or- haps supranational powers to give safeguards credibility? Are safeguards important enough to the United States to induce it to accept the problems and risks of such a force — especially if its members incli;ded nationals from the Soviet Union, its satellites, and mainland China? To what extent should the United States in its bilateral and multilateral agree- ments extend safeguards terms and conditions beyond those expected of the IAEA under the NPT? W ithin the United States what are the respective safeguards fimctions, respon- sibilities, and authorities of the Department of State, the Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency, ERDA, the National Research Council (NRC), and the De- partments of Defense and Commerce? Who is responsible for coordination of these P'edcral activities? How are these activities coordinated with U.S. foreign policy? What level of international effort would be needed to assure reasonably effective safeguards in an international plutonium economy? How should this be financed? What should be the nature and extent of U.S. participation? Should the IAEA be transformed into a world nuclear safeguards agency V Should the safeguards function be transferred to a new, separate international agency with no other functions? To what extent should U.S. diplomacy seek to expand international safeguards to include phj^sical protection of nuclear materials, interception of attempts to steal materials, and recovery of stolen materials? Man}' developing countries appear to be less concerned with safeguards thnn with acquiring the benefits of nuclear power. How are the}' to be persuaded that the need for safeguards is not a "put-on" designed to serve the convenience of the nations which already have nuclear power? To what extent would placing U.S. nuclear fuel facilities for civil nuclear power under IAEA safeguards by voluntary action reduce or neutralize expressed fears and concerns of nonweapons nations that IAEA safeguards maj' violate their sovereignty, or put their nuclear industries at a disadvantage? CASE THREE— THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPHYSICAL YEAR^" Statement of the Case The Intenialional Geophj'sical Year or IGY (July 1, 1957-Decem- ber 31, 195S) was the most ambitious venture in international scientific cooperation in history-. Broadly speakin";, it had as its purpo-e the observation of phenomena relating to the entire Earth and evei'ylhing in and around it. It enlisted the services of tens of thousands of scientists and volunteer observei's from 07 nations, working at ^ome 8,000 observation stations around the wo.'ki. It yielded much scientific data, was attended by significant technological achievements, and stimulated other major international coopei alive efforts invohing science and technology in the years to follow. "' U.S. Congre.s.s, Uouse, Cornmittee on Foreign Affairs, The PoUficul legacy of ttu Intrrnntional Oin- pfiysical Year, a sttidy in the series on Science, Technolcpy, anhments in llie area of })(/iitics anil diplomacy weie al^o important. Among the latter: (1) the IGY, while generously supported by national governments, was successfully run by s(;ientists — for scien- tific and not for political purposes; (2) it nevertheless contributed to the diplomatic framework for later negotiations leading to such developments as the 1961 Antarctic Treaty, the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, and the 1967 Space Treaty; and (3) at least one IGY event did liave a powerful political impact, especially in the United States: The Soviet launching of Sputnik I. The iG Y's scientKic achievements included the acf|uisition and pub- lication of valuable data relating, among other things, to cosmic rays, geomagnetism, ionospheric ph3"sics, meteorology, oceanography, solar activity, and the upper atomosphere. The Antarctic was opened up to scientific exploration on a substantial scale. The outstanding technological development of the IGY — a develop- nrent which has been widely characterized as marking the world's entrance into the Space Age — was the launching of aitificial Earth satellites. Beyond making possible such important IGY scientific achievements as discovery of the Van Allen radiation belts, the use of satellites for scientific space probes opened "a new era of exploration and discovery which has progressed much more rapidly than could possibly have been foreseen during the IGY."^^ Progress has been so rapid and so extensive, indeed, as to raise the question of whether a second International Geoph^^sical Year might be appropriate for 1982-83. How the Case Developed ^^ A certain amount of intercountry and interregional scientific cooperation has long taken place in such activities as navigation and mapmaking. Not until the 18th century, however, did coordinated efforts by many observers at different locations begin to become common. These eft'orts were intensified during the 19th centiuy; for example, an international conference was held at Brussels in 1853 to facilitate coordinated weather observations at sea. Increased coopera- tion led to the formation of international scientific organizations in various fields, and then to the First International Polar Year (FPY) of 1882-83. During the FPY, scientists from 20 nations conducted studies in the high northern latitudes, with emphasis on surface meteorology, geomagnetism, and the aurora borealis. The success of their efforts led to the much larger undertaking, 50 years later, of the Second Inter- national Polar Year or SPY (1932-33). Scientists from 40 countries participated in the SPY; they concentrated on the same subjects that had occupied tlie FPY plus Earth-Sun relationships and atmos- pheric electricity. An important result of the SPY was increased knowledge of the ionosphere, which facilitated the development of radio communications. 3< Bullis, The Political Legacy nj the International deophysical Year. Vol. I, p. 327. '5 For a more detailed account of I he origins and development of the IGY, see: IT.S. Congress, Senate, International Cooperation and Organization for Outer Space, staff report prepared by Mrs. Eilene (Jalloway, Legislative Reference Service specialist and special consultant to the committee, for the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Senate Document No. 56. Washington, U.S. Government Printing OfHce, August 12, 1965: 353-373. 96-243 O - 77 1548 IGY CONCEPT REPLACES THAT OF TPY The success of the First and Second Polar Years, at intervals of 50 years, led to expectations that a Third International Polar Year (TPY) would be held in 1982-83. However, before even half of another 50-year period could elapse, it became apparent to some observers that the accelerating pace of technology and the fact that available basic data in the Earth sciences had been largel}^ exploited were making further international observation efforts desirable. Early in 1950 Lloyd V. Berkner ^e proposed that the TPY be held in 1957-58, 25 years after the SPY, and coinciden tally a period for which unusual solar activity was predicted. The idea was widely discussed among scientists and scientific organizations, and in May 1952 the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) established a special committee to take charge of planning for a Third Polar Year. Invitations to participate were sent to ICSU member nations and to the U.S.S.R. The response was only moderate, however, and included the suggestion from several scientific groups that the scope should be broadened to encompass worldwide phenomena rather than concentrating on the polar regions. ICSU considered the suggestion, and in October 1952 its general assembly approved the enlarged scope, which was reflected in a change of name from Third Polar Year to International Geophysical Year. The IGY concept gained quick acceptance throughout the world scientific community. The ICSU special committee was enlarged and designated as CSAGI (initials of the French version of Special Com- mittee for the International Geophysical Year) ; the Englisli scientist Dr. Sydney Chapman was named president and Berkner vice presi- dent. The number of countries represented at CSAGI meetings grew from 26 in 1953 to 67 in 1958. Enthusiasm for the IGY idea was not limited to scientists, but was, . . . shared by tho various gnvornmcnts concernrd, by heads of state, and by the public at large. This interest was aroused by the strong appeal of the ICiY as a cooperative venture representing many nations working together for the benefit of all mankind. Consequently, the collective response of the many legislative bodies and governments whose approval was necessary to make the program a success was on a far more generous scale than that prompted by any previous scientific enterprise. Governmental support consisted not onlj' of unprecedented financial contribu- tions, but also of equally valuable and necessary logistic support. Governments cooperated by facilitating the movement of participating scientists from one country to another, and in assuring prompt movement through customs of scientific equipment on which the various programs de]jended. . . . Wides])read interest in the IGY was aroused in the general public by numerous articles in the daily press and in popular magazines. Consequentlj', more was imdoubtedly known concerning the IGY than had been the case for any previous international scientific effort, and expectations were correspondingly raised. 3^ '* Author of thr 1050 Bcrknpr report on Riatr Dppartmcnt oreanization and stafTme for science and tech- nology. For a description of the report and its consequences, see: U.S. Congress, House. Committee on International Relations. Science and Technoloqy in the Department of State: Bringinq Technical Content Into DipUnnnlic Pniicy niid OpeTationn, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the SubconiTnittee on International Sectirity and Scientific Affairs by Franklin P. Iluddle, senior specialist in science and leclmology, Coiiere<;sioiial Research Service, Library of Congress, Wash- ington, U.S. Government Printing Ullicc, June I'JT.'i. Vol. \l, pp. 1342-1317. ■" Bullls, The Political I.cgacj of the International Geophysical Year. Vol. I, p. 30.3. 1549 IG^' programs wore selected mainly to assist in solving specific planetary- problems of the Earth, with emphasis on problems requiring concurrent observations at many points around the globe and coopera- tive efforts by many nations. These problems fell generally into three broad areas: tlie Earth as a structure, atmospheric and oceanic circula- tion, and upper atmosphere physics and solar-terrestrial relationships. The broad areas were divided into thirteen scientific areas — for exam- ple: oceanography, ionospheric physics, nuclear radiation — in which research would be concentrated. SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF IGY The scientific results were unprecedented: Tremendous masses of data were obtained during the IGY. For example, 17 tons of records were generated by American Antarctic stations alone. Triis dramatic out- pouring of information posed more questions than were answered. Borkner likened the situation to that of coming from outer space and finding a new planet. ^^ One commentator wrote that cosmic ray physics had emerged from the IGY as "the broadest ranging of all man's intellectual endeavors," encompassing not only the vast concepts of galaxies and intergalactic space but also the microcosm of atomic particles and forces. ^^ IGY investigations in the Antarctic showed that ice depths may extend to more than 14,000 feet. Much was learned concerning the elasticity of the Earth and its crust, and concerning the distribution of the Earth's mass. Additional valuable information affecting radio communications was acquired. Meteorological findings provided the ba.sis for better weather predictions and for long-range efforts to exercise some degree of control over weather. Experiments involving the explosion of small nuclear devices be- tween the Van Allen radiation belts represented the first time in history that worldwide measurements of a completely controlled geophysical phenomenon had been made simultaneously. Studies of ocean currents showed that ocean depths are very much in motion, and not stagnant; one related finding was that deep ocean trenches are unsuitable for the dumping of radioactive wastes, another that life — including fish and crustaceans — exists even in the ocean trenches of the Pacific at depths of almost 40,000 feet. Studies of solar activity raised the possibility that much thermal energy might be transferred to the Earth's atmos- phere through direct contact with the hot gases of the Sun's corona. Further, IGY research established that there is no definite end to the Earth's atmosphere — As far distant as 10 Earth diameters a substantial hydrogen atmosphere was found to exist, fading into the atmosphere of outer space itself, dominated by the effects of untold meteors, X-rays, ultraviolet light, protons, electrons, cosmic rays, and electric and magnetic fields. Thus, the upper atmosphere was found to be a place of considerable activity, affecting many phenomena on the Earth itself. Of tremendous interest was the discovery of the two Van Allen radiation belts, exist- ing as annular shrouds about the Earth, shaped by terrestrial magnetic fields. These belts of intense radiation were seen as important factors in determining and perhaps limiting man's future exploration of space.*" i> Ibid, p. 324. 33 Ibid, p. 324. o'l Spwe Scic'ico and Applications, House Science and Astro- nautics Committee, pursuant to H.R. 14978 and H.R. i:w81, Oct. 3, 4, and 9, 1974. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, 283 p. M Bullis, op. cit., pp. 341-342. 1555 Finally, there is highh^ suggestive evidonco that the new communications •channels, the tremendous cooperative spirit, and the increased understanding among participants of the 67 nations which took part in the IGY led directly to the Antarctic Treaty. Whether or nut the IGY can be credited in such strong terms, it clearly played an important part in helping shape that treaty, which in turn reinforced the cooperative pattern for the other treaties and agreements which v,'ere to follow. Just as scientists approach their objectives through a step-by-step process, so did politicians appear to approach these international objectives in similar fashion, with similar success. 5' Assessment How can the full significance of an undertaking as far-reaching in its ramifications as tlie IGY be measured? Perhaps, by way of caution — especially because, as Bullis notes, the record of the IGY as written by contemporary observers is full of exuberant praise but apparently lacking in significant critical reac- tion — the way to begin is with some negative considerations. He observes that it seems tmfortiniate in retrospect that the occasion of the IGY and its achievements was not systematically exploited in the United States to influence lasting ptiblic attitudes toward basic research : Unlike many of the activities of the K'.Y, which took place dramaticall.y in remote and exciting areas of the globe, basic research was a difficult area of scientific activitj' for the general public to understand and appreciate, and still remains so. Although the IGY was, to scientists, primarily an exercise in basic research, to the public it appeared largely a matter of polar adventures and space satellites. Thus, were such an effort proposed today, it would appear doubtful that it would receive widespread puljlic support unless the activities involved were sufficientlj' broadened so as to appeal to a wide variety of interests. ^^ Again in retrospect, the new emphasis in education on science and mathematics and on related curricuhun, test, and teaching reforms was not entirel}" beneficial: Science careers may have been made attractive to some students who lacked either the necessary qualifications or the sustained motivation required for such careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has pointed out, curriculum reform was largely undertaken for the wrong reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counter- parts," rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in which science was being taught. Thus, while the Sputnik motivation increased interest in science and made changes easier, the danger also existed that both interest and programs might collapse once the motivation subsided. ^^ In the context of the issue of the nuclear threat, possibly more sus- tained and serious attention should have been given to the Soviet pro- posal for a continuation of the IGY oiganization and procedures. The spirit of cooperation engendered b}' the IGY itself, reaching not only scientists but also the world's ])eoples and their political leaders at a time when the prevaiUng atmosphere was one of cokl war hostility, could perhaps have been captured and institutionalized in this way to bring lasting benefits of a still higher order of magnitude than those conferred by the IGY. Would the good will and flexibihty implicit in such a response to the Soviet initiative have eased Soviet suspicions of U.S. intentions in other areas, such as arms buildup, and made for earlier and more certain solutions to pressing cold war problems? Or, on the other hand, would tlie Soviet Union have attempted to convert 51 Ihid.. p. .358.. 5= Iliid., p. .33.".. 53 Ihid., pp. 338-339. 1556 the extended IG\ msiehinery into a front organization serving its own version of peace and progress? The answers to these questions are beyond the reach of the present study, but they would seem worthwhile for historians and long-range ])olicy planners to ponder. In any case, it is clear that what the IGY and its sponsors failed to to do was far outweighed by its accomplishments. Its outstanding achievements in science have been mentioned. On the organizational level, a formula was invented which mside possible the smooth and in- dependent functioning of a complex enterprise, under the lendership of scientists, with generous sup»port from many governments but a mini- mum of interference by them.''^ On the substantive side, although the IGY was primarily an exercise in pure science, it made brilliant use of contemporary technology; the scientific space prohes which opened a new era of exploration were only the most visible of many such uses. In the area of international cooperation, to cite one category of results, the same technology employed in the Eai'th satellite program required agreements among nations which subsequently smoothed the way for other agreements in related areas. There is, perhaps, a danger attending the euphoria generated by a great and successful enterprise in international cooperation like the IGY. Especially among scientists, for whom good will is an accus- tomed accompaniment to cooperation in scientific and techno- logical problem solving, there may be a tendency to underestimate the problems inherent in the political setting. On this theme, Bullis comments: One of the difficulties in attempting to transfer scientific methodology into political reality is suggested by Sullivan's observation that "science, in treating our planet as indivisible, is far ahead of politics, which treats it as two worlds." In view of today's multiple ideologies, "multiple worlds" might be a more appro- priate political designation. During the IGY, as a result of their common participa- tion in efforts which opened up to man not only Antarctica but outer space, scien- tists were said to have experienced unusually strong feelings of humility and brotherhood. These feelings served to reinforce the traditional attitudes most natural scientists develop as a result of sharing with others the common objective of unveiling nature's secrets. There is but one universe for scientists to study, and its singularity unites all scientific minds. Thus scientists tend to have fewer social problems since their research is generally focused upon common, well-defined objectives offering "a natural point of con- vergence, namely, the correct result." Unlike politicians, they are not engaged in conflict resolution as a profession and are not charged with responsibility for the protection of national interests in a competitive arena. Rather, the existence of a common, agreed-upon technical objective creates a tendency toward social cooperation despite all obstacles, a tendency which has become a characteristic of the international scientific community. ... ■ ■•«••• In view of the substantial differences between the scientific and politicnl communities in the kinds of problems they are respectivelj^ called upon to solve, prudence would suggest caution in looking for too bold a transfer of techniques from one comnumity to another. The IGY itself was apttlitical and closed ended whereas the political process is, a priori, political and open ended. Yet, politicians and scientists do share some important human characteristics. Politicians and governments, no less than scientists and scientific organizations, are capable of and motivated toward uniting to achieve common ol)jectives. A major difficulty is that th(^ i3roc(dures for finding solutions to problems facing politicians and goverinnents are less clearly defined than are the procedures for finding solutions to the specific types of problems commonly faced by scientists and engineers. Scientific and engineering problems are t3'pically more specificall.y defined than 54 Sro //)/(/. pp. 30."i-:({)',), for a (li'scripUon of how this was done. 1557 are political problems, which tend to be overburdened with value systems in which rational and irrational factors are intermixed. Nevertheless, the author concludes, ... if men can unite to solve problems under cne set of circumstances (the scientific), there presumably is room for hope that they can learn to do so under another (the pohtical). Scientists, as already indicated, tend to share this hope.^s Author's Reassessment The International Geophysical Year was an episode, with a begin- ning and an end. The interval since the basic study was written has viclded no important new revelations about it or interpretations of its sio-nificance. Nevertheless, its influence continues to be exerted, as Bullis points out in the following observations of September 1975: GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION The IGY study represented a detailed examination of a specific example of how the world scientific community worked together in cooperation and good will toward resolving international problems. In particular, it analyzed the contributions this massive scientific undertaking made in overcoming ideological' differences to bridge science and diplomacy. In so doing, the study attempted to identify and explain the attitudes, behavior patterns, and procedures followed during the IGY as a step toward detente. These themes are as relevant today as when the study was written in 1973. However, international cooperation appears to have been a mixed affair. On the positive side, international exchange undoubtedly experienced sharp growth immediately following the IGY. Precise figures are not available, partly because of what is meant by an "international" meeting, partly because so many meetings have been held that it is difficult to keep track of them, and partly because interest in compiling relevant statistics does not appear to warrant the expense of collection. Such data as are available, however, indicate that the number of international meetings remained fairly constant throughout the early 1950s and through 1957, when the IGY began, and then increased by about 25 percent during 1958 and almost doubled during the next decade. (Yearbook oj International Organi- zations data.) It would seem reasonable to infer that much of this growth resulted from activities initiated during the IGY, IMPROVED TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE Also on the positive side was the signing by the Soviets of the Universal Copyright Convention in May 1973. Prior to this time, the Soviets had reproduced about 70,000 pages annually from U.S. scientific journals published by the American Institute of Physics, and had been in frequent communication with the Institute regarding copyright permission and payment of royalties.''^ It would appear to be a fair assumption that these scientific com- munications had a positive effect upon the Soviet decision to sign the Copyright Convention. 55 76/rf., pp. 348-3o0. 5t Physics Today, vol. 28, Jan. 197,'). p. HO. 1558 REMAINING OBSTACLES On the negative side, the Soviets have not always honored tentative agreements for exchange of scientific information and research. Typical of this faihire is lack of cooperation in mental health research, first proposed in mid-1971 and discussed in subsequent years as part of an overall health package, but not agreed upon until 1975.^^ Much of the delay has been due to Soviet unwillingness to discuss details of the proposed research and possible exchange of scientists between the two countries. More recently, U.S. scientists have devel- oped doubts as to the advisability of such cooperation as a result of the possibility that some Soviet' psychiatrists may be deliberately misdiagnosing political dissidents as schizophrenic to silence them by confinement in mental hospitals. THE EMIGRATION PROBLEM Another problem which has continued is friction between United States and Soviet scientists over alleged Soviet persecution of Soviet scientists who wish to emigrate to Israel. The head of the Foreign Relations Department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences has expressed the view that such emigration represents a capitalistic brain drain to the disadvantage of the Soviets,^^ whereas U.S. scientists have ex- pressed their strong support for the Soviet scientists who wish to move-. Correspondence between United States and Soviet scientists on this subject has at times been abrasive. As a result of these and other incidents, communication and travel by scientists between the United States and the Soviet Union have been characterized as recently as July 1977 as being a difficult problem.^^ A SUMMING UP In summary, while it is clear that the "IGY spirit" is by no means in universal evidence throughout toda^^'s international scientific community, international scientific cooperation continues at a higher level of activity than it had reached in pre-IGY days. To the extent of the difference, there is perhaps justification for greater hope that bridges built by this cooperation will increasingly serve constructive purposes of science and diplomacy. Some Illustrative Questions The IGY yielded far more new data for scientists to assimilate than did the SPY 1932-33. On the other hand, data assimilation and technological application are growing progressively more rapid with every passing decade. The following questions are posed in the light of this latter consideration: In what scientific areas covered by the IGY, and to what extent, is there already a need for fresh data? Are there other geophysical areas not covered by the IGY which should now be studied, from a purely scientific stand[)oint, through a similar international cooperative effort? 57 Science, vol. 183, Mar. 8, 1974, pp. 932-935, and communication from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). ^Physics Today, vol. 27, Aug. 1974, p. 64. =» Communications from various services, Including the American Institute of Physics, the American Psychiatric Association, and NIMH. 1559 Besides the international conferences leading up to major treaties (Antarctic, Test Ban, and so on) and the governmentally sponsored scientific efforts like the lYQS, World Weather Watch, and Interna- tional Biological Program — two categories of developments influenced by the IGY — the past two decades have witnessed a number of other major international and regional conferences in which science and tech- nology have played important roles. These conferences, sponsored by governments to help solve tough political problems, have dealt with such matters as food (see Issue Three), population (also Issue Three), health (Issue Two), the exploitation of ocean resources (Case Five), and environmental programs (for citations see bibliography following this final chapter). Have these, too, been influenced, in their organization and proce- dures, by the successful patterns established in the IGY? Has a con- scious effort been made, in planning and conducting them, to build on the best experience of the IGY, other mainly scientific conferences, and the mainly political treaty conferences? Would a systematic, comparative studj^ highlighting the goals, methods, procedures, and results of all these major conferences, beginning with the IGY, conducted by a university or a private research foundation, be likely to make a significant contribution in the interests both of scholarship and of improved governmental policy formulation and planning? Much has happened to change the world in the short time since the IGY. Whether or not most of the scientific knowledge gained in 1957-58 has been assimflated, would it be useful to "stop the clock" and take fresh readings at IGY-plus-25, or 1982-83; i.e., hold a second IGY? Should some new IGY follow the pattern of the first one in terms of scientific leadership mth government support (but with minimal interference)? Would it be desirable this time for governments to take the initiative? Would this be feasible in today's world, with its increas- ing trend toward independent behavior by nationalist states and by regional or economic blocs pursuing special interests rather than global cooperation? If governments take the initiative — or even if scientists retain it — would it be feasible and productive to focus a large part of the scientific effort on fields closely related to current human needs, the conscious- ness of which has come so much to the fore since the time of the IGY: e.g., energy, agriculture, exploitation of ocean resources, mineral discovery, and preservation of the natural environment? CASE FOUR— THE MEKONG PROJECT: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM Statement of the Case On April 7, 1965, in a nationally broadcast and telecast speech at Johns Hopkins University, President Lyndon B. Johnson asserted U.S. willingness to negotiate an end to the then-expanding conflict in Vietnam, defended the U.S. policy of bombing North Vietnam, and offered U.S. support for an extensive program of regional development in Southeast Asia, including rehabilitation of Vietnam. The President singled out for particular attention the Lower Mekong River Basin project, a major development enterprise undertaken in the 1950s jointly by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam with the support of the United Nations Commission for Asia and the Far 1560 East (ECAFE) and the cooperation of a large number of U.N. agencies, foundations, and individual countries. As a peace initiative the President's offer failed; Hanoi and Peking emphatically rejected it. In retrospect it is seen as merely a brief episode of the eventful period, characterized b}^ mounting opposition to the Vietnam War that culminated in the Pr-esident's decision not to seek reelection in 1968. Nevertheless, it called attention to the poten- tialities of the Mekong project, both in itself and as a model, and of regionalism as an approach to development. Importance of the Case What emerges from this study as significant is not the President's proposal, dramatic though it was at the time, but the hardiness of the Mekong project and the regional approach: ". . . throughout the 7 years from the time of the speech to the present (May 1972), the international effort to apply technology to the systematic development of the Lower Mekong Basin has grown considerably. . . . Despite many strains, cooperation among the four countries of the Basin held steadfast. . . . As a multi- national development effort it has demonstrated 14 years of continuity, stability, and growth." »" How the Case Developed In a 1946 study of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Herman Finer wrote that— "The Council will encourage or institute regional conferences on economic, social, and humanitarian problems. . . . Some countries by reason of their prox- imity and certain common characteristics of geography and climate and location or the chance of history, have some problems in common. Under its charter, ECOSOC on March 28, 1947, created an Eco- nomic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), with head- quarters in Bangkok, Thailand. ECAFE's scope extended to trade, agriculture, transportation, industrial and technological development, education, and data gathering. Its membership included all members of the United Nations in Asia plus Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and the Soviet Union. (Other regional commissions have been established bv ECOSOC: for Europe— ECE; Latin America— ECLA; and Africa— ECA.) «i In 1957 the four Riparian Nations (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam), in association with ECAFE, established a permanent Com- mittee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong. The four members of the coordination committee representing the Riparian Nations had full powers of decision; an executive agent, heading a permanent advisory board of professional engineers created in 1958, had authority for making day-to-day decisions in preparing requests for technical and financial assistance, program planning and super- vision, and staff support of the coordination committee. M U.S. Congres<5, IIoiiso, rnmniittpp on Foreign Affairs, The M(kmig Project: Opportitnilkf and Prohhm.i of Reqionalism, a sliidy in the series on Science, Teclinolopy, and American Diplomacy, prerared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Frai'klin P. Ihiddle. Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Wasliinglon, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Oflice, May 1972. See vol. I, pp. 361-4.S4. The quotation is from page ,371. For a men- tion of how the Meliong project has survived the turl)ulent years since, the above lines were written, see below undn' Antlior's lieassissincnt. «' Huddle, The Mekong Project, vol. I, p. 380. 1561 On this rather unusual and extemporized foundation was erected the organiza- tion to plan and administer a, regional program covering three-quarters of the drainage ba-^in of the tenth largest river in the world, a region larger than France, with a population of perhaps 30 million. ^^ By the time of President Johnson's proposal for a bilhon-dollar aid program featuring the Mekong regional plan, a complex of 21 countries, 12 U.N. agencies, and 7 private institutions were contributing support to the project — donations and pledges were to reach $68 million by the end of 1965 — and the technical and administrative resources of the coordination committee's executive agent and staff were expanding. France, India, and New Zealand were collaborating on preliminary plans for a major dam at Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia; a Japanese team was at work on the Sambor Dam, also in Cambodia; the United States was taking the lead ($2.5 million in feasibility studies) in con- nection with a third great dam at Pa Mong in Thailand. Australia had a half-million-dohar program of geologic studies underway at both Sambor and Pa Mong Dam sites. In addition, construction was in progress on dams, channel markers, and other engineering or pre- paratory projects on tributary streams feeding the Mekong.*"^ In short, the enterprise to which the President proposed to extend massive support was no mere flight of fancy but a major project in being, backed by a strong and broadly based multinational commit- ment to see it through. At the same time, it could be considered a grossly underfinanced enterprise, proceeding at a pace which would require many years for completion of most of its elements and even decades for some. Was it not appropriate, then, for the nation which had fathered "the first regional development project to command worldwide attention — the Tennessee Valley Authority" ^* to offer assistance in accelerating the progress of this enterprise, as a construc- tive contribution to a negotiated peace? The U.S. and world press in general found it appropriate, though recognizing the offer as part of a ''carrot and stick" approach. The timing of the speech coincided with stepped-up bombing of strategic targets in North Vietnam by U.S. military aircraft, beginning with isolated strikes in mid- February, and broadening into a more sustained air offensive in early March. It followed by a week the President's decision, to be disclosed later on, to deploy U.S. troops and undertake ground combat operations in South Vietnam (to an extent that would number 184,314 military personnel in the area by the end of 1^65).^^ But Hanoi was not in a bargaining mood: The determined nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict . . . re- mained obdurately aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a prospective ultimate victory. ^^ U.S. Involvement A succession of three studies was undertaken between 1951 and 1958 to explore the potential for a regional development program for the Lower Basin of the Mekong. The first of these was carried out by the Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Development of ECAFE. The second, made at the request of the Riparian States 6-' Ibid., p. 381. •^^ Iliid..\i.'A'M). (Talilr 1 of the study, pages 301-394. prosonts an imprrssive list of ipsourccs, including ongi- nt'oring and other toclinical services, contril)uled or ph^dgod l)y the various countries, agencies, and institu- tions support ingt lie project as of January lOe.'i.) 6* Ihid., pp. 36;3-366. 65 Iliid., p. 366. 66 Ibid., p. 430. 1562 when the poUtical situation in the area had stabiUzed briefly after the signing of the Geneva Accords of 1954, was a reconnaissance by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (later U.S. AID). According to the study, Although the interest of the States themselves was undeniable, it seems likely that the initiative for this effort traces ultimately to France and the United States. It may well have been thought that stimulating a general interest in technological and economic development of the region might help to stabilize the political regimes there. At any event, a Special Project Agreement was signed between the Riparian States and the United States in November 195.5. There- after, the representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation ranged the area, held several meetings with representatives of the four countries, and returned to the United States, where their "Reconnaissance Report — Lower Mekong River Basin" was issued in March 1956." This .36-page report and its detailed appendices received close attention in Indochina, the study continued, perhaps because it was issued by representatives of the nation that had most to offer in support of the project as well as the broadest experience with sys- tematic river development. In any case it was a collection of the best data available about the region, and it specified what further data would be needed to get on with the project: Specifically, it called for hydrographic and sediment surveys of the main river; surveys of such features of the entire basin as topography, geology, trans- portation, communications, and agriculture; establishment of water flow meas- uring stations on the main stem and tributaries, weather stations, and a systematic search for preferred dam sites; studies of such special problems as the control of the water level of the great lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia, the salty soil in the great Plaine des Jones of Vietnam, the technology of double-cropping to increase agriculture production, and improved fish capture and processing; and such action programs as improved sanitation in water supply, and the training of local personnel in the technical skills that would be required later on. The study emphasized the need for cooperation among the four Riparian States in collecting, maintaining, and disseminating data on a uniform, integrated basis. ^* The Bureau of Reclamation report was enthusiastically endorsed when it was presented at the annual meeting of ECAFE in Bangkok in March 1957. Meetings of experts from the Riparian States were held in May and September to implement the recommendations of the report, and resulted in agreement on a charter for the aforemen- tioned Coordination Committee. ^^ THE WHEELER AND FORD FOUNDATION REPORTS When a Preparatory Committee met to adopt this Charter, it also asked the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to help recruit a visiting team of water resources experts to review and amplify the previous studies. By mid-November 1957 a U.N. team had been assembled in Bangkok under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Raymond Wheeler (Ret.) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Wheeler Report, completed January 2.3, 1958, reinforced and went beyond the recommendations of the Bureau of Reclamation study, proposing a 5-vear program of data collection at a total estimated cost of $9,200,000. 6^ Ihid., p. 386. M/ftirf. •' Renamed in 1967 the "Mekong Development Committee." 1563 In 1961 the Ford Foundation, at the request of the Coordination Committee, sent a mission lieaded by Gilbert F. White to examine the economic and social implications of the proposed development. The report of this mission was made in Bangkok in Juh^ 1962: It recommended substantial strengthening of the staff of the Coordination Committee in social science fields for the purpose of generating and collecting social statistics. It called for joint studies with intergovernmental agencies on problems of wide interest in the ECAFE region. It proposed that the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) be invited to participate in a study of methods for determining economic feasibility, and pointed out that the primitive economy of the Riparian States imposed inexorable limits on the rate of investment in regional development.'" The report emphasized the need for a systematic compilation of available data concerning resources, resource use, and social charac- teristics. It called for a power market survey, a land use inventorj^, and a study of ways to optimize agricultural use of water. The require- ment for training of technicians was again emphasized. Further: The report suggested that flood control benefits might be overstated and the institution of a flood warning system could reduce losses at moderate cost. It suggested that a large demonstration area be set up where the potential impacts of the Mekong project upon rural life could be observed. It proposed an elaborate program of demonstration projects in forest planting. In the introduction to the report, the authors warned that heavy investment in engineering works would not automatically lead to solid growth in social structure and economic gains.'' Instead of "monolithic concrete structures whose most immediate return is inflation of the national ego," the report urged a more n^odest start and suggested that ". . . the first construction be initiated on one or more of the tributaries: They can provide essential experience with ways of reaping an adequate harvest of benefits from investment in water management." This recommendation, the stud}' notes, directly conflicted with the views of the Coordination Committee, which Jiad given priority to three ver}'' large engineering projects at Pa Mong, Tonle Sap, and Sambor. The committee's views prevailed for a time over the Ford Foinida- tion Report's concept of a small-scale beginning. On the other hand, the Foundation Report suggested a list of investigations and research projects which would require more extensive and close supervision than the Coordination Committee could manage. Nevertheless, the period of the Foundation study and the years immediatel.v following was marked by an increased tempo of activity on the Mekong project. The number of participating countries increased, as did donations and pledges of contributions to support the planning studies, which rose from $20 milhon in March 1962 to $42 million by the end of 1963 and $68 million a year later. THE MEKONG PROJECT'S BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT Two things stand out in a review of the events associated with the Mekong project from its beginnings until the time of President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech in April 1965. One is the broad base '0 Huddle, Tlu Mckoiiq I'rojict, vol. I, p. 388. ■I Ibid., pp. 388-389. 96-243 O - 77 - 5 1564 of support for the project, with no nation monopoHzing the leader- ship; the other, the major contributions made by the United States, both officially and unofficially. A sampling of activities of the years f 962-64 will'illustrate: In 1964, a first geological map of the basin was completed. In France, work was proceeding on a mathematical model of the river while representatives from the Columbia River headquarters of the U.S. Corps of Engineers were undertaking a system study of the Mekong. Studies were underway by the World Health Organization of the problems of malaria and schistosomiasis in the basin. Scores of hydrologic and meteorologic stations had been set up and a radio network linked them to headquarters in Bangkok, where their reports were collected and tabulated. The Bureau of Reclamation was beginning work on a feasibility study of the Fa Mong Dam. Stream gradient measurements on the main stem had been completed in 1961 and measurement of the capacity of possible reservoirs was actively proceeding. In 1964, ECAFE completed an agricultural market analysis. Resources for the Future, Inc., had begun a study of world demand for products of electro-processing industries. A study of manpower needs and resources was begun in 1962, with the International Labor Office as lead agency. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and Israel, were studying agricultural improvement methods; plans were underway for farm and timber demonstration projects. ''^ With a broad base of support and stepped-up pace, the character of the investigations changed markedl}' as the project proceeded: Not onh^ w^as the scope of the pertinent data recognized as far wider than it had been in the 1950s, but primary emphasis was shifting to the economic and social consequences of proposed constructions and development. In the United States, river basin development had followed this trend, but the conversion to total system planning had taken more than a century; benefiting from U.S. experience, the Mekong planning activity had achieved it in less than a decade." Role of Congress Congressional reaction to the President's speech of April 7, 1965, was mixed. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield saw the speech as a U.S. commitment to help make the peace, once obtained, "a dynamic peace, a peace of constructive benefit, not only to the people of Vietnam, North and South, but to Southeast Asia as a whole." Congressman Zablocki asserted that the "principal object" of the speech had been insufficiently recognized: "That is the bold move to stabilize Southeast Asia and assist the peaceful progress of the people in that area through a multi-national program of economic assistance, directed b}^ the United Nations, in which Communist nations would be invited to participate." Senator McGovern declared that peace in Asia "... means precisel}^ the kind of imaginative effort the President proposed . . ., including regional develop- ment . . . and experienced assistance from the best people available in the field of international development." Senator Moss added that the speech "represents a major breakthrough in international posture." On the other hand. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen ques- tioned the feasibilit}^ of an attempt to "buy peace with an American aid program," and Congressman Gerald R. Ford declared that . . . friendship, security, and solid international relationships cannot be bought with dollars." ^* Despite forebodings. Congress supported the proposal advanced in the Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965. When the President in a '2 Ibid., pp. 389-390. '3 Ibid., p. 390. 7< Ibid.. Di). .368-.36n. 1565 special message of June 1, 1965, asked for a supplemental $89 million in foreign aid funds for the Mekong River Basin project, Congress acted promptly to grant the request. On March 16, 1966, it authorized a $200 million subscription to the capital of the new Asian Develop- ment Bank." Had the President's initiative succeeded in hastening an end to the Avar, there is little doubt that Congress would have given strong support to a postwar reconstruction program in South- east Asia with the Mekong project as a major feature. Outcome President Johnson's initiative ended in failure. It seems clear that the main reason it failed w^as its timing: it was too late, probably by several years. The North Vietnamese were dug in and were apparently convinced that they held the long-run advantage. There is evidence, however, that the proposal Avas taken seriously at the time, even in North Vietnam, and that it had considerable influence on long-range thinking about regional development. Presidential emissary Eugene K. Black has commented as follows on the political impact of the speech in Southeast Asia : . . . there is little doubt in my mind that the political impact of President Johnson's offer of large-scale post-war assistance to South Asia was substantial. I say Southeast Asia rather than the "Riparian States" because the offer of assist- ance was not confined to them. I believe the President intended and I acted as though Southeast Asia covered the five Mekong coimtries — Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and both Vietnams — and Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. And I considered the $1 billion of^er to be more symbolic than mathe- matically precise. My visits and contacts included all of these countries except North Vietnam. Both an immediate and shortrange political impact of our offer was its positive role as a catalyst in stimulating the interest in and moves toward regional cooperation. While nationalism is, of course, the dominant political force in the region, this is now tempered by a fairly widely accepted view that the states of Southeast Asia have a common interest in working together for political, economic and even cultural reasons. Many of the regional organizations and groupings in Southeast Asia owe their origin cr vitality to the boost for regional cooperation given by the United States in the period 1905-09. Best known is the formation in late 1965 of the Asian Development Bank.'*! Less recognized but no less real. Black continued, was "the large increase in interregional personal contacts which occurred in South- east Asia over these years at various levels and in various forums": I have in mind such developments as the initiation of plans for a regionwide study of transportation infrastructure (the study was completed in 1971 with help of the ADB) ; the coming together of ministers of education of the region to plan development of training institutions of regional significance and the mush- rooming of specialized regional groups to consider one topic or another of economic, social or political significance. As for the Mekong "Riparian States," they have participated in most of this regionwide activitj^ plus, of course, made progress iri further developing plans for harnessing the resources from the river itseli. The Johns Hopkins speech and the stepped-up interest in the development potential of the Mekong which it generated certainly had a healthy political impact in the non- Communist Riparian States by focusing attention on the future. I know this " Eupene R. Black, former— 1949-62— president of the World Bark and in 1965 a special emissary of Trc;!- dent Johnson in connection with the Mekone project, commented in his response of March 14, 197'.', to soiii'' questions by the author of the Mekong project study that while the idea for the Asian Devolopiuciit Ba'ik "had been around for several years and ECAFE circles favored it, its formation in 196.5 resulted directly from President Johnson's April 7 general offer to Southeast Asia and his July offer to propose the linifed States join such a bank, if formed, which I was able to convey to a special meeting of Asian bankers in Bang- kok." [See Appendix to The Mekong Project, vol. 1, p. 433.] ''• Appendix to The Mekong Project, p. 433. 1566 from my four trips to the area for President Johnson and siiljscquent visits. Whih; I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi and other accounts that some poHtical figures there were quite interested in the possibihty of sharing in the proposed major develo])ment effort. At the same time it was as xmreaUstic in 1965 as it is today [March 1972] to believe that leaders in North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would abandon their goals simply in response to offers of aid." Assessment Stiul}^ of the Mekong projecit as a particular undertaking, a model venture in regionalism, and as the subject of a major wartime political initiative affords a number of significant insights. One is that "as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of co- operation in a regional development scheme does not present a con- vincing opportunity." " Or, to put it in more specific terms, "The response of the Hanoi authorities . . . appears to have demon- strated . . . that 'dollar diplomacy' does not convince an adversary as long as there is any reasonable prospect that he can outlast the United vStates without some form of capitulation." '^ THE MOMENTU.M OF NONPOLITICIZED REGIONALISM Another is that a regional enterprise which is essentially apolitical and at the same time promises tangible economic benefits throughout the region may develop a momentum powerful enough to keep it going despite traditional animosities between groups \\ithin the region, and even under complex conditions of war. "Perhaps the most notable events to be chronicled about the Mekong scheme from its inception to early 1965, a period of more than a decade, were the events that did not happen": The rather improvised Coordination Committee was able to maintain coherence and control, as well as forward movement. The four Riparian States, despite several .serious diplomatic contretemps, continued their active participation and cooperation in the conunittee. Communist factions in all four states did not impede the field studies or construction, and a minimum of guerrilla incidents were reported, even as the conflict in Vietnam worsened."" Underpinning this phenomenon is a range of attractive character- istics shared by development enterprises ^vhich involve multinational regions and multilateral relationships: Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning; Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advancement tend to receive priority by local consent; Nati^ the policies of the Coordination Committee and its stafT have appeared to be progressively more adaptive to both the sociological and the environ- mental impacts of the Mekong project. Mohamed Shoaib, a World Bank official, has summed up the adaptive process as one involving (a) deliberateness and incrementalism, (b) increasing pragmatism — learning by doing, and (c) attention to the problems created by intervening in depth in the subtle equilibria of established eco- systems. Shoaib observes that it can always be shown that the effects of any development will be in part adverse, but that the consequences of economic stagnation too are demonstrably adverse. He calls for a meaningful balance between the urgency of development and the demands for conservation . . . through a timely interdisciplinary approach to development planning.*^ Author's Reassessment Five years after the study was completed in the late spring of 1972, the author of The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problems of Regionalism sees it in the following light : THE MEKONG PROJECT IN PERSPECTIVE The theme of this study is that a regional approach to develop- ment affords a focus for peaceful economic progress, serves as an educational process, and establishes a base for wider cooperation among participating nations. It offers a possibility for realignment of nations and international structures toward diplomatic goals: regional stability, international cooperation, tension reduction, a peaceful alternative to insurgency, and bridges across ideological and ethnic differences. The study does not assert that these are certain con- sequences of the regional approach, but suggests that the approach warrants further study as a possible way to improve the world system to exploit economic and technological resources in a more balanced and rational manner. The Mekong project was a natural outcome of the application of U.N. values and purposes in Southeast Asia. The effort to expand it greatly as a means of damping a nationalistic and ideological conflict in Vietnam failed. However, the project itself showed remarkable durability, even under the stress of conflict and insurgency in the region. A possible lesson is that a constructive regional approach can help to evolve conditions and relationships favorable to international cooperation, but it is not a useful instrument for damping conflict already in progress. With the withdrawal of the U.S. presence in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, a complete takeover of governmental authority by 85 7Wd., p. 41'J. 88 Ibid., p. 420. 1569 Communist-oriented groups followed. The most recent meeting of representatives of the four Riparian States in the Coordinating Com- mittee was in March 1975. A subsequent meeting held in Bangkok in April 1977 was attended by delegates from Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand, but not Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia). The delegates of the three countries announced tentative agreement on establishing an interim tripartite commission to proceed (pending resumption of participation by Kampuchea) with development of Mekong Basin water resources. Meanwhile, the Mekong Committee's operating budget through 1977 has been assured by support from various sources, and Vietnam and Laos have officially asked for L^nited Nations Develop- ment Program (UNDP) support of the Committee through 1978. A phase-out of U.S. support of the project, begun in 1975, has been com- pleted. While there is uncertainty as to the future scope of the Mekong project, and as to w^hether it will maintain its previous practices of extensive multilateral coordination and consultation, the remarkable fact is that the project is still alive and appears to be in the process of institutional rebuilding.^^ The study traced the change in emphasis of the Mekong project from large civil works and capital-intensive development to socio- economic programs appropriate to the local culture. Concurrently, an increased concern is evident for the environmental consequences — • principally adverse consequences — of large public works. Taken together these two trends accentuate the human importance of technological impacts. An understanding of the cultures and economic systems of parts of a region undergoing development planning is now perceived as of foremost importance. The implication of these cir- cumstances is that development under local leadership, w^ith local participation, may yield slower and less substantial physical results but may tend to create institutions and social organization that are more stable and compatible with local culture and social forces. The study gave some, but perhaps not enough, attention to this require- ment. Moreover, the role of regional development as a vehicle for cooperation, tension reduction, and social integration seems to be furthered by this sliift of emphasis. SOME OBSERVATIOXS AND CONCLUSIONS Among the conclusions and observations suggested by the study are these : — Habits of cooperative relationship may be more important than formal organization in the mounting of a complex inter- national development.' — A regional development program must harmonize differing national objectives rather than overriding them. In particular, a regional program cannot win acceptance if it aims explicitly to diminish nationalistic aspirations and contravene national- istic values. — The logical appeal of large civil works that enrich the energy, transportation, and resource development of a region, while reducing flood hazards, provides a powerful motivation for cooperative effort. It also justifies large capital investment. The risks of such large civil works are less obvious, but still real. 87 Source: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, July 1977. 1570 There is a tendency for local leadership to concentrate on the piins and io;nore tlie risks. However, unless gains are balanced a2;ainst risks, the long-range consequences — both regional and diplomatic — may be unfavorable. — Political acceptability of a multination regional development proje(;t requires that benefits be evident to all participants, and that costs and benefits to each nation be in reasonable balance. A large midtination project can attract contributions from many nations outside the region; these can aggregate to an impressive total investment even though no one contribution is much of a burden to the donor. — An important benefit of a large project in a developing region is the necessarv education and training of local participants, and tlie experience gained in lo(;al leadership and planning. — The subject of regional application of technology for social purposes contains many of the elements that make the interaction of science and technology with diplomacy important politically. In addition to the potential contributions of the subject to diplomatic goals, it challenges the ability of the executive and legislative branches to exploit opportunities that may require years of evolution. — When tlie Pi-esident presents the Congress with a specific regional program, with the costs and benefits adequately defined, the Congress tends to respond favorably and promptly. — The combining of U.S. interests in international regional development as an approach to national security and as an ap- proach to economic advancement tends to detract from the effec- tiveness of such development for either purpose. A "low profile" of external supporting nations tends to yield most fruitful results. — For a variety of reasons attention to international regional development b}' the Congress has diminished. Domestic economic concerns have attracted attention away from foreign develop- ment. Tensions in the Middle East have replaced Southeast Asian troubles as the focus of effort in conflict reduction. Confidence in the practical utility of social science for pubhc policy has been shaken. Finally, there is a tendency for the Congress to give principal attention to short-term problems, at the expense of longer-range considerations — especially when the opportunities of diplomatic gain ofl'ered b}' the latter are at a low confidence level. — To conclude with a quotation from the study itself: "It is slieer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus for peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process, and established a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted legion. However, the question seems legitimate as to whether the consequences of a slowly and deliberately encouraged regional development — region by region — in lagging parts of the world might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run." *^ Some Ilhistrafive Qiiestio7is What U.S. institution might best take the lead in planning for th^ application of regional development principles to advance U.S. diplo- matic objectives? Might the role of U.N. agencies be usefully expanded for this purpose? 8S Huddle, The Mekomi Project vnl. I, p. 43! 1571 Would the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna, Austria, be a possible locus for international plan- ning of multination regional development? What regions of the world offer the best opportunities for technical development, and which of these might yield the greatest diplomatic benefits — e.g., the Middle East, the Sahel, the Amazon Basin, the Iberian Peninsula, etc.? In December 1973 Congressman Clement J. Zablocki spoke on the House floor in support of the formation of a Mideast Regional De- velopment Bank. Such a Bank, Mr. Zablocki asserted, would "repre- sent a positive, reasonable, and promising approach to promoting the social and economic development of the entire area, thereby creating a climate for true and lasting peace." ^^ Is there still merit in this proposal as a practical possibilit}', considering present economic conditions in the Middle East and the world at large which reflect recent Arab oil price manipulations and revenue accumulations? Could it perhaps put some of the new oil wealth to work in ways beneficial to the entire Middle Eastern region? What constructive roles might be played by multinational corpora- tions in supporting multinational regional development projects? What geographic features other than river basins might suppl}' the central coherence for regional development? Does the Tennessee Valle}^ Authority offer any useful lessons, that is, in the relationships among States in the TVA area, on how best to exploit the diplomatic advantages of regional development? Could TVA personnel serve usefully in educating local leadership in developing countries in the principles and methods of regional development? What interactions would be A^aluable and should be provided between subnational and supranational regional institutions and activities? W^hat kinds of clearinghouses are needed for the sharing of basic data in this field? A stronger role is required of political and social scientists in tlie field of regional development; how is it to be defined and given scope? How can political and social scientists best go about structuring an approach to defining the normative objectives of a region, as a frame- work within which economic objectives would be determined — and do so in a manner acceptable to the various political leadership elements involved? Apart from economic factors, are there generalizations about regionalism — having to do, for instance, with social patterns reflecting adaptation to geographical environment — that need to be incorporated into the body of thought and planning doctrine on regionalism? An invention is needed that can do for regional programs what the systems approach has done for missile and space systems development. The thrust of sj'^stems development is that all values must be quanti- tatively defined and subjected to cost-effectiveness analysis. What is the normative counterpart? A critical factor to be dealt with in multination regional under- takings is the social tensions set up by bringing representatives ol different cultures — however similar — together in working relation- ships. What standards and methods can be devised for measuring " Congressional Record, December 11, 1973, nil0~6. 1572 levels of intensity of these social tensions? How can changes in these levels (a) be brought about, and (b) measured? To what extent is it feasible to attempt to ascertain the ideal level of tension— that which would result in the best blend of harmony and accomplishment — for any given regional enterprise? CASE FIVE: EXPLOITING THE RESOURCES OF THE SEABED"^ Statement oj the Case The matter of who owns the ocean floor came into prominence as a consequence of technology. Historically, the seabed was an inter- national commons of neghgible utility. International law afforded no substantial provision for its governance or possession because there was no need for it. Man's invasion of the ocean deeps came gradually, beginning v,dth exploration by deep-submergence vehicles, mapping expeditions using the military technolog}' of ultrasonics, systematic collection of samples from the ocean floor, and ultimately core drilling of the seabed at progressively deeper submergences. Offshore drilling for oil by the United States,' begun during World War II, led to the evolution of a large and complex technology that extended from its early application in the Gulf of Mexico to Asiatic waters, and most receiitly to the North Sea. Early discovery of manganese nodules, occurring in great profusion on the deep ocean floor, received little notice until world consumption of such materials as copper, nickel, cobalt, as well as manganese, contained in these nodules began to press on world capacity to extract them from sources on the continents. As the winning of these resources, as well as petroleum, from the seabed neared practicality, the question of who owns the ocean floor came to international attention. Importance oj the Case Questions of national sovereignty traditionall}^ rank liigh among the concerns of nations. Determination of seaward jurisdiction of coastal States remains an unresolved question with proponents of different interests adducing conflicting principles: major maritime powers seeking boundaries close in, some smaller states reaching out as far as possible, and some states pursuing a mixed strategy based on the principle of submarine geography. The potential for conflict is inherent in a resource-rich region over which no authority of law extends. As on land, the riches of the seabed are unevenly distributed and the right of first capture can always be challenged by a stronger power. States lacking the technological means of exploiting the regime adopt the position that they should be able to share the harvest of seabed wealth from the international commons. Landlocked states contend that the accident of geography should not deprive them of a share in the new source of mineral wealth. Poor and less developed states base their claims for some preference in the matter on the fact of their relatively greater need. The technology of extracting petroleum from the ocean floor is already being applied, with eyer-increasing expertise. In the face of the energy crisis growing out of the OPEC oil embargo and price increases, seabed petroleum operations are growing in importance. 6" U.S. C'onpross, House, Committee on Foreign Aff;iirs, Exploiting the Rcsourcs of the Seabed, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by George A. Doumani, Science Policy Research Division, Congres- sional Kesearcli Service, Lil)raiy of Congress, I'.iTl. See vol. I, pp. i:{0-.i24. 1573 As a practical matter, the resolution of the seabed issue in oil-ricli areas is an early necessity. Although the recovery of soUd minerals from the deep ocean floor is less immediately in prospect, there is little question that the tech- nology will eventually be perfected. The resources sought are enormous in their occurrence; indeed, it is estimated that they are accumulating by natural processes more rapidly than they could ever be mined. As a matter of quantitative perspective, it is reported that maukinri will never be able to use as much magnesium metal as is contained in a single cubic mile of seawater. On the problem of resolving the rights of capture of these solid minerals, the diplomats of the world have some indeterminate period of advance w^arning before the issue re- quires operational solution. However, if the solution is not reached before it is needed, the prospect is that the technology of ocean uuning will be put to use regardless, leading to many foreseeable (and doubt- less some unforeseeable) international complications. How the Case Developed The study by George A. Doumani approaches the seabed case from two perspectives: the technological and the diplomatic. The focus of the case, however, is political. As the author notes, "It is conceded that development will be confined, for some time to come, to the Continental Shelf areas, and that progress into the deep sea is not imminent." However [Doumani continues], the confusion created b)" the Geneva Conven- tions, particularly the exploitability clause, invites review; definitive political boundaries are needed for the seaward limit of national jurisdictions. Beyond this limit, the deep sea areas would then be confirmed as the common domain of the community of nations. Whatever regime is suggested for this international deep sea domain is subject to legal considerations and international approval, but the issue is not as urgent as is the delineation of national jurisdictions at this time.si After presenting in some detail the technological state of the art in exploiting seabed resources, the author recounts the political and diplomatic institutions that were endeavoring to deal with these "inter- national legal considerations." A specific proposition was advanced, August 17, 1967, by the Permanent Mission of Malta to tlie United Nations that called, among other things, for the reservation of the seabed (outside of the limits of present national jurisdictions) from appropriation by nations, and the use of its resources primarily to promote the development of poor countries. In response, a U.X. ad hoc committee was formed to study the Malta proposal. Its report, in February 1968, was referred to a U.N. standing connnittee in- structed to continue the work of developing a rationale for legal control of the seabed. As Doumani was completing his report, the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction — and especially its legal subcommittee — was engaged in an extensive series of studies in preparation for a "Law of the Sea Conference." The first tangible result of the U.N. effort was the signing, Febru- ary 12, 1971, of a "Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and Subsoil Thereof." As the report went " Doumani: Exploiting the Resources of the Scalxd, vol. I, p. 481. 1574 to press the treaty was awaiting approval by the U.S. Senate of its ratification. (Tlie treaty was subsequently ratified.) U.S. Involvement in the Case Tiie Doumani analysis included a statement of the problem, a description of the U.S. and U.N. institutions created to deal with it, an account of problems up to July 1971, and an assessment of pros- pects for resolution of the problem thereafter. Thus, in June 1966 the Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment Act, Public Law 89-454, was passed by the C^ongress. It es- tablished ". . . policies and objectives for the U.S. effort to develop the Nation's marine resources" and ". . . for the establishment of a National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Develop- ment. . . ." that ". . . represented a wide-ranging mandate over the total national program in oceanography." "^ This Council was to make a comprehensive investigation and study of all aspects of marine science in order to recommend an overall plan for an adecpiate national oceanographic program that will meet the present and future national needs. One panel of the Marine Council was the Committee on Inter- national Folic}' in the Marine Environment. Another action by the Council was to recommend creation of an operating agency in the field. The policy conmiittee lapsed in 1971, and was replaced by an Interagency Law-of-the-Sea Task Force, imder the chairmanship of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. The agency, as created by the Congress in October 1970, took the form of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).^^ A U.S. policy was proposed May 23, 1970, by Frcsident Ni.xon, who called for two types of "international machinery": First, I propose that coastal nations act as trustees for the international com- munity in an international trusteeship zone consisting of the continental margins hej'ond a depth of 200 meters off their coasts. In return, each coastal State would receive a share of the international revenues from the zone in which it acts as trustee and could impose additional taxes if these were deemed desirable. As a second stop, agreed international machinery would authorize and regulate exploration and use of seabed resources beyond the continental margins. ^^ As the study concluded, it was ''too early to predict what success the U.S. proposal will achieve". It was likely to encounter opposition not onl}' abroad but at home as well. Moi-eover, the proposal left untouched the thorny question of where the seabed began and the coastal shelf terminated. The U.S. position favored a 12-mile limit. Latin American nations clung to their 200-mile limits. Agreement would not come eas}-. Role of Congress Numerous committees and subcommittees of the Congress had interested themselves in the seabed problem.^'' An early congressional action was the creation of the Marine Council. Following the Malta proposal to the United Nations, Al)out 3 dozen resolutions were introduced in the House and the Senate, mostly in opposition to vesting control over the deep ocean resources in the United Nations. House resolutions were for the most part identical, expressing tz Jbid., pp. 4!l6-l(t7 sa Ibid., p. 498. M lbid.\ p. 510. «5 These are enumerated on p. 4% of tlic study. 1575 the sense of Congress that any action at that time to vest control of deep ocean resources in an international body was hasty and ill advised . . . .^^ In hearings before several congressional committees, witnesses favoring the principle of the Malta Proposal cited as among its advantages the following: . . . regulation of the depletion of mineral resources, avoidance of an anarchic rush to claim and exploit subsea resources, reduced danger of marine pollu- tion . . ., reduced threat of a military race to exploit strategic advantages of submarine weapons placement, provision of an independent income for the United Nations, and a general strengthening and maturity in the U.N. itself, through the experience of administering the vast area of the ocean floor." Objections to any U.N. action "stemmed primarily from fears that the United States might be giving away some valuable assets and rights the extent of which were not yet known". The qualifications of the United Nations to accept the responsibihty were questioned. Scientific exploration might be hampered by a premature definition of political jurisdiction. National security interests might be compro- mised. An executive branch proposal, August 3, 1970, became the focus of a series of hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcomnriittee on Ooean Space chaired by S3nator Chiiborne Pell. Hearings on the proposal were also held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, through its Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic Lands Policy, chaired by Senator Ernest F. Rollings, and before a Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf. These sought answers to such questions as: — What were the limits of the Continental Shelf? — Should the limit be geological or legal? — Should it be based on considerations of equity, security, or economic advantage? — How much did the United States stand to lose by the creation of an international regime? — Was a new Law of the Sea Conference necessary? — Should the States have a narrow or wide Continental Shelf? — For areas beyond the Continental Shelf, what sort of an international regime would be best? — What kind of international machiner}^ should be established? — How did all these aspects affect the economy and national security of the United States? The hearings made evident that two differing sets of policies were taking shape, one favoring substantial transfer of jurisdiction bej^ond a narrow Continental Shelf to an international body and the other urging extension of the Continental Shelf to the limit of exploitability. Outcome The case was unresolved by the time the Doimiani report went to press. In fact, it continues unresolved in mid-1977, 6 years thereafter. As an interim measure, a policy was proposed by the LTnited StatCvS to the United Nations that "all nations join the United States to in- sure that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond the 200-meter limit be issued subject to an international au- thbritv".'^ sii Ibid., p. 4'.(i». " Ibid., p. .5(K). « Ibid., p. 523. 1576 Writing in 1971, Doumani concluded his study with the observation that evohition of TJ.S. seabed policy "had been relatively slow". I'ndoubtedly the marine scientists and technologists would have preferred a brisker pace than the diplomats were jirepared to take. For its part, the Congres was ready to move faster than was the Department of State, although in wha direction is still not evident.^* ■ss t Assessment The United States and the other interested countries of the world have long had the opportiniity to resolve the question of who owns the seabed before the beginning of a rush of entrepreneurs to exploit the seabed mineral wealth, using technology certain to be perfected sooner or later. The problem is not a technological one, although it is cieated by technology and without the prospect of a technological opportunity the problem would be a tiivial one. Only when the technology is perfected to enable profitable exploitation of seabed resources will the problem require urgent solution. The advantage of advance resolution of the problem is evident. One can imagine the chaos of an international-gold rush into a territory without law or property rights. The prospect of anarchy in a difficult and perilous environment, with many claimants and costly equipment, is disturbing to contemplate. For the United States to assert a policy of "right of capture," based on this country's technological superi- ority, affords no answer if the right should be challenged by another nation using officially sanctioned force based on territorial claims. Either the seas will be apportioned among national sovereignties, perhaps by force, or some device for shared sovereignty in the hands of a jointly established regidatory body must be created to regulate the international commons. One way or the other, an agreed decision must be made among nations as to jurisdiction over every part of the ocean floor. Sovereignty, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In 1971 the U.S. Department of State had not formulated any clear policy on how to resolve the dilemma. The Congress was divided between a national and an international solution. There was un- certainty over the competence and even the political stability of the United Nations. The problem of extent of seaward boundaries re- mained unresolved. There were emerging differences in goals between the developed and the developing nations. And uncertainty over the timing of technological advance permitted the problem to linger in controversy until technology itself would eventually compel a crash solution under crisis conditions. It is interesting to note that in this case the essential facts of the situation are not in question; the case is political and diplomatic rather than technological, even though it is technology that makes it important. Author's Reassessment The study defined the legal and phj'sical boundaries of the seabed and presented an inventory of its resources. The value of these re- sources was then related to economics and the present and future technological capabilities for exploring and exploiting them. The study discussed potential technological breakthroughs, particularly in the areas of offshore oil and hard minerals on the ocean floor. 95 Ibid., p. 524. 1577 Political aspects were also considered, with particular attention to the U.S. policymaking apparatus. From the national scene, the study moved into the international arena and concentrated on the concern of the whole world over ocean space. It also explored the effect of science and technology in shaping national and international policies, as well as the effects of man's activities on the environment. Underlying these various discussions was a call for a new sense of world community and a new breed of scientist-diplomat to meet the pressing need for fair and proper conduct in the international diplo- matic process. These themes are as relevant today as they were when the study was written. The study stopped chronologically at the time when the world community of nations was preparing for the Conference on the Law of the Sea; it served as a reference tool for those participat- ing in the Conference. The first session of the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was held in 1974 in Caracas, Venezuela. Progress has been slow ; by the conclusion of the sixth session in New York on July 15, 1977, a Law of the Sea Treaty had not been adopted and there was a particular deadlock over the critical issue of seabed mining. If the study were to be altered, alteration would be in the form of updating the chronology of events rather than alteration in the scope of the study. However, since the problems of the seabed have not yet been resolved, any alteration to the study at this time would be pre- mature. The subject remains relevant to congressional concerns, and both Houses have been active in related legislation since the publica- tion of the study. As far as the project series is concerned, the study is much more relevant today than when it was wi'itten. This relevance is particularly evident in the executive branch, where the State Depart- ment, pursuant to statute, has created the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, headed by an Assistant Secretary of State (as of July 1977, this position was held by a former Member of Congress, Patsy T. Mink.) Throughout the text the study showed the interaction of science and technological development with the diplomatic process and with the process of decisionmaking on the national level toward exploring and exploiting the seabed resources. The conclusions reached can be main- tained with the same emphasis today. Legislative action was initiated or completed in some areas directly related to the contents of the study, such as the bills introduced in the 92d through the 95th Congresses for the exploitation of hard min- erals on the ocean floor, the resolutions in both Houses regarding the Law of the Sea Conference, and the measure introduced in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the creation of the above-mentioned bureau in the Department of State. The significance of the issues raised by this study has not been difficult to communicate to the Congress and the American people. The subject has been the focus of attention throughout the world since 1967, and recognition of its significance has been spreading into a wide spectrum of the academic, industrial, economic, and political sectors of the Nation. This significance is also reflected in govern- mental reorganization in both the legislative and executive branches, particularly in the former where several committees and subcommit- 1578 tees have established jurisdiction over ocean matters.'^" The Senate Commerce Committee also initiated the National Ocean Policy" Study in 1974, aimed at focusing Federal attention on, and national recogni- tion of, the issues of offshore resources. In evaluating the study and its effects, it can summarily be said that the study was needed, was timely, and will remain a useful reference for the period ending with the Conference on the Law of the Sea. It has been useful to Congress in particular, and has had wide use by many different people, governments, and organizations. POLICY PROPOSAL BY SECRETARY KISSINGER Secretaiy of State Henry Kissinger in a speech given on August 1 1, 1975, before the American Bar Association annual convention ad- vanced the following set of proposals for seabed policy : — An international organization t-hould be created to set rules for deep seabed mining. — This international organization must preserve the rights of all countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed resources. — It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests and security of investment. — Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the interna- tional organization, to be used for the benefit of developing countries. — The management of the organization and its voting proce- dures must reflect and balance the interests of the participating states. The organization should not have the power to control prices or production rates. — If these essent'al U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree that this organization \\'ill also have the right to conduct mining operations on behalf of the international community primarily for the benefit of developing countries. — The new organization should serve as a vehicle for coopera- tion between the technologically advanced and the developing countries. The United States is prepared to explore ways of sharing deep seabed technology vitli other nations. — A balanced conmiission of consumers, seabed producers, and land-based producers could monitor the possible adverse effects of deep seabed mining on the economies of those developing countries which are substantially dependent on the export of minerals also produced from the deep seabed.'"^ too During the 92d Congress the determination to protect U.S. investment in deep seabed mining opera- tions crystallized into legislative iiroposals. Legislation revised as a result of hearings held in 1972 and i;i73 was introduced during the 93d Congress. S. 1134, as amended, and II. R. 12233— the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act — would require U.S. nationals to obtain a license from the Secretary of the Interior before engaging in the exploration and commercial recovery of manganese nodules on the deep seabed. S. 1134, as amended, was favorably reported to the Senate on August 21, 1974 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 4, 1974. During the 94th Congress the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act as reported out of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee during the 93d Congress was reintroduced as II. R. 1270/3. 713. i"' Henry A. Kissinger, "International Law, World Order, and Human Progress," speech before the American Bar Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, August 11, 1975, pp. 4-0. These points were reafUrmed or amplified by Secretary Kissinger on several subsecjuent occasions throughout 1976. 1579 At this time the Secretary also took note of several other issues to be faced when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvened in Xew York in 1976 : Wa,ys must be found to oncounigo marine scientific research for the benefit of all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coastal states in their economic zones. Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. We must establish uniform international controls on pollution from ships and insist upon universal respect for environmental standards for Continental Shelf and deep seabed exploitation. Access to the sea for landlocked countries must be assured. There must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-party settlement of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilater;^! interpretation of a treaty of such scope b}" individual States or by an international seabed organization. '"^ Some Illustrative Questions What are the implications for U.S. policy at the continuing Law of the Sea Conference of Third World pressures for a more influential role in the development and operation of international institutions? Is the trend toward politicization that marks current U.X. activities spilling over into the deliberations of the Law of the Sea Conference to the extent that it endangers the progress of the Conference? What possible new U.S. diplomatic initiatives might help improve the nego- tiating climate and the prospects of the Conference ? What is the likely timing of technological exploitation of seabed minerals today, and what are the implications of this timing for the urgency of reaching a resolution of the seabed problem in the 1976 conference? What factors and trends in the world diplomatic situation have tended to obstruct the reaching of agreement on a Law of the Sea, and what other emerging diplomatic/technological problems might also be obstructed by these factors and trends? What constructive measures might be taken by the United States to reverse them? Might U.S. technological capabilities provide a leverage to promote international agreement in the seabed problem? Are there other U.S. -developed technologies having broad geo- graphic implications that could provide leverage to promote agree- ment on a Law of the Sea? Would a regional approach — one which took account of the needs of landlocked countries — be useful in working out a svstem of benefits from exploitation of seabed resources? CASE SIX— U.S.-SOVIET COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: THE INTERPLAY OF ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND DIPLOMACY^* Statement of the Case "The estabhshment of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Com- mission at the May 1972 Summit Conference and the signing of a comprehensive set of trading agreements on October 18, 1972, opened a promising new period of economic relations between the two nations." (p. 529) li initiated what Secretary of State Kissinger called the process of creating a "vested interest in-mutual restraint". Although the scope i<» Ibid., p. 5. '»' U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Sovkt Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series. Science, Technology, and American Diplo- macy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by John P. Hardt and Cieorge D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, l!tT3. See vol. I pp. .i26-60(j. Throughoul tliis commentary all citations are from lliis source. Page numbers are given in the text imme- iliatcly after the citation. 96-243 O - 77 - 6 1580 of the agreements is limited to economics, trade, and technology trans- fer, its political significance is judged by U.S. leaders to be high; costs and benefits of both the economic and political consequences need to be assessed. The Hardt-IIolliday study sought to provide a pre- liminary assessment, and in particular to identify the imponderable questions that need to be monitored in the futuie as the process of building the relationship unfolds. Importance of the Case Any bilateral undertaking or transaction involving the United States and the Soviet Union is of inherent importance to the extent that it reflects change in the relationship of the two superpowers. This relationship between two nations which are joint custodians of ultimate military power can determine the well-being of the rest of the world, as well as their own. Any agreement that promotes accom- modation or reduces tension, that promotes peaceful dealings or reduces competition in military technology, has importance _ for world peace and security and accordingly for the security of the United States, which is the Nation's ultimate (liplomatic goal. Trade, accord- ing to the hypothesis favoring the 1972 detente, influences internal policy as well as external dealings of nations; and, "in the long run, selected trade, intelligently negotiated and wisely administered, may turn out to have been one of our most powei-ful tools of national policy", (p. 585) The importance for the United States of the series of 1972 trade agreements is only moderately in the field of economics. U.S. exports are limited by Soviet willingness to accept trade deficits, U.S. willing- ness to extend trade credits, and U.S. acceptance of Soviet expoi-ts. Totals allowed by these constraints on Soviet dollar earnings and credit are not impressive. However, the policy implications of Soviet adjustment to the changed U.S. -Soviet trade relationship are seen to be of potentially high importance. They affect such factors as the military arms race, Soviet allocation of resources as between military weapons develop- ment and civil goods production, long-term trade commitments, and long-term commitments to technological development programs incompatible with a vigorous military posture. It would seem beneficial to U.S. diplomatic goals that Soviet interest in improved economic relations with the United States should be expressed in terms of a reordering of Soviet priorities favoring "technological change and improvement in the availability of desirable consumer goods to the Soviet workers and ])easants". (p. 603) It does not appear likeh^ that the Soviets can pursue vigorousl}^ both the arms race and expanded productivity to sustain exports and pay for imports in connection with programs to modernize their economy and to increase the availability of consmner goods. From the Soviet ])oint of view, the ti'ade pact might be ex])ected to yield such selected benefits as: The closing of the technological gap in Soviet production of civilian goods (p. 54o), ex])an(le(l production of Soviet oil and gas based on U.S. technology (p. 544), increased production of nonfcrrous metals (p. 546), and improved quality of consumer goods (i.e., better diet, clothing, ])ei'sonal transportation, and housing) (p. 547). But the overall aim is to raise the level of their civilian economy to the technical level of the other industrial nations. 1581 It is also possible that tlie internal organization of the Soviet Union in response to the pressures generated by expanded trade with the West may include such reforms as indicators of "profitability," de- centralized decisionmaking by cnteiprise managers, and wage and profit "incentives". Thus, "New planning technicpies, a more flexible piice system, and increased reliance on market forces are key aspects of the reforms". (]). 550) As the report pointed out : While Soviet reformers have not emphasized the international implications of the reforms, it is clear that a more rational economic decisionmaking structure would facilitate the integration of the Soviet economy into the international economic system. Rationalization of Soviet prices would encourage the importation of goods produced inefRcientlj' by domestic industries. At the same time, by fostering effi- ciency in domestic enterprises the Soviet Union may be able to expand its e.\))orts to Western markets. Moreover, economic reform would remove many of the features of Soviet central planning which inhibit Western businessmen from dealing with Soviet foreign trade ()rganizations. (]>]). 5i)l-~>k>2) How the Case Developed The Hardt-Holliday study traced the uneven course of U.S.- U.S.S.R. trade relations from the 1920s through diplomatic relations and a trade agreement of 1933; at that time the U.S. Export-Import Bank was created to finance trade with the Soviet Union. Then, during Workl War II, U.S. military and civilian goods were delivered to the U.S.S.R. through the Lend-Lease Program. After 1945 efforts to normalize peacetime trade relations between the two countries and to bring the Soviets into the world economic community were largely abortive. There were several reasons for this failure. As the report observed : To a large extent, Soviet foreign economic policy in the late 1940s and early 19o0s was a continuation of its j^rewar strategy of minimizing its economic ties to the industrial West. During the 1930s, Soviet foreign economic relations had been characterized by a policy of self-sufficiency or autarky. Although the im- portation of high-technology products and, for a time, the services of foreign engineers were permitted to meet high-priority, short-run needs, minimum reliance on the non-Communist world economy was a primary indicator of econouiie .success, (pp. 53^^-534) Other factors on the Soviet side were the leadership's ideological hostility toward the United States, unresolved questions of pre- 1920 indebtedness of Russia to the United States, and more generally the suspicion of "capitalist" countries and the "Soviet predilec- tion for comprehensive planning and control of the domestic economy. ..." "Cold war" attitudes began to harden soon after the close of World War II, with trade declining to a low point in the early 1950s. Soviet moves to relax from an extreme position of autarky in the late 1950s and the 1960s were again set back by the Cuban crisis, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Vietnam War. On the United States side, "The central feature of U.S. foreign trade polic}^ toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War period was an attempt to deny the Soviet Union the benefits of trade with the more advanced industrial West." There were also allegations of unethical Soviet trade practices such as dumping, pirating of inventions, de- liberate disruption of markets, and use of slave labor. However, during the 1960s, several small steps were taken to expand U.S. -U.S.S.R. trade. U.S. export controls were eased and agricultural 1582 credits were extended. By 1966, President Lyndon Johnson was urging increased economic exchanges to "build bridges" to East European countries, (pp. 534-535) ACCELERATED MOVEMENT TOWARD DETENTE With the advent of the Nixon Presidency, the exploration of means toward detente accelerated. One means of correcting recurring balance- of-payments deficits was expanded trade with the Communist coun- tries to increase exports, production, and employment. A Presidential Commission in 1971 proposed that: "Within the bounds set by stra- tegic considerations, the United States should attempt to expand its trade with Communist countries." Export restrictions and tariffs should be eased and multilateral trade arrangements explored for this i)urpose. (p. 535) B}^ the close of 1971 the pace of events quickened. The Peterson Report in December noted that the countries of the Communist world were trading more extensively with the West and urged a new U.S. approach to Communist tracle in order to improve the trade prospects of the United States and to open the way for Communist countries to join the world trading and monetar}^ community, (p. 536) In November 1971 Secretary of Commerce Stans went to Moscow to discuss trade matters; he was followed in April 1972 by Secretary of Agriculture Butz. These missions encouraged expectations of a substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet trade. Then in May 1972 came the Summit Meeting at which a Joint Commercial Commission was created to negotiate an overall trade agreement (including reciprocal most-favored-nation or MFN provision), arrangements for reciprocal availability of credit and facilities to promote trade, and an arbitra- tion arrangement to resolve trade disputes. By this time also, the Soviet authorities appeared disposed to press for early resolution of the issues that had obstructed trade between the two countries. Thus: On July 8, 1972, an agreement was reached providing credit through the Commodity Credit Corporation for Soviet purchases of American grain. A mari- time agreement was conchided on October 14, 1972, which removed several barriers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18, 1972, a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet Lend-Lease debt were signed. The commercial agreement projected a tripling of U.S.-Soviet trade within a 3-year period and provided a number of regulatory measures. The lend-lease settlement arranged a repavmcnt schedule for the Soviet World War II debt to the United States, (p. 538) Although the discussions of the series of agreements projected optimistic consequences for future trade between the two countries, the significant technological lag of the U.S.S.R. in other areas than mihtary and space offered less reason for these expectations. Soviet economic relations with the West rested mainly on technology trans- fers to the relatively backward Soviet industries, paid for by exports of raw materials. This structure of trade was unlikely to be quickly altered by the new agreements. U.S. Involvement Assessment of the implications for the United States of the trade agreements \v\i\\ the Soviet Union must consider both costs and benefits, problems as well as opportunities, and arrangements to fulfill the expectations raised by the agreements. 1583 It is generally assumed that trade is a means of encouraging more amicable and stable relations among nations. U.S. interest in Soviet trade has tended to reach beyond this generality: Although somewhat inconsistent in application, a policy of reward-penalty appeared to be followed by the United States, apparently with three objectives: (1) To encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lowering force levels, and moderating crisis management; (2) To encourage detente through moderation and reform of the Soviet regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic reform, freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate; (3) To encourage polycentrism in the Commimist world, detente in the foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than the U.S.S.R., and moderation in their domestic policies, (p. 040) U.S. interest in the effects of expanded trade and detente with the Soviets raises ambiguities in at least four areas: As to wlietlier the U.S.S.R. exerts a moderating influence on world tensions or helps foment dissensions; as to whether Soviet priorities need to shift to meeting consumer requirements or to remain fixed on strategic mili- tary weapons; as to whether Soviet internal controls are easing to encourage modernization and professionalism or tightening over civil liberties, emigration, and access to foreign media; and as to increased or decreased independence of satellite countries. On the commercial side, the question persists as to how good a customer the U.S.S.R. can be. One view, ofi'ered in the study, is that "increasing U.S. sales in agribusiness facilities, petroleum and natural gas equipment, computer systems, and a variety of other high- technology lines may be an effective wedge into the wSoviet market; once begun, these sales tend to accelerate over time", (p. 572) This principle was extended in the discussion to apply generally to advanced industrial systems, management-control-communications systems, mass production machinery building, agribusiness as both a system and a series of technologies, and tourist systems. The hypothesis is offered that requirements for imports in these areas "appear to represent a pattern of technical and managerial relatedness that would limit the ability of Soviet leaders to take short-term advantages, borrow technology, and then withdraw from continued U.S. -Soviet economic relations in ])articular lines." (pp. 578-574) BARRIERS TO TR.A.DE EXPANSION Again from the U.S. point of view, there are major barriers to the proposed trade expansion. One is the unfamiliarity of U.S. business- men with Soviet foreign trade techniques. Corporate rights are some- what imprecisely defined. "One feature of Soviet state trading to which Western businessmen object is the necessity of dealing with Soviet foreign trade enterprises." There is no direct contact with Soviet producers, consumers, and (hstributors. (p. 591) There is also a tendency for Soviet traders to "insist on barter trade, tied trans- actions, and other clumsy arrangements." Other barriers are the limited Soviet export capability, the doubtful adaptability of Soviet trade institutions to large-scale economic cooperation, and U.S. resistance to exports with possible "national security" implications, (p. 593) The report concluded that further trade negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, to ease the indicated barriers, 1584 called for a considerable mobilization of U.S. talent. "In order to link the broadest security and diplomatic interests with the commercial arrangements, the involvement of high-level polic3rmakers is es- sential." Also indispensable are "specialists on the Soviet Union, foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen" to provide technical advice. In short: The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and the broad national interests inherent in U.S. -Soviet relations require a permanent working blend of experienced people with the following characteristics : a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches, authorized to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole ; b. Government trade specialists from the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, State, and other agencies ; c. Specialists on Soviet political-economic affairs from governmental or academic positions; and (1. Repivseiitatives of private business and hankiuR. (p. (')05) Bole oj Congress The Hardt-Holliday report pointed out that, "Congress neces- sarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S.-Soviet economic re- lations in the future." For example, "Congressional approval is re- quired for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union". (]). 5:^9) Congressional action would also be rcciuired to e.\|)an(l the credit resources of the Plxpoi-t-Iinpoi-t liank (p. 5S6) and would be desirable to monitor the various easements in legulation by the administration to facilitate the enlarging ])attern of U.S.-Soviet trade. Although seveial reports (|). 5.'^eralization in recent years. The Expoi-t Administration Act of 1969 effected a major reorientation in U.S. export control policy. It maintained the controls that had been in effect since World War II, but called for a removal of controls on goods and technology that are readily available to Communist coun- tries from non-U.S. sources and on items that are only marginally of military value. The 1969 legislation rej^resented a new mandate for exi)ort controls. Whereas the thrust of previous laws had been to limit East -West trade, the new Act was designed to foster such trade. The Nixon administration initially resisted the changes in the law but subsequently accepted them and used the new mandate to reduce sub- stantially the amount of goods and technologies that were prohibited for export to Communist countries. The Export Administration Amendments of 1977 (Public Law 95-52), signed by President Carter on June 22, 1977, made further significant changes in the law. They include a requirement to expedite the export licensing process and language which shifts the emphasis of national security controls from exports to Communist countries as such to exports to any country which poses a threat to the United States. Carter Administration Policy The Carter Administration has not enunciated a comprehensive policy on U.S. East-West trade. However, the initial steps taken in this area and statements by administration spokesmen suggest an intention to follow cautiously the lead of previous administrations in normalizing commercial relations with the East. Thus, President Carter has recommended an extension of the waiver authority enabling Romania to maintain its MFN status and eligibility for government credits. His administration has opened negotiations with the People's Republic of China on settlement of financial claims between the two countries — an important step toward expanding trade. The President has also signed the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, which appear to call for a less restrictive policy on export controls toward Communist countiies. At the same time, the Carter administration's denial of an export license for the sale of a sophisticated Cyber-76 computer to the Soviet Union seemingly established a precedent for limiting the kinds of technology eligible for export to the East. Statements by administration spokesmen have confirmed a general inclination toward normalization of U.S. trade with Communist countries. In his confirmation hearings before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, John L. Moore, President Carter's nominee as President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, ex- pressed his support for Eximbank financing of trade with the Soviet Union.^**^* Later, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that he hoped !*»» U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urt>an Affairs. Nomina- tion of John L. Moore, Jr. Hearings, 95th Congress, Ist session, April 20, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.. 1977; p 7. 1592 that Congress would repeal the Trade Act restrictions of MFX and ofovernment credits for non-market economy countries. Secretary Vance described U.S. -Soviet trade as "an important underpinninor of our relationship." ^"^^ Secretary Vance made his comments after repeated expressions by Soviet officials of dissatisfaction with the status quo in U.S.-Soviet trade. Soviet representatives officially con- ve3-ed tlieir dissatisfaction to the Carter administration in a June 1977 meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission,^"^'' The Soviet delegation informed U.S. representatives that imports from the United States would drop sharply in 1977 and 1978 as a result of the continuing trade and credit restrictions. A reduction of U.S. ex- ports to the Soviet Union had been anticipated because of a reduced Soviet need for U.S. grain, Soviet hard currency payments problems, and the end of Soviet orders for several large industrial projects which had made extensive use of U.S. machinery and equipment. However, Soviet officials have asserted that they would shift future import orders from U.S. firms to other Western firms if the U.S. restrictions remain. Some Illustrative Questions Should the United States grant trade benefits to governments which pursue hostile foreign policies and repressive domestic policies? Will increased U.S. trade with Communist countries help to bring favorable change in their policies? Will exports of U.S. technology, often assisted by low-cost Govern- ment credits, assist the economic and military development of Com- munist countries? Will the United States receive significant economic benefits from East-West trade? Should the United States make exceptions to its general long-run policy of advocating unrestricted international trade? Is there a danger that the United States might become dependent on Communist countries for important raw material supplies? What effects are increased economic exchanges, especially in tech- nology-intensive products, likely to have on U.S. foreign policy goals and on U.S. national security? What technological contributions will U.S.-Soviet commercial exchanges make to American industry? What risks will these exchanges pose to specific U.S. industries and industrial corporations? Does the Soviet leadership perceive as yet the need for serious changes in internal planning and management to rationalize produc- tion to satisfy market needs? At what point will the leadership see the cost of not changing as grea,ter than the cost of change? Does the sale of U.S. high technology products to the Soviet Union encourage or discourage Soviet military preparedness? Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods of commitment than w^as the case in the past? Does the trade agreement represent a part of a new pattern of relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States? io.-!b Wttshliigton I'ost. .Tune 17. 1977. p. A22. 103c 'x-he U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission wa.s established in 1972 to find ways to facilitate and promote commercial ties between the two countries. The June 1977 meeting was the first of the Carter Administration. See Washington Post, June 11, 1977, p. D8. 1593 Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soviet economy and the non-Communist world economic system? How can economic exchanges with the Soviet Union, particularly those involving technology transfers, be used to further U.S. foreign policy? What changes are needed in negotiating procedures and commercial institutions to insure that the United States maximizes its political and economic benefits? In light of past grain sales, the question is important as to how good a market the Soviet Union really is for U.S. exports and how the United States may have to change its marketing procedures to deal effectively with the East. And also: how good an investment for the United States is Soviet exploitation of petroleum, natural gas, or other raw materials? Chapter 17 — Six Substantive Issues Which Further Illustrate the Interaction CONTENTS Page Issue One — The Evolution of International Technology: Statement of the Issue 1601 Importance of the Issue 1602 How the Issue Developed 1602 Technology as a Primary Source of National Power 1603 Dimensions of the Impact of Technology on Society and on Diplomacy 1604 U.S. Involvement 1606 Elements of U.S. Technological Structure 1607 Role of Congress 1608 Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 1609 Author's Reassessment 1611 Some Illustrative Questions 1013 Issue Two— The Politics of Global Health : Statement of the Issue 1014 Importance of the Issue 1614 How the Issue Developed 1615 Beginning of Preventive Medicine 1615 Early International Efforts To Control Disease 1616 Establishment of World Health Organization 1617 Status and Potential of WHO Today 1618 U.S. Involvement 1619 Possible Reasons for Early U.S. Delay in Supporting WHO 1620 U.S. Government Organization for International Health Affairs- . 1620 The Role of DHEW 1621 The DOD Role in International Health 1621 Role of Congress 1622 Inadequate Budget Justification for U.S. Share of WHO Funding Support 1623 Lack of Understanding of Multilateral Health Programs 1023 Status of the Issue 1624 Prospects and Options 1625 Seeming Need of Stronger U.S. Support of International Health Programs 1625 Reasons for Possible Shift of Budget Defense Role From State to DHEW 1626 Author's Reassessment 1627 Implications of Global Health Planning 1628 Some Illustrative Questions 1629 Issue Three — Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation 1629 Statement of the Issue 1630 Importance of the Issue 1631 How the Issue Developed 1632 U.S. Involvement 1633 U.S. Policy Need of Facts About Food and Populations 1634 Role of Congress 1634 Status of the Issue in 1971 1635 Food/People Equation as Index of Development 1636 Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study 1636 Bilateral Versus Multilateral Approach 1630 Problems of the Green Revolution 1638 Problems of Stabilizing Populations 1638 Author's Reassessment 1639 Relevance of the Study 6 Years Later 1639 Food/Population Problem Inseparable From Development Process 1640 Early Congressional Recognition of Problem 1641 Some Illustrative Questions 1641 (1597) Ii598 Issue Four — U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs Page for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange 1642 Statement of the Issue 1643 Importance of the Issue 1644 How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 1645 Agencies Involved in U.S. Exchange Programs 1646 The Fulbright-Hays (State Department) Program 1647 Lack of Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness 1648 National Science Foundation Programs 1649 The NAS-NRC Inter-Academy Exchasnges 1651 Role of Congress 1653 Fulbright-Hays Program 1653 NSF Programs 1654 NAS-NRC Programs 1654 Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options 1655 FCST Efforts To Improve Management of U.S. Exchange Programs 1656 Author's Reassessment 1658 Continuing Need for Better Direction and Coordination 1658 Some Illustrative Questions 1659 Issue Five — Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility: Statement of the Issue 1661 Importance of the Issue 1661 How the Issue Developed 1662 The Heightened Human Mobility of Modern Times 1663 Impact of Decolonization on Brain Drain 1664 Effects of Changes in Immigration Priorities 1664 U.S. Involvement 1665 Main Trends in Immigration 1666 The Growing Influx of Foreign Medical Graduates 1666 The Foreign Medical Graduates as a U.S. Domestic Problem 1667 The Brain Drain as an International Issue 1668 The Complexity of the Brain Drain Problem 1669 Role of Congress 1670 Status of the Issue 1671 Prospects and Options 1673 The Problem of Losing Track of Problems 1673 Remedies for the Brain Drain Problem 1674 Some U.S. Options in Coping With Brain Drain 1675 Author's Reassessment 1676 Some Illustrative Questions 1677 Issue Six — Science and Technology in the Department of State 1678 Statement of the Issue 1679 Importance of the Issue 1680 How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement 1681 Official U.S. Concern With Science and Technology 1681 The Berkner Report 1682 Establishment of Post of Science Adviser 1 682 The Ups and Downs of Science at State 1683 Functions and Limitations of SCI 1684 Shift of Presidential Science Advisory Functions to NSF and State; Creation of OES 1685 Role of Congress. 1686 Earlier Congressional Studies of Science, Technology, and Foreign Policy 1686 Studies and Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Committee 1687 Studies and Hearings by House Science and Astronautics Com- mittee ■_ 1688 Introduction of National Science Policy Bill 1689 The Murphy Commission Report 1690 Need of Added Congressional Resources 1690 1^9 Issue Six — Science and Technology in the Department of State — Con. Page Status of the Issue 1691 Diplomatic Personnel Are Discouraged From Acquiring Tech- nical Expertise 1691 The Department Is Not Organized To Conduct Technical Planning 1692 Presidential Leadership Has Not Motivated the Necessary Technical Modernization of the Department 1692 Prospects and Options 1693 Author's Reassessment 1693 Kissinger's 19 Proposals to U.N. General Assembly 1694 Implications of Kissinger Initiatives for State Department and Congressional Backstopping 1 695 New Study of State Department's Management of Diplomacy- Technology Interface 1696 Some Illustrative Questions 1698 Appendix: Letter of Resignation to Secretary Kissinger From Assist- ant Secretary Dixy Lee Ray and Her Letter to the President 1701 CHAPTER 17— SIX SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH FURTHER ILLUSTRATE THE INTERACTION The remarks introducin*:: chaptoi- Ki apply to this cha]:)ter as well. The foi'niat ti-overnino; the commentaries to follow did'ers only slightly from that used in summarizing' the six cases just presented: Statement of the issue Importance of the issue How the issue developed U.S. involvement Role of Congress Status of the issue Prospects and options Author's reassessment Some illustrative questions ISSUE ONE— THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY Statement of the Issue This initial study ^°* was designed to provide an overview of the subject, and at the same time to express a common theme for the series. Thus: The focus of this chapter is on technology. It is intended: To delineate the important ways in which technology influences diplomacy; to show technological change as a process producing effects that diplomats must deal with ; and to raise questions as to whether and how governments can make purposeful, constructive use of these processes to further diplomatic objectives. '"^ The theme was stated in universal terms, but an assumption of the study series was — and remains — that the United States could further its interests and its position in the world by systematically and judiciously exploiting its technological skills ancl resources. Seven years and 12 studies later, however, the project director and associate director find themselves impressed not so much by the opportunities (though these are many and great) as by the dimensions of the obstacles to their realization, and by the lack of appreciation even in the United States itself of both the opportunities and the obstacles. In the world at large, irresponsible expressions of nationalism and independence oppose the working out of acceptable accommodation w^th the imperatives of technology-induced interdependence. There is evidently a dearth of national and world leadership that sufficiently comprehends and takes determined steps to direct the dynamics of technological change. Also largely lacking are concepts and machinery of mid-range and long-range planning for both U.S. and global growth and development which take appropriate account of the likely im- 'M U.S. Congress, House, Committpe on Foreign Affairs, The Evolution of International Teclinology, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Science Policy Re- search Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Olhce, December 1070. See vol. 11, pp. (;()7-(i80. iM Ibid., p. (in. (1601) 1602 pacts of further technological advances. The rising dangers of drift, drag, and decay threaten everywhere. But times of uncertainty and flux are not new in history, and despair has never been an answer to human problems. An important part of the answer to the problems of civilization today lies in better under- standing of the changes being wrought in the world by technology and in efforts to direct these changes. The present study, and the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy series as a whole, represent an attempt to contribute to such understanding. Importance of the Issue The influence of technology in human affairs is pervasive and profound. As Vietnam reminds us, technology may not be the decisive force in resolving a given issue in some particular situation, but its cumulative impact on people's lives all over the world is nonetheless powerful, and growing. Its growth is so dynamic, indeed, that some critics would arrest it altogether if they could, professedly to save the world from mind-boggling excesses of human inventiveness. Other more optimistic analysts, noting that for the first time in history it is technically possible — given the will, and effective planning and organization — to eradicate famine, epidemic disease, and other impediments to the physical well-being of the world's peoples, argue for actively controlling and directing technology to make it serve the greatest good of the greatest number. Whatever the point of view, technology mil increasingly be a force to reckon with. The responsibihty for reckoning with it, while in part diffused among such extranational instrumentalities as multinational corporations and agencies of the United Nations, is mainly vested in sovereign nations, which may or may not rise to the challenge. Diplo- macy is the instrument in deahngs among sovereign nations. It is therefore important that the association between technology and diplomacy, which in the past has tended to be formal, hmited, and contrived, become increasingly close, continuous, and comfortable. Hoiv the Issue Developed ' This study has for its subject the full range of applications of technology to human affairs. It explores the history of how these applications have proliferated since the beginning of the industrial revolution and in a more intensive way since World War II. Technology, as used in the study series, is a comprehensive term "covering a wide variety of scientific and technical activities and products. In its simplest usage, it merely signifies 'tools.' At the other extreme, it conveys the broad meaning of 'how man works.' " ^"^ In the context of planned activity it "signifies the systematic, purposeful application of knowledge to modify an environment toward pre- determined goals." '" Foreshadowing the more detailed treatment of the interrelationships of technology and diplomacy 4^2 years later in the last of the 12 studies, Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations, this early study spoke of "Technology as the Underpinning of Diplomacy": '"6 l\)\d., I). (il2. "" Huddle,' Th( M(konij I'Tojict. vol. 1. p. »i-'i (footnolc). •'^I'l' :il«i IHiddlc. ScUiia and 'J'lchiiolwjy in llic De part iiK lit of Slate, Introduction, vol. 1!, pp- 132.")-133t. 1603 The profound influence that technological change has had in the past, and promises to have for the future, implies the need for a strong corps of diplomats trained to anticipate and prepare for the direct and indirect impacts of technology on diplomatic concerns . . . " '°^ Diplomacy, the study continued, deals with problems between sovereign nations and with the common concerns of members of the world community of nations. "The objective of diplomacy is to re- concile or resolve issues and establish agreements to advance the national interest in a constantly changing world. Changes within the jurisdiction of each member of the world community alter its relations with others. No source of change is more potent than an alteration in a nation's technological condition." It produces changes of many kinds at many levels of impacts and interactions: military, commercial, cultural, political, and scientific; these changes involve many agencies of government, the academic world, private business, and the public at large. Familiarity with technology, and with the nature of its impacts, is thus an indispensable tool of the diplomat. Moreover, the skill with which a nation manages and advances its own technology contributes to the status of its diplomats, and to the options with which they can negotiate. In both senses, national technology confers diplomatic power.^"' TECHNOLOGY AS A PRIMARY SOURCE OF NATIONAL POWER But the point can be made even more strongly: ". . . technology is a 'primary source of national power and diplomatic influence." "° (Emphasis added.) The story of how technology has progressively aflfected human civilization is too long, and too familiar, to be retold here. The reader interested in detail is referred to The Evolution of International Tech- nology or — since even this is a highly abbreviated account — to the definitive treatment contained in the five-volume work, A History of Technology }^^ The following account is limited to a few reminders of the history of the past century: "Early in the industrial revolution, a race began for both overseas markets for manufactured goods and supplies of needed raw materiaLs. In this race the process was one of commercial penetration, followed by military enforcement of commercial rights." "' From the close of the Napoleonic Wars to the latter part of the 19th century, England was technologically and industrially the dominant nation of the world. Between 1870 and 1895, Germany surpassed England and assumed world technological leadership. "On the eve of World War I, Germany's energy showed itself in many ways: in ambitious plans for a railroad line to the Middle East, construction of a modern war fleet, development of African colonies, and the prospect of hegemony over the European continent. When the war broke out, Germany's superior technology very nearly enabled her to overmatch the combination of England, France, Italy, and Russia." "^ So strong was the emphasis in German education on technological skills and innovation that even after defeat in 1918, followed by two decades of social upheavals, inflation, political instability, and finally "a dictatorship too erratic in its concepts to exploit systematically the m* Huddle, The J-Joliilion of Intirnalional T-i Ibid., p. 015. 1606 public and professional anxiety. Imperfections in technology are more and more coming under attack, as in the cases of air and water pollu- tion, noise, radiation, thermal effects, solid waste, and accumulations of toxic materials. Problems of information overload confront tech- nologists in fields of medicine, of properties of materials, and of scientific discoveries generally. With continued global growth in both the uses and the adverse side effects of technology in prospect, the leading technological nations — of which the United States is the foremost — are increasingly confronted with awkward diplomatic problems. U.S. Involvement Many factors — geographic, historical, sociological, and economic — contributed to the emergence of the United States as the technologi- cally most d^aiamic Nation of the world : An unpeopled continent with rich natural resources and temperate climate was settled by immigrants who tended to be self-selected for initiative [and] inde- pendence. ... A chronic labor shortage automatically placed value on labor- saving devices and machinery. These combined to sustain rapid progress in technological innovation toward high manpower productivity and swift economic growth. Foremost among the new Nation's needs were roads, canals, and a postal system, all of which the early Government undertook to provide. Later, the railroad and telegraph were eagerly seized upon to link up throughout all parts of the Nation the flow of goods and information. The American Civil War had a profound effect on technology. For the first time, ". . . the technological resources of a whole Nation were ultimately mobil- ized to overwhelm an opponent. There was mass production of weapons and ammunition, of uniforms and boots; canned food was .supphed to armies trans- ported for the first time by rail."'22 Thereafter came great industrial growth, characterized by the expansion of the railroad network throughout the United States, heavy output of steel, the mass production of lighter engineering products (agricultural equipment, the typewriter, the sewing machine, and the bicycle), and radical improvements in the metalworking machine tool — wdiich (to quote Walt W. Rostow) : . . . comes as close to being a correct symbol for the second phase of industrial growth as the railway is for the first. And, by the 1890s, electricity, chemical, and automobile industries, which were to play an extremely important part in the third phase, were commercially in being, the first two rooted in new and expanding fields of science and technology. '^^ The opening of the 20th century was marked by two important new trends which heightened the intensity of U.S. exploitation of industrial technology. One was the appearance of the large industrial laboratory; the other was the rapid spread, by the Taylor Societies, of the doctrine of "scientific management." The great industrial laboratories made products better and scientific management made them lower in cost. "World War II dramatized the importance of science for military power, but as a practical matter it was technology that proved itself of importance": Trained American scientists, with an impressive supi)lement of refugee and British scientists, were able to turn themselves into technologists to serve a great national and international purpose. In 194.'i, when the scientists called attention to the opportunities of the "endless frontier" of science, and urged its public support, they based their claim on the proposition that investment in '" Ibid., p. (322. ■23 Jhid., p. 022. 1607 research and education in the sciences would automatically reward society — • would .stimulate innovation, and develop opportunities for an expanding econ- omy — in addition to its having military implications. When their a{)peal was heeded, beginning about 1950, a veritable explosion, scientific and technological, took place. '2* ELEMENTS OF U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL STRUCTURE By 1970 the United States, combining a higli-consumption economy with a heavy emphasis on scientific innovation, had built a techno- logical structure that included the following principal elements: A large number of very large, efficient, highly productive, geographically extended business enterprises with families of satellite suppliers of materials, components, and specialized services, comprising complex, interconnected, production-distribution-service enterprises; separation of business ownership from business management; and a great increase in policy, planning, and admin- istrative staff in the management of enterprises of all kinds. ^^^ The two decades foUowing the outbreak of the Korean War were a period of great ferment, with intensive U.S. efforts in both military and nonmilitary research and development. In his book about Amer- ican technological dominance, The American Challenge (1968), French writer J. J. Servan-Schreiber observes that from the launching of the first Sputnik (October 1957): American power has made an unprecedented leap forward. It has undergone a violent and productive internal revolution. Technological innovation has now become the basic objective of economic policy. In America today the government official, the industrial manager, the economics professor, the engineer, and the scientist have joined forces to develop coordinated techniques for integrating factors of production. These techniques have stimulated what amounts to a permanent industrial revolution.'-" But accompanying the "leap forward" were some fumbling back- ward and sideways steps, at least in the area of technological inputs into American diplomacy. With the outstanding e.xceptions of the highly successful Marshall Plan to restore European industry after World War II and the U.S. role in the emergence of a new Japan, and except also for the technological coup of the Berlin airlift, U.S. employment of technology as an instrument of foreign policy enjoyed limited success. The Korean War, and the Vietnamese conflict later on, demonstrated "the serious, painful, and frustrating limitations of technology in waging a limited war against a highly organized and resourceful, if technologically unsophisticated, adversary." ^" The Soviet Union achieved brilliant if temporary diplomatic advantages with its unexpectedly fast development of fission and then fusion weapons, and with the launching of Sputnik I. Subsequent world admiration for U.S. space achievements "was tempered by reserva- tions over U.S. inability to solve such domestic problems as pollution, crime, and highway accidents . . ." i^s gome constructive interna- tional applications of U.S. technology proved to have awkward side effects: for example, the insecticide DDT pla^^ed an important part in malarial control but came to be recognized as ecologically un- desirable. Various nations, both developed and developing, became concerned over the "brain drain" to the United States. (See Issue 1-' Ibid., p. 023. 1" Ibid. '26 Ibid., p. (i2-l. '■-' Ibid., p. (i2(). 12S Ibid., p. 027. 1608 Five for an analysis of this problem.) The territorial sovereign t}' con- cept in international law and the issue of ownership of the ocean floor came increasingly into question; the United States often did not succeed in developing diplomatic solutions to protect its own interests and that of its nationals in this critical sphere, or alternatively to reach harmonious international understandings in the interests of all. (See Case Five.) The rise of the multinational corporation, gaining impetus from "the opportunity seized by American entrepreneurs to exploit U.S. computer and electronic technologies in European markets," ^^^ created complex policy problems for the U.S. Government and raised questions as to proper relationships and degrees of control. Even the innovative "Green Revolution," which seemed to buy time for the search for solutions to the ultimate human problem of balancing food and population (see Issue Three), proved to have its special technological problems and political dangers. "Thus, by the close of 1970, it was evident that U.S. technology had not been an unqualified success in furthering either U.S. foreign policy objectives or the aspirations of the world at large": The undoubted promise of technology had not achieved fulfillment. It was not clear why. AVas it because technologists were unable to produce imflawed innovations? Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies for global effects? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplo- mats to achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product? Where did — • and do — the weaknesses lie? '^^ The outstanding development in technologically based diplomacy since the above words were written has been the setback suffered by the oil-dependent nations at the hands of the oil producers — a setback which compounded a major world economic recession already under- way. As of mid-1977, the foregoing questions seem more insistent than ever. Role of Congress As a broad tour d 'horizon, the study of Tke Evolution of Inter- national Technology does not address the legislative aspect in the United States, except to acknowledge in passing that, "The political role of the farmer and the response of the Congress to the needs of the farmer appear to have been affected by the technological revolu- tion in agriculture. . . . Much of the legislation between 1800 and 1900 had a rural or agricultural bias, including the Northwest Ordi- nance, creation of the Department of Agriculture, the land grant colleges, the Homestead Act, railroad land grants and subsidies, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and sustained support for agri- cultural research." ^^^ For the sake of perspective, however, it should be noted that Con- gress has played a significant part in giving shape and direction to the technological leadership exercised by the United States since World War II. The Marshall Plan, technical assistance to developing nations, establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and subse- quent support of European nuclear power activities, the space pro- gram (including the creation of related organizational structures in the executive branch and in the Congress itself) in response to the challenge of Sputnik I, the development of the Polaris system — these 129 Ibid. ■30 Ibid. 131 Ibid., P.G42. 1609 are only a few of the American undertakings combining technology and diplomacy in which Congress has been involved, and in some of which it has at times played the leading U.S. role. It is not the purpose here to catalog such congressional involvements; a number of them are explored in some detail in the other studies of the Science, Tech- nology, and American Diplomacy series. Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options Some of the main points made in the study, as of December 1970, under the heading of "The Emerging Policy Issues of International Technology," deal with effects of technology as the dominant factor of change that has shaped the modern world; these are shown to be both beneficial and injurious. The point has been made that tech- nology is the most obvious avenue to national strength and inter- national influence. "Technology has also been shown to be a potent force, linking the world together by many threads. Technolog}^ itself has an evident propensity to 'go global'." ^^^ The United States, by virtue of tremendous vigor and public expenditure in the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, enjoys a com- manding technological lead among the nations of the world. As Herman Pollack has said: "The attraction generated by this pre- eminence among the nations of the world, especially those in the process of development, is perhaps one of the lesser understood but more pervasively powerful forces at work in international relation- ships today." ^^^ But will the United States adopt wise and imaginative policies to turn its technological tour de force into permanent gains for humanity?— "The emerging question posed by the onrush of tech- nology, and its effect on the relations among the countries of the world, is whether this potent factor of change and national power is to operate in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable, to devise a national strategy to guide and direct it, to stimulate innovation in some directions, and possibly to slow and inhibit innovation in others." '^' In the July 1970 issue of Science, Prof. Robert Gilpin of Princeton identified three major interrelated economic consequences of modern technology: increased interdependence among national economies, the growing role of technological innovation in economic growth and competition, and the rapid spread of multinational corporations, primarily dominated by American capital. He suggested that a "new international economy" was developing under the stimulus of tech- nology, and that there were three alternative national strategies in response to the development: (1) "to support scientific and tech- nological development across the broadest front possible"; (2) scien- tific and technological specialization; and (3) the importation of foreign technology. The United States and the Soviet Union [wrote Gilyiin] have followed the first strategy; Sweden, Great Britain, and a number of other countries have followed the second; while Japan and West Germany have, in general, followed the third. Although the U.S. strategy has been relatively successful, particularly 133 Ibid., p. 675. 1" Ihid. i3< Ihid. 1610 in fields of high technology like space and the computer, it has begun to show defects, and, in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy will become an increasingly important political issue." '^^ Gilpin argued that, first of all, "even America does not have the economic and technical resources to support all projects of impor- tance; it too must choose. Second, a high proportion of the limited resources has gone into militar}' and military-related projects, while pressing social and economic ideas of the society have been neglected. Third, the devastating consequence of technological advance for the environment has suddenly emerged as a major national concern. . . ." ^^^ Accordingly, the study suggests, "thought might be given . . . 'to the formulation of a more explicit technological strategy designed to increase the social return of its immense investment in science and technology and to minimize its negative environmental effects.' Gilpin concludes with a prediction that" : . . . To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems."' The study observes that the great efforts of the United States in science and technology — since 1940, at least — were inspired by external events. The Manhattan Project was initiated out of fear that Nazi Germany might achieve nuclear weapons first. Work on the H-bomb was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic-missile submarine was a response to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race was an effort to catch up with and pass the Soviets in a strategically and psychologically important area in which they had assumed a lead. "The great technological programs supported by the United States are still in military, atomic, and space developments, and all are motivated by events outside the United States or else support for them wanes." '^* Indeed, it is no secret that man}^ U.S. domestic programs owe a substantial measure of their support to the circumstance that they can be tied to the coattails of programs related to military security. Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard declares that national defense is too often used as justification for doing what is needed simply for the good of American society. For example: We backed into Federal support of higher education while stoutly insisting that we were only buying necessary military research results. We entered upon school curriculum reform, long ov^erdue, on the grounds that it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts. We launched a gigantic interstate highway program on the grounds that it was needed for national defense. We fostered the study of international affairs and the development of foreign area research on the grounds that a great power needed this knowledge to maintain its power position.'^' 135 Ibid., p. G7G. 13' Itj:a. 133 HM.. pp. 070-077. 139 Ibicl., p. 077. 1611 It seems paradoxical, concludes the study, that the United States — best equipped to apply science and technology to the solution of the world's problems, and credited with the highest development of managerial skills — "has been reluctant to devise and implement a positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no lack of opportunities: earth resources satellites, ocean and ocean floor development, urban improvement, recovery of resources from all forms of waste, the Oak Kidge proposal for large agricultural-industrial- nuclear complexes, and man}^ more." '^° Author's Reassessment Technology is perhaps the most powerful of all forces for change in the modern world. It' measures the qualification of nations for leadership in the community of nations. It affords a nieans for the achievement of a nation's domestic and foreign goals. It is a principal substance of modern diplomacy. A nation's diplomatic voice is often heard in proportion to the nation's excellence in science and tech- nology, and in its competence to use these for national and inter- national purposes. In this chronologically first substantive study of the Science, Tech- nology, and American Diplomacy series, the research drew mainly on historical sources. Most of the eleven studies that followed it provided evidence that the theme and findings of this study were altogether valid. The impact of the energy crisis, the demands by developing countries for technical assistance, and the directions recently taken by bilateral and multilateral programs, are some additional contemporary evidences of their validity. The emphasis of the study was on the roles and impacts of tech- nology on the world scene. Attention might usefully have been given also to the ranges of problems created by these developments for U.S. and foreign diplomats and for the U.S. Congress. The study demonstrated beyond cavil the diplomatic significance of technology. But the relevance of the study would have been more incisive if the diplomatic issues related to main technological trends had been ex- plicitly stated. This was done in later studies in the series with nar- rower scope, and most strongly of all in the concluding substantive stud}'. Science and Technology in the Departjnent of State. (See vol. 11, pp. 1319-1504.) ' _ There are two aspects to the question of legislative relevance : the actual relevance of the subject of international technology for the Congress, and its perceived relevance as demonstrated by congressional action. The variety of problems of diplomacy with substantial tech- nological content is large, and growing. Accordingly, the subject is increasingly more relevant for the Congress. However, the complexity of the problems presented, and the want of means for rendering them coherent and manageable, stand in the way of congressional action. At the oXitset of the project the decision was made, as to its scope, to encompass both science and technology in their relation to diplo- macy. It soon became evident that science and technology had different kinds of impacts on diplomacy. In starting out with an examination of the technological impacts on diplomacy, we saw that these were direct and powerful; moreover, we observed also that the main im- pacts of science on diplomacy tended to be indirect — through the "0 Ibid. 96-243 O - 77 - 1612 medium of technology that grew out of the science. It also became evident that in the early etiorts to relate science and technology programatically to diplomacy the emphasis was on science and the leadership was provided by the scientific community. Science had the prestige and the intellectual attractions. However, with the passage of time it has become apparent that functionally technology has the greater direct impact and requires more attention of diplomatic analysts. Now there are some persons who even contend that science should not be separated from technology in the diplomatic environ- ment lest science drop out of the orbit. The study emphasized the changes in the effects of technology on U.S. diplomacy over the past several decades. These changes were in terms of pace, size, complexity, variety or scope, and range and per- vasiveness of impacts. In more general terms : A nation that consciously and dynamically lays the groundwork for tech- nological advance, encourages technological skills, rewards innovation, and systematically increases the variety, depth, sophistication, and universality of its technology, is in a stronger bargaining position than a nation that does not. Technology increases the range of [diplomatic] options. . . . Technology was seen to be a "primary source of national power and diplomatic influence," but at the same time the quest for such power and influence led to the internationalization of technology. Thus: ... As each technology evolved it became internationalized, its substance became the subject of international conversations, its effects extended beyond national boundaries, and [the study foresaw as an ultimate outcome] the evolution of a global system incorporating or resolving the technology. Recent examples of this process are to be found in the production, distribution, and use of energy fuels and industrial materials. At the third Henniker Conference on National Materials Policy a major theme to emerge was that modern nations are "condemned to interdependence." Three trends were observed in the global sweep of technology: (1) The important wa^'s in which evolving technologies added to the problems and issues confronting the diplomat (as was made abundantly evident later in the study Science and Technology in the Department of State) ; (2) the wa3^s in which technology tended to draw nations together in international enterprises (as demonstrated in the studies of world food/population balance, global health, the Mekong project, and commercial uses of atomic energy, for example) ; and (3) the emergence of many positive values and serious dangers of technology that were of concern to many nations (and here the evidence is over- whelming: SALT talks, the Stockholm conference on the environment, the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on materials, various meetings on food and population, energ}'^ and so on). These trends evidence a growing need for explicit plans to manage technology to produce global results compatible with U.S. foreign policy. (Although on this last point the need was abundantly documented throughout the series, and especially in Science and Technology in the Department of State, the performance and the institutional provisions to meet the need were, in general, not considered adequate.) 1613 An interesting contemporary example of both the importance and the ambivalence of technological impact on diplomacy is the reception by the "Third World" of the U.S. plan for earth resources satellite surveys. These were recognized as beneficial in the discovery and inventorying of resources but denounced as an invasion of sovereignty and a means by which rich nations would be enabled to plunder the minerals of the poor countries. One conclusion of considerable importance was neglected in this study: that the kinds of impacts of a given technology and the rate at which they occur are susceptible of analysis leading to prediction. The study of diplomatic consequences of a technology is accordingly a vital activity. The impacts are reasonably foreseeable, and the necessary diplomatic responses can likewise be defined in advance with careful study. But they seldom are. With the benefit of hindsight, this neglected area of diplomatic planning was later discusse d in Science and Technology in the Department oj State. The purpose of this initial study was to define and explore the universe of technology as related to diplomacy. The principal issue it raised that might have taken legislative form concerned the relative utility for U.S. diplomacy of bilateral versus multilateral programs. This issue runs as a theme throughout many of the subsequent studies. However, the question persists and the need for its examination as a policy issue is greater than ever. The space program is the subject of some 250 bilateral agreements. Bilateral science agreements number another 50 or so. Atomic energy bilaterals are continuing to pro- liferate. Precisely how these are coordinated for foreign policy pur- poses, and how they relate to multilateral objectives and programs, is a continuing perplexity. Both for the 1970s and for the rest of the present century, the issue of global management of technology is likely to remain a foremost concern of U.S. diplomacy. Some Illustrative Questions What are the U.S. diplomatic goals that are served, or contravened, by the international spread of technology and its impacts? How do U.S. diplomatic goals that involve technology relate to those of other nations? What mechanisms or institutions are there, or might there be, to reconcile U.S. and foreign diplomatic goals respecting technology? How is U.S. diplomatic planning conducted with reference to the uses and concerns of technology? What is the present balance in the U.S. Government's effort as between maintenance of deterrent force and emphasis on technological programs serving constructive peaceful purposes? What balances of this sort are observable in other nations? Could the uses of peaceful technology be further extended for diplomatic purposes? What domestic developments in technology might be encouraged in support of U.S. diplomatic goals? How far into the future is it possible to project analyses of tech- nological change, and with what degree of probability? How does technological analysis compare with economic analysis and political analysis as to predictive power? 1614 ISSUE TWO— THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH"' Statement of the Issue For more than a century the health of the peoples of the world has been a subject of international concern and action, enlisting the combined efforts of diplomacy and science. However, public awareness and public investment have not been commensurate with the health benefits of global action. The author. Dr. Freeman H. Quimb}^, puts the central question in his introduction to the stud}^: Why has a matter so important to all mankind— human health and disease prevention — not become a more effective, comprehensive, and dynamic focus of international cooperation? ^*^ Importance oj the Issue Disease is international ; it moves freely across political boundaries. Preventive medicine, also inherently international, requires con- tinuing vigilance and international cooperation on the part of scien- tists, diplomats, national and local political leaders, and the public. Pockets of infectious and communicable disease exist all over the world, in less developed countries and even in those most advanced. Under conditions of social disruption, floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters, these cells of infection can burst forth as world epidemics. Conversely, by a relatively modest investment in each case, they can be eradicated or controlled. Yet, half of the world's people have no access to health care at all; millions die each year of readily preventable sicknesses. There is even some retrogression as the effects of urban blight strike the slum poor in the midst of affluence. Against this dismal picture of underachievement must be seen a great and growing array of unused and underused technical capabilities for controlling disease and building health. The issue is how to, advance world health through programs utilizing these capabilities supported by the combined efforts of diplomats, scientists, and the public. In the context of the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy study series, the issue is illustrative in several special ways: (1) It demonstrates that general acceptance of the importance of an issue, and of the desirability of taking measures to cope with it, does not insure full implementation of appropriate measures. The problem differs in intensity from that of the brain drain,"' in which a persistent issue that lacked comparable popular appeal and dynamism surfaced from time to time only to drop out of sight again, still unresolved. The issue of global health, affecting the lives and well-being of people everywhere, commands continuing support from the world's govern- ments. This support, however, does not extend beyond halfway or palliative measures to stout and forceful programs and toward rational goals of achievable global health. '" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Politics of Global Health, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcomjnittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. See vol. U, pp. 081-763. i" Ibid . p. 085. "3 lor a lull treatment of this subject, see: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Foreign Affairs Divi- sion, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1974, vol. II, pp. 1037-1318. 1615 (2) The issue also provides instructive examples of progress attribut- able to the teaming of scientists and diplomats in extended negotia- tions. When the French Government convened the first international quarantine congress in 1851, each of the 12 participating nations was represented by a medical doctor and a diplomatist. Delegates were left free to vote individually. Although in voting the two groups tended to cancel each other out, with resultant tensions and frustra- tions, the diplomats and doctors were at last able to agree to 137 articles on international sanitary regulations. The pattern of one diplomat and one doctor from each country continued during 10 international sanitary conferences which followed between 1851 and the end of the century. (3) The same example illustrates another point: the essentiality of sustained application of diplomacy among countries as well as in relations between scientists and diplomats. The pairing arrangement would probably have been fruitless if not held to doggedly until the job was done; failure might have discouraged further efforts for years to follow. Adoption of the first international rules required 48 plenary sessions and 6 months of work. What is more important, for the first time diplotnats and doctors from leading nations had met in earnest to discuss common global disease problems. (It was the diplomats rather than the scientists in this instance, in contrast to that of the International Geophysical Year,^" which made the undertaking a success. The scientific community of the time was divided between the sanitarians and the quarantinists. Today, both views are recognized as separately inadequate but complementary elements of a compre- hensive approach to the problem. Arguments over rival scientific theories consumed most of the time of the conference, but the French diplomatic representative who chaired it continued to seek workable solutions, and the diplomats as a group appeared to have had instruc- tions not to yield to either of the extreme scientific positions. The result was successful compromise.) How the Issue Developed Historically, cycles of pestilence were accepted as a fact of life. There was a series of disease invasions of Europe beginning with the Cliristian era, running on through the fall of Rome, and climaxing in the black death of the 14th century. (They did not end there: the influenza epidemic of 1918-19 took 20 million lives.) In time, the attitude of acceptance yielded to an active search for causes and remedies. BEGINNING OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE Preventive medicine began, at least in England, with public demand for corrective measures against recurring epidemics based on the observed association between polluted water and disease. Its first phase, including some aspects of sanitary engineering and public hygiene, was marked by legislative acts like the Great Reform bill of 1832, the Metropolis Water Act of 1852, and the Public Health Act of 1875. '"See: U.S. Con?rpss, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcom- mittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Harold Bullis, Analyst in Science and Technology, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, 1973, vol. I, pp. 293-300. 1616 The scientific or experimental phase of preventive medicine — the era of bacteriology — overlapped and followed the sanitation move- ment. It provided the technical foundation on which sanitary water and sewage disposal practices are still based, as well as for coping with those infectious diseases which can be controlled or eradicated by vaccination. Though all nations benefit from the health of their own citizens and those of other nations, and health measures are generally accepted throughout the world, present levels of international cooperation in public health were not easily achieved and remain hard to sustain or extend. In the early deliberations (1850-1900) the paucity and uncer- tain authority of scientific knowledge left much room for debate and for the convenient alignment of medical science with national interest. Thus, the German members of the International Sanitary Council of Constantinople made decisions of little consequence to disease but calculated to expand the political dominance of Germany or to weaken British commercial dominance; British physicians, even with French scientists ridiculing their logic, supported British shipping interests by downgrading the importance of quarantine restrictions ; Turkey reportedly paid little attention to sanitary rules, holding that the whole system was a tool of imperialist power poKtics rather than one designed to protect Europe from invasions of epidemics,^" EARLY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO CONTROL DISEASE It is to the credit of diplomacy that under these circumstances nations persisted in developing constructive plans and international rules for controlling the spread of disease. It was a long step forward when the French Government convened the first International Quarantine Congress in 1851. Successive congresses were held in Constantinople in 1866, Vienna in 1874, Washington in 1881, Rome in 1885, and Venice in 1892. Three other agreements dealing with cholera which followed in 1893, 1894, and 1897 were later combined in a single International Sanitary Convention in 1903. In 1909, as a result of a 1907 meeting in Rome of 12 nations including the United States, a permanent International Ofiice of Public Hygiene was set up in Paris. It continued to function through both World War I and World War II, after which it was absorbed into the World Health Organization (WHO), created in 1946. The first full-fledged international health organization, in the sense of one which carried out sanitary policing action, was the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), established in Mexico City in 1902. Further strengthened in 1924 when 24 nations of the Americas ratified the Pan American Sanitary Code, the Bureau provided for regional cooperation in public health which went beyond existing European practices. Now known as the Pan American Health Organi- zation or PAHO, it still exists as an autonomous international health organization for the Americas; it serves additionaDy as the WHO regional office. It brought extensive experience in the control of disease to the process of designing the new WHO. It also played a strong role in the adoption of a decentralized structure for WHO, which (with '*' Many similar examples could be cited. In 1898, for example, German provincial Inspections for trich- inosis were designed as much to keep out American pork as to protect local populations. (See Huddle, Science and Technology in the Depannient of State, vol. II, p. 137ti.) 1617 its six regional offices) is unique among the specialized agencies of the United Nations. There was another major development in international health organization before World War 11. The League of Nations set up an International Epidemic Commission in 1920; this was succeeded by a health organization in 1923. The latter was a success despite feeble financial support from member governments (it had substantial assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation) ; it soon outstripped the Paris office in both importance and influence. The League of Nations Health Organization expanded to a new order of magnitude both the pattern of large-scale cooperative effort through international organizations in general and the dissemination of public health knowledge and skills in particular. It stimulated quarantine reform and quelled numerous epidemics; sought to standardize serums and vaccines; set up epidemiological centers in Geneva, Singapore, and Melbourne; established international study- tours, lectureships, and a public health library; published monographs; placed its experts at the disposal of governments; and brought together public health officials from many countries to coordinate their efforts. Thus, when the World Health Organization was born, it began not as a revolutionary experiment in public health but as the sophisticated heir to the work of the League Health Organization and its predecessors. ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION The World Health Organization was formed in July 1946 within the terms of the United Nations Charter. (The United States, which had not belonged to the League of Nations or its Health Organization, became a member of WHO in June 1948.) The WHO constitution cites a single objective: "The attainment by all peoples of the highest possiblelevelof health." Health is defined by WHO as ''. . . a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." The WHO constitution specifies 22 functions for the organization, ranging from the broad mandate to "act as the directing and co- ordinating authority on international health work" through "assist governments, upon request, in strengthening health services," "estab- lish and maintain such administrative and technical services as may be required, including epidemiological and statistical services,'^ "promote and conduct research in the field of health," and "assist in developing an informed public opinion among all peoples on matters of health," to "take all necessary action to attain the objective of the Organization." These high aims and the need to resume work interrupted by the war, as well as to deal with conditions caused by it, gave WHO an early momentum. It has since grown into an international operation of considerable size and significance. At the time of this study (1971), its regular budget, funded by assessed contributions from member governments, had risen from an initial $5 million to $73 million — that of WHO and PAHO together to above $100 million. (The latter figure had grown to more than $150 million by 1975.) It had (and still has) regional offices in Copenhagen, Alexandria, Brazzaville, 1618 Manila, New Delhi, and Washington, in addition to its headquarters in Geneva. It had a total staff on the order of 4,500 — about a fourth at headquarters, the remainder at regional and zone offices and in 131 (now 151) member countries. It maintained hundreds of lab- oratories and reference centers or collaborating institutes all over the world, had formal working relationships with some 82 major inter- national government and nongovernment organizations in the health field, and was supported by numerous advisory panels and expert committees in virtually every health or health-related subject area. It initiated annually thousands of research grants and training fellow- ships. It administered the international health regulations adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1969, and under the regulations operated a global intelligence network on the principal epidemic diseases of the world. Finally, it was a major pubhsher of biomedical literature: Its monographs and technical reports often represented, in effect, a world consensus of experts in various health subject areas. STATUS AND POTENTIAL OF W.H.O. TODAY Despite this impressive growth, WHO today is far from translating into global accomplishment such principles, enunciated in its con- stitution, as "The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attain- ment of peace and security. ..." and "unequal development in different countries in the promotion of health and control of disease ... is a common danger." The failure to meet the implications of these declarations has been generally attributed to budgetary realities. Even if the major nations fully appreciated the diplomatic potential of public health and modern medicine as a vehicle of international good will, it is not likely that they would approve a budget or a philosophy which would look to the World Health Organization for the solution of all global health problems. With a budget less than one-tenth that of the New York City Health Department,*** WHO concentrates its resources on advisory and coordinating activities and on major disease control and eradication programs. Undeniably, a greater degree of U.S. involvement and contribution of funds in excess of its annual assessment would improve the rate of success in the control of malaria, cholera, and other infectious diseases, but the monetary exchange rate is currently a greater problem for WHO than is the U.S. attitude toward international organizations. Larger U.S. and other member commitments to WHO would indeed make it possible for improved followup on its projects and programs; disease eradication or control programs could be intensified and studies of health care systems and of health manpower coordination could be expanded. But WHO was not intended to be a world medical society to provide global health services to developed and developing countries. Its services and technical assistance are rendered in response to specific requests from member governments. It is the demand and the legiti- mate need for technical assistance, and the ability of the requesting 14a Kevin Cahill. The Untapped Retource: Medicine and Diplomacy. Orbis Boaka, MaryknoU, New York, 1971: p. 7. 1619 country to use it, which should largely determine the size of WHO'a budget. Dr. Quimby's study suggested that WHO's budgetary re- straints necessitated the setting of a few high-priority programs, and that there would still be numerous countries in desperate need of advice and assistance because of degrading health conditions. A further perspective on WHO's failure to realize its fuU potential may be found in the author's concluding comment: Public health on a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention of govern- ments which a global perspective of health would appear to require. The nature of the work is undramatic; the subject oflFers little in the way of political capital as do so many other medical topics. Disciplinary development and professional status for public health and preventive medicine are low compared with those of modem diagnostic and curative medicine in the United States and other de- veloped countries. The public and its elected representatives may not be aware of the miracles which have been achieved in the field of preventive medicine; it was these, rather than the glamorous surgical and pharmaceutical inventions of recent vintage, which so dramatically changed the life expectancy of man. The world was made a relatively safe place in which to live and travel many years ago by the iippli cation of what now appear to be rather simple biological, medical, and engineering facts. Indeed, the techniques of preventive medicine have been 80 successful in developed lands that neither crisis nor controversy worthy of intensive political attention has emerged in recent years. In the less-developed lands, the power to improve human health at least cost ■still lies in the application of proven technology in the public health and sanitation field. Curative medicine in the poor countries has as much appeal as it does in advanced countries with large populations of people with various forms of degen- erative disease, but there are lacking the medicines, the doctors, and the places in which to apply the cures. In many of these developing areas, the services of sanitary engineer, hydrologist, or geologist are more essential to permanent health gains than is the increased availability of doctors and clinics. Plant geneti- cists and agrarian reform, together with culturally adapted population policies, will contribute more at this time to a revolution in the health of some of the economically depressed countries than will the importation of modem technology."^ U.S. Involvement The United States has played an active, if not necessarily a leading, part in many of the international health initiatives of the 19th and 20tn centuries. U.S. financial support of the World Health Organization since its inception has been steady, and has far exceeded that of any other country. (The U.S. assessment ranged from about $6 milHon or 31.7 percent of the WHO assessed budget of about $20 million in 1961 to roughly $23.65 million or 30.87 percent of the WHO total assessed budget of more than $73 million in 1971. In 1975 the U.S. assessment for WHO was $30.15 milhon, or 25.64 percent of the WHO total assessed budget of $115.4 million.) The United States has a re- spectable record of faithful payment of its WHO assessments and good performance in voluntary contributions to international health activi- ties in general. On the other hand, U.S. support from the beginning has been less than all-out ; the United States has rarely voted for approval of the WHO budget, and in recent years has worked to reduce it. This situation could change : as of July 1977, U.S. policies and actions in support of international health activities were undergoing a White House review. According to the office of Dr. Peter Bourne, Special Assistant to the President for Health and International Human Needs, an interagency task force headed by Dr. Bourne was to report to Presi- dent Carter by early fall 1977 on problems, prospects, and policy op- portunities in the associated areas of international health, nutrition, and population. "' yuimby. The Politia of OMxU Health, vol. 11, p. 757. 1620 POSSIBLE REASONS FOR EARLY U.S. DELAY IN SUPPORTING W.H.O. For example, the 2-year delay of the United States in ratifying the constitution of WHO seems to have been motivated by both medical- political and national-poHtical considerations, including fears that WHO would become involved in such questions as health insurance and socialized medicine in an international context rather than the problems of preventive medicine on an international scale. Another factor making for confusion of goals at the outset may have been that the American leaders involved in the planning of WHO were more likely to have been specialists in preventive medicine or public health than experts in curative medicine with individual patient orientation. They were supported by diplomats whose thinking was conditioned by the past dominance of pubhc health (preventive medi- cine) over private health (curative medicine) philosophies in most of the countries of the world. It is the curative medicine school of thought that has dominated the power structure of American medical practice, and that is the more vocal and organized in exerting pressures on the decisonmaking processes of the U.S. Government. Another pervasive factor has been the U.S. preference for bilateral programs, over which it could exercise more direct control, as against multilateral activities, which many U.S. leaders have tended to regard as inefficient if not misdirected. Since World War II the United States has conducted a wide range of bilateral programs in the international health field, some with further multilateral ties and some independent. The major U.S. Government departments supporting programs of research, technical assistance, or economic aid in health and related subjects overseas have been the Departments of State, HEW, and Defense. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL HEALTH AFFAIRS It The two principal organizations in the Department of State with responsibilities for international health affairs are the Bureau of International Organization Aifairs (10) and the Agency for Interna- tional Development (AID). The former administers the U.S. con- tributions to international and Inter-American organizations — mainly WHO and PAHO — and to certain special programs; they are dis- cussed further below under Role of Congress. AID administers the bulk of U.S. bilateral technical and economic assistance, including health and sanitation projects, and makes voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations like the United Nations Development Program. One of the largest health programs supported by AID has involved community water supply development and management of sewerage and waste disposal systems to lessen the danger of diseases caused by pollution. By 1971 AID had established unique guidelines and machinery for both operations and research in international health work, such as the control and eradication of epidemic and endemic diseases. Although funds available for such operations had been decreasing year by year, there was a turnabout in 1972; by 1975 1621 AID had a budget of about $90 million for international health, of which nearly a third consisted of funds for capital investments in sanitary sewerage and water supply. Earlier hmitations of AID as an organization serving U.S. interests in international health were lack of staff in the medical field and its practice of concentrating assistance in relatively few countries. In the fiscal year 1969, 87 percent of AID's assistance to individual countries went to only 15 nations. Today, however, AID provides health assistance to about 40 nations and co- operates actively with WHO — not only with its Geneva headquarters but with its various regional offices. Indeed, along with the growing bilateral programs of HEW, the multilateral programs of WHO and the bilateral programs of AID are the mainstay of global health ac- tivities involving the United States. Both programs are increasing in total funds and in scope. Furthermore, coordination between WHO and AID is today much greater than in the past. Each knows what the other is doing, and programs are coordinated. THE ROLE OF DHEW The Public Health Service (PHS) in the Department of Health; Education, and Welfare is the primary U.S. Government resource in both national and international health. It is the official technical liaison with WHO and PAHO. Its chief medical officer played a major role in the drafting of the WHO's constitution and has usually served as head of the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly. PHS prepares the U.S. technical position papers for the assembly and pro- vides or assists in providing experts for the WHO advisory committees. Many of HEW's laboratories and institutes serve as WHO reference centers or collaborating research institutes. There are many such cen- ters and institutes in the United States; several of them are located in the PHS National Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Ga., which is part of WHO's worldwide epidemiological intelligence net- work. Besides playing a prominent role in international health or- ganizations, HEW participates actively in U.S. bilateral health and sanitation programs. The National Institutes of Health of the Public Health Service (NIH) no longer maintains overseas offices in U.S. Embassies in Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, or New Delhi. It continues, however, to support research laboratories in the Panama Canal Zone (the Middle America Research Unit and the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory) and Guam (Epidemiology and Genetics Centers). NIH also adminis- ters the Pakistan Cholera Research Laboratory for SEATO, funded under a bilateral agreement between AID and the Government of Bangladesh. Funds obligated for HEW's international health activities, on a relatively low plateau in recent years ($38.5 million in fiscal year 1973, $39.0 million in 1974, $36.5 million in 1975), have risen sharply in fiscal years 1976 and 1977 ($57.9 million and an estimated $72.2 million), re- spectively. According to the HEW spokesman who furnished these figures in July 1977, the increases have been mainly for research. THE DOD ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL HEALTH The Department of Defense (DOD) plays a special part in the inter- national health field. Military medicine has long been the backbone 1622 of tropical and preventive medicine. The improvement in military medical organization from the Civil War on, the ability of the services to attract competent researchers and practitioners, and the mobility of the Armed Forces, have made it possible for mihtary niedicine to contribute to the remarkable progress of American medicine as a whole and especially to the solution of global health problems. Ameri- can military medicine has produced one of the best medical libraries in the world, and among the medical disciplines it ranks high in the fields of pathology and epidemiology. DOD supports a substantial amount of research in foreign countries and maintains four overseas offices in developed nations, mainly for research and development liaison purposes. Experienced observers have noted that with the end of colonial administrations and their health services in many of the less-developed countries, U.S. military medicine has helped to fill the gap, especially by providing a pattern for American industry to follow. With the decline in teaching of tropical medicine in U.S. medical schools a physician must look either to military service or to experience in one of the international health programs to learn how to deal with malaria and other endemic tropical diseases. Despite all this U.S. activity in the international health field, what seems to stand out in overview is a reluctance to become any more involved than is required by the tacit dictates of conscience, humani- tarian impulse, and characteristic American pragmatism. Forthright considerations of moral leadership, on the one hand, or of political gains to be had in pressing U.S. technical and economic advantages, on the other, do not appear to have been consequential factors. Role of Congress Early congressional actions with respect to WHO were not enthusias- tic. Congress was slow to ratify the WHO constitution and then arbitrarily set the annual U.S. contribution at $1.9 million, meanwhile appropriating tens of millions for short-term bilateral health aid. In general, extensive hearings records examined during the preparation of this study showed a strong congressional preference for bilateral programs. Three major studies of aid and development, available at the time, were of little use in focusing the attention of Congress on the extent to which poor health impedes the social and economic progress of mankind, or in presenting a realistic and balanced picture of both the problems facing international organizations like WHO and the great potential of adequately supported health organizations for providing cost-effective solutions to many of these problems. These three studies were : One: The 400-page Pearson Keport of September 15, 1969 (report of the Commission on International Development set up by World Bank President Robert S. McNamara), which dismissed international health problems in two pages but conveyed the impression of sweeping advances and credited WHO with achievements that that Agency would not itself claim — prompting the New England Journal oj Medi- cine to comment: "The cursory and grossly inaccurate treatment afforded health is representative of current economic thought." Two: The Jackson Report of September 30, 1969 ("A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System," published by the United Nations), which appeared to deemphasize WHO in favor of a reorganized U.N. development program as the focal point of 1623 funds, coordination, review, and decision in technical assistance for country-centered liealth programs, and — even though such an ap- proach could not have been put into practice for several years — sug- gested to U.N. member governments that they could stabilize the WHO budget at the level already achieved. Three: The Peterson Report of March 4, 1970 (Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development) , which proposed to rely on multilateral organizations like WHO in place of AID, but included no specific recommendation that AID funds for health and sanitation be transferred to WHO. Indeed, it did not even mention WHO directly, and rarely mentioned health. INADEQUATE BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. SHARE OF W.H.O. FUNDING SUPPORT "^ Nor does the method by which the executive branch presents its budget justification for the U.S. share of funding support for WHO and PAHO provide Congress with a clear and emphatic picture of the needs of these organizations in relation to potential for accomplish- ment. This justification is submitted to the House and Senate Appro- priations Committees (the respective Subcommittees on State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary) as part of a total package that includes the United Nations and its nine specialized agencies — of which WHO is one; the package also includes PAHO and five other inter- American organizations, NATO and 6 other regional organizations, and 15 miscellaneous bodies. Related hearings records typically do not deal with the nature and merit of the substantive work of agencies like WHO and PAHO; attention is largely focused on budgets and balance of payments. The prevailing view seems to be that the United States is overassessed and overcommitted to ever-increasing organizational budgets; assessments for multilateral enterprises are seen as one more form of foreign aid. Not only has international health not been spared from rising congressional concern about costs, lack of control over budgets, and the need to restrict the outflow of American dollars; on the contrary, international health organizations — as modest as their demands are in comparison with nuclear power and weapons donations, and in relation to possible returns — have often been singled out for budgetary discussion in both Senate and House appropriations hearings. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF MULTILATERAL HEALTH PROGRAMS Congressional frugality with respect to multilateral health programs would seem to reflect in large part a commimications gap — that is, a lack of understanding of how much international health activities have accomplished and also how much remains to be done that cannot effectively be done through bilateral measures — and the absence of a sense of Jurgency. Symptomatic of the latter was the failure of a bill (H.R. 12453, the International Health Act of 1966) aimed at the shortage of manpower trained for international health activities and at raising the low level of U.S. participation in the WHO staff. The bUl was supported by the HEW Secretary, tlie Surgeon General, the American PubBc Health Association, the Association of American 1*8 For a recent account of this problem as it relates to U.S. funding support of intemational organisations generally, see: U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Coveniment Operations, L'.»S. Participation in lutir- national Organizatiovs, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Oflice. February 1977, 140 p. (Senate Document No. 95-50), pp. 48-50. 1624 Medical Colleges, and the American Medical Association. During hearings on the bill in February 1966, there was excellent dialog among the members of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the expert witnesses. WHO and PAHO were mentioned repeatedly during the hearings, as was the fact that international health problems require a different kind of instruction from that available in the typical American medical school. It was pointed out that there were only three medical schools in the United States with associated schools of public health. In spite of these endorsements and the acknowledged need to correct a defect in American medical education, the legislation was not passed, failing to get out of the Rules Committee. This inaction may be attributable to the low priority attached to the measure, inasmuch as no opposition was recorded. No subsequent legislation has been introduced specifically for the training of international health specialists. However, because of demand, several new schools or departments of public health have been established in American medical schools, without specific Federal legislation. Status of the Issue WHO has accompUshed much in spite of lackluster moral support and indifferent understanding on the part of the United States as its major financial contributor. That it has done so must be attributed in large degree not only to the inherently constructive nature of health services — ^^although this character may have insured WHO's survival, it does not account for its signal success — but rather to the sustained diplomatic skill and perseverance of its leadership. Able leadership has been evident in WHO from the beginning. Whereas the drafters of the WHO constitution gave it powers over functions which governments normally reserve to themselves, the authority of WHO has never been fully exercised by its administra- tors. Prudent men have used both commonsense and caution in apply- ing the constitutional provisions. As a result, WHO has- been able to function effectively even in the presence of unresolved political problems. It has refused to deal with some problems because they were predominantly political, but worked out solutions to others— where necessary to organizational progress — by avoiding legalistic debates and pursuing a pragmatic and realistic coursfi,. Thu s- U-S . insistence upon reservations as conditions of acceptance of the WHO constitution was ignored as an obstacle, even though there was no provision in the WHO constitution for reservations: the Assembly accepted the United States with f uH rights and refused to permit such conditions on membership to become an issu« for the future. Then, in 1949 and 1.950, when nine Communist member countries withdrew over alleged failure of WHO to execute agreed progpamsy the break was viewed as temporary. Withdrawing members were asked to re- consider, and by preparing the way for a settlement of assessments in arrears, WHO brought about their return after a few yeaxs. 1625 WHO has relied less on regulations and more on the authority of international biomedical consensus. This course has proven politically wise in many instances, and an effective strategy: to report conclu- sions of the world's health experts and to leave implementation to member governments. Prospects and Options who's power resides largely in the high regard in which it is held among the scientific and public health specialists of the world and its acceptance as the highest forum of world medical opinion. Its limita- tions lie mainly in budgetary constraints which reflect lack of priority standing with governments and the general public. Public health on a worldwide scale has yet to command the attention which its potential for further progress would warrant. The nature of the work is undra- matic; in the United States and other developed countries, disciplinary development and professional status for public health and preventive medicine are low compared with those of modem diagnostic and curative medicine; and the public and its elected representatives are apparent!}^ not aware of the miracles which have been achieved in the field of preventive medicine (although the recently publicized example of the People's Republic of China may be working some change in this field). However, there has been an interesting recent development in this area: a 3-day symposium on preventive medicine held at NIH during the summer of 1975. SEEMING NEED OF STRONGER U.S. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS Recent trends in international health activities reflect a move- ment from bilateral to multilateral programs such as those of WHO, PAHO, and UNDP. The Peterson Report, among other studies, recommended this approach. The United States has the resources, the systems skills, and the biomedical technology for greatly assisting WHO to realize its full potential. For this to happen would require stronger support than is now evident and more visibility at policy levels of the Departments of State and HEW, in the Congress, and — ■ ultimately — among the U.S. public at large. The foregoing assessment suggests the desirability of a national debate on the issue of global health and its interrelationship with national health. Such a debate, involving medical and other scientific and technological, political, and economic circles, would have as its principal aim the education of the American public on a matter of fundamental human concern. The instrument for leading such a debate and educational initiative could appropriately be a committee of the Congress, or perhaps two or three committees in conjunction — • one concerned primarily with international relations, another with health, and a third with science and technology. The study of The Politics of Global Health suggests additional needs. In the annual congressional scrutiny of proposed budgets for inter- national health activities, cost-benefit aspects have not been suflB- ciently examined — probably because of the great range and com- plexity of the subject matter. A qualified research institution could be enlisted to make a thorough study of the relationship between the 1626 actual costs and the direct and indirect benefits of international health programs. Examples are at hand of some successful surveys in specific connections: e.g., the control of poliomyelitis in the U.S.S.R., and the reduction of infant mortality in Yugoslavia. Such a survey should take account not only of past and present experience but also of potential benefits in relation to costs. For example, arrange- ments for global medical surveillance and early warning of the danger- ous spread of disease, together with reliable health statistics, have hardly scratched the surface. The United States would benefit from a WHO evaluation of the various systems of health care now in opera- tion around the world; from a set of WHO standards on electronic medical diagnostic equipment, water and air pollution, and methods in the treatment of alcohohcs and heroin addicts; and from such other internationally established standards as WHO-FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) criteria governing the permissible amounts of heavy metals in foods. Other types of studies for which the United States does not have sufficient affected population samples, but from which much of value to U.S. medical research and the American people could be learned, include studies of the effect of severe malnutrition on early development and learning and perhaps of certain types of cancer and heart disease. REASONS FOR POSSIBLE SHIFT OF BUDGET DEFENSE ROLE FROM STATE TO DHEW It might also be appropriate to consider shifting the main burden of budgetary justification for WHO, PAHO, and other international health activities from the Department of State to DHEW. With appropriate State Department coordination but without present constraints on the presentation of substantive accomplishments and needs resulting from the simultaneous consideration of funding for all international organization activities in all fields, DHEW might be expected to serve as a more effective focal point for the technical documentation, planning, review, and analysis of issues in connection with U.S. participation in WHO, PAHO, and certain bilateral bio- medical programs. Underlying this proposal is the reasoning that the expansion of national public health interests to global dimensions requires not only conventional diplomacy: It calls also for worldwide experience with science, medicine, and public health as political systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. To the increasing extent that a worldwide approach is taken to the problems of human health, it will be necessary for knowledge to be shared and exchanged by those who through training and practice are equipped to work with it. The problems and potential of the State Department for managing U.S. relationships with international activities in general are examined later, in Issue Six. It has been a thesis of the present study that it would be beneficial for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to be brought more into the forefront of policy formulation and review, and budget presentation, with respect to U.S. support of international health programs. (See, however, the author's postscript to this comment, immediately following.) 1627 A uthors Reassessment No changes occurred in the 4 years after preparation of the study in 1971 which would modify its conchisions, except in some matters of detail. Author Freeman H. Quimby's comments in reviewing the situ- ation in July 1975 were as follows : (a) Because science and medicine have an international character of their own, it seemed to make sense that DHEW justify before Congress the U.S. fundmg of international health organizations. However, in recent years domestic problems have so preoccupied DHEW, NIH, and AMA (American Medical Association) that their attention to international concerns has been minimal. Today it would be prudent to consider additional options for a new organizational spokesman for health concerns, as suggested in the Peterson Report, or a combination of services from the National Academy of Sciences Foreign Office and Institute of Medicine. (b) The diplomatic potential for the worldwide improvement of human health lies primarily in preventive medicine and in related socioeconomic factors. The relatively high level of medical teclinology in the developed countries is not a primary contributor to this potential, though it may have its uses as a diplomatic tool in dealing with the ruling elites of the less developed nations. Diplomatic efforts should b« aimed at providing technologies to benefit the health of whole populations, thereby also sub- stantially promoting development. (As indicated in The Politics of Glohal Healthy a correlation study of a broad spectrum of social and economic indicators in 115 countries showed that health variables tended to be the most highly correlat/cd with all other measures of progress.) ^*^ There is no doubt as to how this factor operates, and most international public health experts, sociol- ogists, and economists understand it. In simple terms, good health equates with social, economic, and personal development. (c) The role of WHO in the administration ot programs for the control and eradication of disease is the same as it was 4 years ago. The importance of that role, however, has been under- lined by subsequent events: The growing competition for food and energy resources, heightened perception of environmental problems and the need for controlling them, and further pressures for the advances in family planning. The essentially international character of these problems, along with those of health, becomes increasingly clear, as does the fact of interaction among many of them; a global perspective is essential to their management and ultimate solution. (d) The 1971 study suggested that the Congress may not have gi-asped the significant relationship of international health to national health. Since then, other international problems have gained priority in Congress over those in the health field ; except in connection with food reserves, congressional attention is per- haps even less focused on international health than it was 4 years ago. n'Quimby, The Politics of Global Health, vol. U,\).7rA. 96-243 O - 77 - 9 1628 IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL HEALTH PLANNING (e) It is more effective to think and plan globally for the health component in the quality of life than it is to make bilateral agreements with other powers to undertake research of interest to them in a certain disease, when in fact, large regions if not the whole world are affected by the disease. Several such bilateral agreements in effect today will probabl}^ accomplish less than if the same money were spent on regional centers involving the participation of many nations, developed and less developed. The WHO cancer center in Lyons, France, is a highly effective example ; there is an urgent need for other multinational centers focusing on specific diseases. (f) It was pointed out in the study that evidence did not support the idea that medical assistance should be withheld from less developed countries on the ground that it will merely exac- erbate the population problem, but rather — at least in long-range terms — the reverse. In most explicit terms, the study suggested, and quoted authorities who contended, that good health facili- tated population control. However, the theory of the relationship of the population growth to improvement in public health measures, combined with rising standards of living, is not well developed.^'*" This is a subject deserving of intensive investigation by Congress and additional research efforts in support of such investigation. (See also Issue Three.) (g) As a result of politically motivated decisions by UNESCO, some Western nations are withholding funds and some scholars are boycotting UNESCO-sponsored meetings. It is too early to determine whether or not such pro- Arab, Communist, and Third World trends will continue in UNESCO. The question, of course, is whether WHO will experience a similar awkwardness and require adjustments beyond those which it has already satisfac- torily negotiated in response to similar influences in its Eastern Mediterranean Region. The answer is, probably not; WHO is organized in such a way that combinations of bloc votes in its World Health Assembly have less influence over crucial WHO decisions than do the decisions of its more powerful 24-man Executive Board. On the Board, professional representatives of at least four major powers wield strong technical influence over who's major assistance programs. It is important to preserve this arrangement if the United Nations itself should become less effective and future development should leave WHO to go it alone. (h) In summary, it seems reasonable today to reach conclusions similar to those in the original analysis : That multinational cooperation in ^VHO and PAHO will con- tinue to contribute effectively to the technical and organizational health needs of the world, of regions, and of the participating member countries. »» Qulmby, The Polilkt of Global Health, pp. 751-752. 1629 That the massive prestige and universal respect commanded by WHO justifies a greater involvement of the U.S. Government and American health experts in supporting and shaping the WHO programs for those global health problems which do not lend themselves to typical bilateral aid. That a U.S. role of positive promotion of WHO should be viewed as beneficial if not, indeed, essential to the success of that agency's rational attack on world health problems, with commensurate benefits to U.S. national health. Some Illustrative Questions The study of The Politics of Global Health poses a variety of questions for congressional consideration. The following are some examples: Would it be desirable, and reahstic, for the United States to assume a more positive and supportive role in the field of global health as a means of strengthening its overall diplomatic posture? If so, what steps should Congress take: (a) To inform itself more fully about needs and opportunities? (b) To persuade the American pubUc of the appropriateness of such a move? What can be learned from public health/preventive medicine and health care programs of the People's Republic of China? Could the United States effectively promote regional health activi- ties as a low-profile way of contributing to "technological end runs" in areas of mihtary conflict, such as the Middle East, or of lesser poU tidal confrontation, as in sections of Africa? Should it seek to do so? How should U.S. programs in the international health field be coordinated? What should be the respective roles of the Department of State and the mission-oriented agencies? How ejffective is the monitoring of the World Health Organization by U.S. agencies? How well do they report on WHO's budgetary needs and the importance of WHO's activities to the United States? Do the new Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President, the National Science Foundation's Directorate of Scientific, Technological, and International Affairs, and/or the State Department take an active interest and play a constructive role in this connection? Who should account to Congress and the U.S. public regarding U.S. support of ongoing and projected WHO activ- ities? Is a new inst itutional and mecha nism needed ? Should there be more intensive eflForts to inform the pubHc through the press of the existence of the World Health Organization and its objectives and achievements? (One of the few related areas to receive recent attention is that of WHO's goal of eradicating smallpox in the near future. This will be the first time in all history that man has suc- ceeded in eliminating globally a human disease.) ISSUE THREE— BEYOND MALTHUS: THE FOOD/PEOPLE EQUATION « In a world shrunk by television, electronic communications, and air transport, the tragedy of famine is increasingly everyone's concern. Although technologies of food production and population control are 1" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Beyond Malttius: The Food/People Equationi in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on Nations' Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Allan S. Nanes, Foreign Afiairs Division, Congressiona' Research Service, Library of Congress, 1971. See vol. II, pp. 765-864. 1630 sufficiently advanced that the age-old problem of feeding the world's people is technically solvable, famine still occurs. Food and people are unevenly distributed over the globe. The undertaking in the study by Dr. Allan S. Nanes is to explore the reasons why the technical balancing of the food/population equation, although feasible, remains unachieved. Since about 1950 the United States has maintained a substantial program of aid to developing countries. Two main elements of this program have been the strengthening of institutions and measures of enhancing food production and public health. Although agricultural productivity has risen, the death rate has declined and populations have increased so that despite the efforts of the developing countries, with U.S. aid, to improve their food/population positions, the effect is that of being on a treadmill — or worse. The impact of inflation and the raising of petroleum prices by OPEC has intensified the plight of many developing countries. As the problem is summed up by Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank: . . . Roughly half the population — in the developing world — are neither con- tributing significantly to economic growth nor sharing equitably in its benefits. These are the poor. Within most developing societies, they form a huge group at the lower end of the income spectrums, receiving only a fraction of what the middle- and upper-income groups do. Some 900 million of these individuals subsist on incomes of less than $75 a year in an environment of squalor, hunger, and hopelessness. They are the absolute poor, living in situations so deprived as to be below any rational definition of human decency. Absolute poverty is a condition of life so limited by illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, high infant-mortality, and low life-expectancy as ^o deny its victims the very potential of the genes with which they are born. In effect, it is life at the margin of existence. '^^ As these vast deprived populations struggle for sustenance, the technology of the developed world has enabled it to produce large surpluses of food, and to elect by conscious choice the kind of lifestyle it wdll adopt. The division of the world into rich and poor nations is increasingly a source of bitter resentment at international forums where the subjects of environment, energy, materials, food, and popu- lation are discussed with animus and frustration by spokesmen for a majority of the world's sovereign states. It is in this context, in which diplomacy, technology, and human institutions are closely intertwined, that the study Beyond Malthas attempts to define the issue of the food/population equation, its importance, and its significance for future American foreign policy. Statement of the Issue The implication of the food/population equation is that mankind must somehow contrive to produce enough but not too much food to feed the world's population, while providing incentives and means for the world's population to hold itself within reasonable bounds. Beyond this dual task is the further task of assuring the development of a system of distribution of food to meet human needs, and a political and economic structure to assure stability of the whole process. •52 Robert S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, Sept. 1, 1975, p. 13. ' ' 1631 The complexity of the task of evening out the global inequities in food supply and the unbalances in the food/population balance is described by Dr. Nanes in the following passage : The problem of achieving a relatively stable balance between food resources and population in the less developed countries is one of enormous complexity. It has biological and medical aspects relating to the development and employment of safe and effective methods of contraception. It involves decisions about basic economic questions such as the allotment of resources, manpower needs, the use of incentives, and the establishment of channels of distribution. It calls for the modification of cultural and social values that have existed, in some cases, for millennia. It affects the internal politics of the developing countries, and adds to the strains on their relatively weak administrative machinery. It tests the ef- fectiveness of communications techniques and training methods. It requires the development of irrigation systems, intensive use of fertilizers, and in the view of many experts the development of new crops even more responsive to fertilizers; this in turn involves research in plant genetics. The depredation of food supplies by animal and insect pests must be brought under control. Improved food pres- ervation techniques need to be developed. Disease, which cuts down the caloric efficiency of ingested foods, must be fought, so that ill health does not diminish the supply of manpower during a planting season, or cause the loss of a crop. In many instances a market economy must be developed where none existed before. What needs to be done is virtually endless, and it is all interconnected. This interconnection of very many diverse elements is characteristic of the entire modernization process in the underdeveloped countries, and the solution of the food/population equation is simply a specialized model of that process.^*^ Undoubtedly the central problem is the construction of political and administrative arrangements to bring to bear the available technologies that can overcome the physical dijSiculties in the global food/population unbalance. Fortunately, genetic developments in food grains (the so-called "Green Revolution") and a number of innovative teclmologies to effect population control have come into being within the present generation. "As matters now stand there is at least a chance that development aid, abetted by a skillful and flexible diplo- macy and working in conjunction with science and technology . . . could help to bring about a reasonable equilibrium between population and food resources in the so-called Third World." ^^ Importance of the Issue The issue should be restated in order to highlight its importance. As Nanes puts it : Rapidly advancing technology shows promise of enlarging world supplies of food to m.eet completely the needs of the w'orld's burgeoning population. Tech- nology has also demonstrated that it can be used to slow the rate of human reproduction. On a global basis, mankind need no longer be the inevitable victim of a postulated Malthusian law that condemns some fraction of the total number to starvation or semi-starvation. The question now becomes one of skill in human management: Can man so order liimself and his institutions of government and administration that he can mate use of the food and population technologies he has been permitted to discover? "• The moral aspect of upwards of a billion human beings on the thresliold of starvation scarcely needs stressing. However, in a de- veloping country the adverse consequences of an insuflBciency of proper nutrition constitute a chain reaction that perpetuates the underdeveloped state of the nation. Calorie deficiencies are measured 153 Xanes, Beyond Malthus, vol. II, pp. 779-780. '^ Ibid., p. 7S0. 1" /Wd.,p.8.55. 1632 in reduced output of work. Deficiencies of the eight amino acids col- lectively designated as "protein" cause physical and mental retarda- tion, a disease called "kwashiorkor," and vulnerability to many normally minor disorders. Thus, the poorer the diet, the higher the incidence of disease, and with it the more difficult the developing country's task in seeking to provide its people with an adequate diet ; and as diet-deficient children become adults, the fewer of them will ultimately be qualified to carry out the more sophisticated tasks of economic development. The population side of the equation is no less important. The world's population is increasing faster than at any time in previous history. Moreover, increases are highest in the underdeveloped coun- tries. "Thus, while the current rate of population growth in North America is 1.2 percent, in Western Europe 0.6 percent, and in the U.S.S.R. 1 percent, in Africa it is 2.7 percent, in Asia 2.3 percent, and in Latin America 2.9 percent." ^'^ The significance of these rates of population growth in relation to food supply and economic develop- ment is of conmianding importance. As the author points out: There are many reasons to consider the need for national and global eflforts to stem the rate of population increase. Population density aflfects the ability of human societies to preserve the quality of life, to make available adequate re- sources to sustain life, to maintain order, to govern, to insure the security of the individual from crime, to maintain the security of nations from tension or even insurrection, I and to reduce the possibility of international conflicts. Population numbers and rate of increase have a profound bearing on all of these."^ PoUtical unrest is a recurrent theme. Thus: All phases of development are retarded as long as population eats into economic growth. Investment is held back or channeled into unproductive areas. Job oppor- tunities are not created, and unemployment or underemployment spreads. Social misery continues unchecked, and populations — rural and urban — become increas- ingly susceptible to appeals to violence."* And again: Population pressure in one country (for example East Pakistan) cannot help exerting pressure on its neighbors (for example India). Population dififerences make bad neighbors, just as affluence and poverty make bad neighbors. This dilemma must be resolved cooperatively if it is to be resolved at aJl. It will be solved either rationally by agreement among nations and an orderly process of implementation; or it is Kkely to be resolved irrationally by war, disease, and social disorder within and among nations."' How the Issue Developed The seriously disproportionate growth of population in relation to agricultural productivity iu the developing countries today presents a different picture from that of 19th century Europe or the United States in undergoing their transformations into modem industriaUzed nations. Abundant fertile and weU-watered land m a congenial climate solved the U.S. food problem, further aided by systematic resort to advancing farm technology and capital. Western Europe combined advanced agricultural technology with imports of food, paid for with exports from industry. Japan combined the European practice with extensive resort to food from the ocean. In all three cases, the fortunate ^ Ibid., p. 822. 1ST Ibid., p. 860. ^ Ibid., p. 864. ^' Ibid., p. 861. 1633 physical and technological conditions combined with organizational and educational strengths to assure a self-reliant and well-nourished population. It is tempting to attribute the food/population unbalance in develop- ing countries today to a lag in technology. Unquestionably, Nanes concedes, it is a factor. However, a more notable deficiencj' — ... is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex factors involved. The processes of population growth are not understood. The statistics of food and population are poor. Even the techniques for disseminating improved tech- nology are faulty. Under these conditions, the negotiation of positive diplomatic arrangements and the task of planning programs to achieve the goal of food/ population balance tend to be unsystematic and episodic.'^" The theme of the inadequacy of data on food and population runs throughout the paper. Data are needed for diagnosis of the problems, formulation of policy, design of ameliorative programs, and setting of practicable long-range goals. Associated with the lack of data for these purposes are two other deficiencies: (1) insufficient understand- ing of the cultural dynamics of each individual society, including its readiness to accept or adapt particular technologies of food production or population control; and (2) the low level of education. It would seem to be essential that the base of education be strengthened in all countries so that their peoples can understand the reality of the problem, and to assure that the best available technology bearing on the food/people equation is ever3'where available and in the hands of people competent to use it. "' U.S. Involvement Recognition in the United States of the need of the developing countries for enhanced agricultural technology came early. From the outset of foreign aid programs after World War II their content was extensively technological. Their scope encompassed improvements in fertilizer practice, genetic strains, irrigation, farm mechanization, food preservation and storage, and marketing systems. However, defects in the programs were frequent: in the appropriateness of particular technologies to the cultures of various of the developing countries, in the willingness and ability of the aided peoples to use the transplanted technologies, and in the basic data required for planning and programing to introduce improved practices. Awareness of the population side of the food/people equation as an appropriate target for U.S. policy lagged nearly a decade behind the attention to the factor of food. Thus, in 1959, President Eisen- hower declared that, "This Government has not, and will not as long as I am here, have a positive political doctrine in its program that has to do with this problem of birth control. That is not our business." At that time, Nanes observes, the "population explosion" had not at- tracted general awareness. However, by 1965, Mr. Eisenhower had reversed his stand "when he came out in favor of measures authoriz- ing the Government to cope effectively with the need to slow down and then stabilize the world's population growth." ^^^ '6" 76!d., pp. 774-775. 161 /bid., p. 862. 162 /6(d., pp. 777-778. 1634 U.S. POLICY NEED OF FACTS ABOUT FOOD AND POPULATIONS On both sides of the food/people equation, U.S. diplomacy has a concern related to world peace and stability. Accordingly, the report suggests, ". . . It would seem to be advantageous for U.S. long- range policy to search out and exploit every available opportunitj'^ to establish a solid and scientific, factual base of information about this equation for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and worldwide." ^^^ In relating diplomacy and national policy to the food/people equa- tion, it is important to recognize that the United States has a profound long-range interest in the achievement of balance, but has a powerful influence on only the food side of the equation. As the w^orld's largest producer of food, and possessing the most advanced technology of "agribusiness," the United States is in a strong position to export both food and food technology. Leverage on the other term of the equation was for long limited to the capability of exporting technology and managerial skill — without, however, any certainty that either of these intellectual exports would be compatible with the cultures and political structures of the nations facing the severest population pres- sures. The possibility that the United States might use the leverage of food surpluses in a compelling way to motivate population policy decisions was not considered. Even the provision of U.S. assistance to voluntary population control programs was not a factor before the mid-1960s. Legislation in 1966 authorized the use of U.S.-owned or U.S. -controlled foreign currencies to assist voluntary family planning programs in countries requesting such assistance. Then, the "Foreign Aid Act of 1967 not only put the stamp of approval on U.S. assistance to family planning programs in the LDCs; it also earmarked funds, for the first time, for this specific purpose. The amount so designated in 1967 was $35 million. Thereafter the amount was to increase annually." In 1968 the legislation renewing Public Lp^w 480 (Public Law 90-436) also earmarked funds for population-related programs. ^^* It is possible to foresee a time in the future at which demands for food exports from the United States will far outstrip the Nation's capacity to deliver. At such a time, what policies will govern the allocation of food to the needy? Will relevant priorities include best effort on the part of claimants to expand their o\vn production of food, or to stabilize their own populations? Role of Congress In 1954 the Congress moved in a major way into the problem of global food supply with passage of the Agricultural Trade and Developmental Act of 1954, better known as "Public Law 480." This act established the policy of Congress "to make maximum effi- cient use of surplus agricultural commodities in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States." Although the main emphasis of the program established under this act was the liquidation of surpluses, i«3 Ibid., pp. 861-862. it*. Ibid., pp. 842-843. 1635 the resultant food aid was massive. Between 1954 and 1967, exports of Public Law 480 agricultural products amounted to $17.2 billion; recipients were 116 countries with half the world's population. How- ever, during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, defects in the program became apparent. In particular, the flow of of U.S. foodstuffs enabled foreign governments to evade the making of hard decisions on agricultural development, internal reforms, and population matters. As recorded by Dr. Nanes, the response of Congress was to redirect the thrust of the program to motivate needed reforms: In 1966, Public Law 480 vinderwent a major overhaul; the program of food assistance was tied directly to the efforts of the developing coxmtries to limit their population growth. These changes can be found in the Food for Peace Act, Public Law 89-808. In the first place, the entire rationale of the law was changed. Instead of a device to dispose of U.S. agricultural supluses, the new law advances a program to combat hunger and malnutrition and assist economic development, particularly in those countries that do the most to help themselves. In line with this program, the President is directed, in negotiating and carrying out agree- ments for the sale of agricultural commodities, whether for dollar credits or foreign currencies, to take account of the eflforts of the other countries to meet their problems of food production and population growth. In the Foreign Assis- tance Act of 1968 one of the purposes for which agreements concerning the use of foreign currencies can be made is that of ". ; . activities, where participati-on is voluntary, related to problems of population growth. ; . . Not less than five (5) percentum of the total sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested by the foreign country, be used for voluntary programs to control population growth." (Emphasis added.) That same law also contained a provision stipulating, as one of the self-help criteria the developing country must meet in order for the President to agree to the sale of agricultural commodities, the criterion of "carrying out voluntary programs to control population growth." This is stronger language than that which would merely take account of LDC efforts at self help.'^^ Concern continues, however, "lest unchecked population growth lead not only to starvation in the LDCs, but to the wreckage of international development as well." In Dr. Nanes' opinion, "It seems likely that the Congress will continue to monitor events in the field of population with a view to the possible passage of legislation to make U.S. pohcy in this area more effective." ^^^ Status of the Issue in 1971 The distinction between cases and issues in the separate studies of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy is that the cases repre- sent discrete events with some sort of terminus while issues are by nature continuing and inconclusive. The summation of the study of the issue of the food/people equation conforms with this distinction: The final result of the international campaign to bring food and population into balance in the LDCs — in such a way that economic development can go forward, and an acceptable level of human welfare can be achieved and sustained — cannot be foreseen. Certainly the challenge is as difficult as any ever faced by man ; it calls for the careful management of a complex interaction of scientific knowledge, diplomacy, and social engineering. At the beginning of the decade of the 1970s, the issue is very much in doubt. In the years ahead, the extent and character of the U.S. effort can have a crucial effect for good or ill. "^ By 1971 it had become evident that the problem of balancing the food/people equation was not fundamentally a technological one. It was true that further applications of science were needed, and »«5 76;d., p. 806. i«« Ibid., p. 8.52. ^^T Ibid., p. 864. 1636 efforts were underway to provide them. But, with respect to food supply the genetic developments of the Green Revolution presaged a large increase in the production of feed grains. More intensive use of fertiUzers offered opportunities of further major gains. Also of importance was the apphcation of well-established technologies of food preservation, storage, and protection against depredations of pests. With respect to population stabilization, the evidence of the developed countries suffices to demonstrate that sharp increases in numbers are not an inevitable consequence of rising affluence but rather the reverse. However, the primary factor missing in the de- veloping countries is the complex of institutions and organizational arrangements to create the social, cultural, economic, educational, and other modifications in human behavior and relationships that collectively result in the motivation of a population to relate its numbers to its resources. In 1971 the rate of population increase was steepest in the countries least able to sustain it. While the United States was exerting increasing pressure on these countries to develop an institutional capability to stabilize the food/people equation, the traditional emphasis of the United States on freedom of individual choice, combined with respect for cultural and religious values, tended to negate official pressures for dealing constructively with the popu- lation side of the equation. By itself, the encouragement of food production in the developing countries, supplemented by U.S. exports,- was no adequate answer. food/people equation as index of development The status of the food/people equation is an excellent index of development. But development must deal with a far larger scope of programs than food production and population stabiUzation. To achieve the necessary level of progress, including the equation discussed here, requires strengthened organization of political forms, improved educational and pubUc health institutions, more comprehensive and timely gathering of statistical data, systems of technology transfer (as for example the highly successful U.S. system of agricultural county agents), rail and highway transport, and other elements of technological infrastructure. Prospects and Options Suggested by the Study A number of policy issues that might merit congressional attention can be drawn from the study. Others, coming out of the 4 years of experience since the study was first issued, amplify but do not alter the general thrust of the report. BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL APPROACH The study divided its attention between two kinds of approaches to the food/people equation: one was the U.S. bilateral approach in which food was used directly as aid and indirectly as a motivation for population control by the aided country; the other was the efforts of the United Nations and associated U.N. institutions, chiefly the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank, to deal with the problem on a global basis. Neither approach has scored marked success and even diagnosis of the problem lacks specificity. The fault appears to lie more in the field of the social sciences and their apphca- tion than in the field of technology. 1637 It is contended by some analysts that a stronger support of the U.N"^ effort might have been more rewarding than the U.S. practice of emphasizing bilateral aid. This is possible, of course. Multilateral aid was shown in the study to have a number of particular advantages in this field, as also in the field of global health. Some of these advantages are identified by Dr. Nanes as follows : The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to contribute substantively to the planning of general programs. If they are in- volved in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation of plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global approach, i*** However, Dr. Nanes also warns that the multilateral approach is not without its present defects: The asserted advantages of the multilateral approach to world agriculture should not obscure the evident weaknesses of present institutions to accomplish purposes generally sought. Some of the weakensses attributed to the U.N. com- plex have included: Uncertain funding, varied quality of technical personnel, wavering political support, confused lines of functional organization, want of firmness in management, and absence of accepted overall authority. The desira- bility of a clearer mandate for specific global chores to be implemented by this system, and a general overhaul and strengthening, would appear to warrant early legislative and diplomatic consideration.'^* One major example of multilateral aid is the program of the World Bank under the leadership of President McNamara. This institution has identified five principal "roadblocks" to enhanced agricultural productivity in poor regions (paraphrase) : 1. Where poor farmers are struggling to subsist on semiarid or marginal land, there is a critical need for new agricultural technologies tailored to these conditions. 2. Another roadblock is government-imposed pricing and sub- sidy policies to provide cheap food to the cities at the expense of reduced incentive to rural areas to expand agricultural productivity. 3. The small farmer is almost always discriminated against by public institutions, which tend to favor the larger and more prosperous producers in terms of access to public credit, research, water allocations, and scarce supplies of petroleum, pesticides,, and fertilizer. 4. There is a scarcity of trained technicians to implement complex rural operations. 5. Finally, all of us have a great deal more to learn about the motivational patterns and behavioral responses of the poor in shifting from traditional subsistence agriculture to cash-crop production. ^^^ "s Jbid., p. 8.58. '^^ Ibid., p. 809. I'o McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors (op. cit.), pp. 10-18. 1638 PROBLEMS OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION There is irony in the fact that one of the most successful technologiea to increase agricultural productivity — the genetic achievements re- ferred to as the "Green Revolution" — has created many socioeconomic problems b}^ its very success. As Dr. Nanes explains: Broadly speaking, the problems set in train by the Green Revolution fall into two categories: (1) Those appearing within the LDCs themselves, as a result of the political, social, and economic effects of the new technology; and (2) the consequences for the developed nations of the world of the appearance of the new abundance of staple food commodities. The actions taken in response call for three sets of organizational entities: (1) institutions and organizational arrangements within the LDC itself to smooth the path and ease the dislocations of the Green Revolution; (2) bilateral arrangements, such as between the United States and an LDC; and (3) international or multilateral agreements and systems to provide global stability, unify international purposes, and ease international conflicts arising out of the changed patterns of trade. The prospective abundance threatens to generate several kinds of problems within the LDCs. Gains in food production may be poorly distributed from one district to another, as between East and West Pakistan. They may benefit the wealthier farmers while leaving the poor farmers even less well off. Both of these effects generate tensions within a country. The already evident flight from the farms to the cities is likely to intensify, with unemployment increasing in both poor rural areas and cities. All of these effects call for mediation and corrective action by the LDC governments, and in some cases for hard decisions on the part of political leaders. If the alternative is between governmental overthrow and outside assistance, it would seem to be important for the United States and its diplomats to know what form such assistance should appropriately take. It would seem also to be important to know in which countries such outside assistance would be likely to be effective, and where it would be merely support for a losing cause. Among the kinds of support that have been mentioned are: Improved credit resources more widely available at regional and local banking levels; more widespread and longer education of the population; encouragement of the use of labor intensive farm equipment; assistance to small farmers in the exploitation of the new genetic forms of grain; increased opportunities for rural industry; improved arrangements for storing surplus grains and preventing losses to pests;, better arrangements and facilities for the marketing o'' agricultural products; and above all, a strong administration of government, equipped with adequate taxing power and management skills to distribute equitablj' the costs and gains of the Green Revolution i^i PROBLEMS OF STABILIZING POPULATIONS Applied sociology is certainly important in meeting the challenge of the food/people equation. Its relevance to the task of raising agri- cultural productivity is stressed by Mr. McNamara. However, its importance for the other term of the equation — -the stabilizing of populations — 'is even greater. On this point Dr. Nanes writes: If the food/population problem in the developing countries is to be brought under control, there must be strong motivation for couples to limit the number- of their children. Mere expressions of general interest in the idea of fertility control will not suffice. For example, surveys have been made which suggest that 70 percent of the women interviewed were interested in controlling the size of their families, but experience indicates that this does not mean that all of these women wlU use family planning services if they are made available. Pre- sumably the same applies to men. In any event, there is little information oa. incentives and inducements for birth control in the LDCs, particularly where, strong motivation is necessary to overcome cultural barriers to contraception. 1" Nanes, Beyolid Maltlms, vol. H, pp. 85G-8r) 1639 Among other behavioral matters in which additional data would be helpful are the following: the sociopsychological aspects of male-female interaction; socioeconomic factors affecting human behavior relative to marriage, fertility, and migration; and social processes leading to cnltural change. Human behavior is, after all, the most critical factor in maintaining a balance between population and available food resources, and indeed in the whole development process.^" For the United States alone, or under bilateral arrangements, to embark on studies of tbis sort would seem less appropriate than for this country to give vigorous encouragement to their pursuit by agencies of the United Nations. The reasons given above by Dr. Nanes for the virtues of multilateral programs appear almost uniquely apphcable to this area. On the other hand, U.S. skills in agricultural technology might well be suited to transfer under bilateral arrange- ments. The technology appropriate to the U.S. cUmate, soils, economy, and other factors might not generally be suited to developing countries. But U.S. research methods and the remarkably successful U.S. methods of transfering technology from the research station to the individual farmer could be widely useful abroad."' Author\s Reassessment The main theme of the study is the interrelationships among food supply, population growth, and the entire process of development. Subsidiary themes concern food requirements and the technology of food production, the technology of birth limitation, and the problem of motivating people in the developing countries to adopt available birth control techniques. The study is further concerned with the organizational concepts, plans, programs, and international arrange- ments designed to operate on these- variables. The enormous human complexity of the food/population problem — social, cultural, economic, religious, administrative, political, diplomatic — ia suggested aa an overlying theme. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 6 YEARS LATER These themes seem unquestionably as relevant today as at the time the study was written. The importance of the food problem has been pointed up again in recent months by the famine in the Sahel and elsewhere, and by the World Food Conference, proposed by the United States and held in Rome in November 1974. Population growth continues essentially unabated, while a key effort to control such growth, namely, the program in India, appears to have failed. The solution of the food/population dilemma remains crucial if the poverty of the underdeveloped countries is to be substantially alleviated. In this connection it may be noted that there hasr been some change in the philosophy of development, with a number of experts now con- tending that first priority should go to the upgrading of agriculture, not only for the purpose of increasing the indigenous food supply, but also as a means of providing emplo3rment. It is sug^sted that the latter objective be achieved by the use of labor-intensive, rather than 1" Ibid., p. 779. 1^ On this point see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology, AgrlcultUTe Reitarch and Derdopment: Background Papers, prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and TechnoK ,iy and the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. September 1975, pp. 25-26. (Committee print.) 1640 capital-intensive, methods. (In other words, the most modern tech- niques may not necessarily be the most applicable, as far as the less developed countries are concerned.) If the study were to be rewritten today there would be no change in its emphasis in any significant way. Few changes appear to have oc- curred in the subject covered except that, as noted above, the food problem has become even more critical. Parts of the sections on the technology of the problem, particularly the technology of birth control, might need revision in light of the latest research. The study is as important to congressional concerns as when it was written, and perhaps even more so. Recent famines, the World Food Conference, and the earlier World Population Conference in Bucharest have higlilighted the problems of food and population once again. U.S. food export policy appears to have become a more important political issue than it was during the period when the study was in preparation. The study seems as relevant now to the project series as at the time it was written. Certainly the relationship of food supply to population is one that is markedly affected by the state of technology in each of these fields. It is equally certain that the food/population problem is at the forefront of the concerns of world diplomacy. Consequently the study can still serve as a highly appropriate vehicle for exploring the interaction of science, technology, and diplomacy. FOOD/POPULATION PROBLEM INSEPARABLE FROM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS Among the more significant observations of the study were the following: (a) The food/population problem cannot be separated from the total process of development — development is a seamless web. (b) The growth of world population is outpacing food production,- and available techniques have not been apphed sufficiently to achieve increased production and more efl&cient marketing of agricultural produce on the one hand, or slow down the rate of population increase on the other, (c) The achievement of a global balance of food and population will require improvements in political, economic, social, and diplomatic organization and management, (d) The devising of programs to deal with both sides of the food/population balance is a matter of great urgency, (e) If economic development becomes a kind of treadmill, with gains in development nullified by gains in population, the United States will have spent many billions of dollars to no lasting purpose. In such a case U.S. foreign aid is likely to be terminated, and the task of U.S. diplomacy in the underdeveloped world is likely to become far more difficult than it aheady is. (f) A solution of the food/population issue, while not guaranteeing the success of U.S. and other development assistance programs, will presumably permit the assignment of additional resources to other phases of development now receiving less attention, (g) The problem of the food/people equation is so complex that its solution is bound to be piecemeal and incremental, and to contain a fair amount of trial and error, (h) Regardless of the total cost of coping with the rapid increase in world population, it is important that every success be as visible as possible. If expenditures for family planning and population control activities show no results, it is unlikely that support for this type of activity can be sustained with Congress and the public. 1641 These same points would still be stressed in such a study today. The emphasis would probably be essentially the same, although some space might be given to the arguments and counterarguments of those who say that there is enough arable land to support a far larger population than now inhabits the globe. EAKLT CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF PROBLEM The study pointed out that Congress had recognized the problem •of controlling population growth as early as 1963, and that Congress was equally responsible with the executive branch for assigning the highest priority under the U.S. Foreign Aid Program to family planning and population activities. Given current conditions, a similar assess- ment of priorities would appear in order. The study also pointed out that it would be advantageous for the United States to search out and exploit every available opportunity to establish a solid, scientific, factual base of information about the food/population equation, for individual nations, for the regions of the world, and for the world as a whole. The study pointed out certain fundamental "weaknesses in the data on food and population, and since those weaknesses have not, apparently, been remedied. Congress should still be interested in ways to strengthen the basic stock of information about these subjects. In addition, recent shortfalls in production, combined with natural disasters, have produced several instances of "famine, thereby thrusting the question of food export policy to the front rank of congressional concerns. In general, the study identified problems for the Congress that still exist. The complexity of the problem area was emphasized, as was its central position in the entire process of development. The crucial Tole of technology with respect to both food production and the limita- tion of family size was highlighted. The study also identified the problems remaining in agricultural production as a result of the "Green Revolution, and raised the issue of U.S. foreign agricultural policy in relation to the less-developed countries. The social and psychological barriers to the effective use of present technology in the field of birth control were emphasized, as was the extreme sen- sitivity of the issue as a matter of bilateral diplomacy. It was sug- gested that in this field a more hopeful route might lie through multilateral action. The foregoing observations could serve to stimulate thinking in Congress should legislation in the food/population area be under -consideration. The questions to which they might give rise are as "valid now as they were when the study was in preparation. Some Illustrative Questions What factors are relevant in determining the optimum population numbers on a global basis? If infinitely continued growth is physically impossible, should circumstances be allowed to determine the point At which growth should stop? Or, should the determination be made as a result of a conscious policy decision? By what criteria should such a decision be made? Are the criteria the same for all countries and for all time? Who should decide? How is the decision to be given practical effect? What are the implications of these questions for U.S. diplomacy and long-range diplomatic planning? 1642 "What is the comparative cost/benefit advantage of multilateral versus bilateral programs in dealing with the food/people equation in •developing countries? What are the implications for future U.S. diplomacy of the increased reliance of developing countries on U.S. food supplies? How is this rehance to be reconciled with U.S. commitments to supply grain to the U.S.S.R., a large part of which is designed to faciUtate Soviet produc- tion of meat for internal consumption? How long will the extensive conversion of grain into meat remain ■an acceptable practice for the United States or any other country, in view of the emerging necessity for conservation of foodstuffs? What improvements might be achieved, and to what end, in U.S. relations with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Bank, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, and the United Nations Population Commission? How can U.S. expertise in agricultural R. & D. methodologies and technology transfer be effectively made available to developing countries? Might food surplus countries act cooperatively to ease food short- ages elsewhere? Would it be feasible to balance food supply and demand within geographic regions? Could a situation arise in which world food needs so exceeded the available supply that the leading surplus countries, perhaps in con- junction with the United Nations, were obliged by circumstance to resort to the triage procedure in allocating food to needy countries? How long will present maldistribution practices continue, and what populations are likely to be exposed to widespread starvation mean- wliile? Is there currently enough food to feed the world's population? Are shortages the result of failures in production, or distribution? If world population continues to increase at the present rate, and assuming no further technological breakthroughs in agriculture, is there likely to be a breakdown on a massive scale of the world's abiUty to feed itself, and if so, when might such a breakdown be expected to occur? What is the best general estimate of the impact of the Green Revolu- tion on the less-developed countries? Should additional inputs of mod- ■ern technology be made available to the agriculture of those countries, and if so, in what sectors? How should it be disseminated? Should the United States continue to give priority in its aid pro- grams to family planning assistance? Would such programs be more effective if transferred to multilateral sponsorship? ISSUE FOUR— U.S. SCIENTISTS ABROAD: AN EXAMINATION OF MAJOR PROGRAMS FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE"* U.S. Government arrangements for sending nongovernmental technical "^ personnel abroad to study, conduct research, attend meet- ings, or lecture have been initiated at intervals over the past three "< U.S. ConRress, House, Cominittpe on Foroign Affairs, U.S. ScievtiMs Abroad: An Examination of Major '^rnqrams for NonqDvernmcntal Scientific Excttange, a study in the series on Science, Technology, and Americuii Diplomacy prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- ments hy Genevieve J. Knezo, analyst in science and technology, Science Policy Research Division, Con- •gressinnal Research Service. Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 1974. See vol. U, pp. 865-1035. "s As used in this commeiitary, the word "technical" generally encompasses science and technology; 1643 decades. A number of these arrangements were made in the immediate post- World War II period ; some were established as a response to the launching of Sputnik in October 1957; but most are of more recent origin "reflecting current trends toward relaxation of mternational tensions and broader understanding of the benefits to science and society of cooperative international science." ^^^ Today, the Govern- ment "maintains a vast array of programs with varying origins and purposes. Americans are sent abroad for information exchange and the advancement of scientific knowledge; to meet goals of prestige; to support the development of a science infrastructure in the developing countries; and to meet the terms of bilateral and multilateral agree- ments for cooperation — agreements which serve both science and foreign policy goals. Scientific and technical exchanges are the largest part of U.S.-sponsored exchange programs." "'' The general assumption of the study is that international scientific exchanges are beneficial. The emphasis on critical analysis of the ongoing programs and identification of weaknesses and flaws in their execution should not obscure their merits. A few examples of these positive values might include — Providing a basis for comparison of United States and foreign science ; Enabhng the tapping of small pools of high competence in speciaHzed fields of science abroad, sometimes surpassing the levels of U.S. achievement; Supporting the international bridging function of science; Extending the reach of U.S. science; Training future candidates for posts as U.S. scientific and technological attaches; Familiarizing young scientists with the reality of the world scientific community; Providing a future basis for a two-way transfer of technology; and More generally, broadening the technical and cultural experi- ence of the participants. It is evident that international scientific exchanges contain these potential benefits. The intent of the study was to suggest ways in which these benefits might be more positively sought, and to indicate that program designs require a solid foundation of factual information for their evaluation and improvement. Statement of the Issue Administrative inadequacies in most of these programs make it difficult to evaluate their effectiveness and accomplishments. In general, they suffer from inadequate direction, coordination, and review. Both direction and review are hampered by lack of a clearly defined U.S. Government set of international science policies. Instead, the State Department issues detailed, somewhat random lists of political, security, economic, scientific and technological, and humani- tarian objectives for U.S. international science and technology pro- grams. Little attention is given to determining priorities systematically or even to relating the programs to the objectives outlined by the "» Knezo, L'.«. ISckntists Abroad, vol. II, p. 873. "7 Ibid., p. 1022. 96-243 O - 77 - 10 1644 State Department.^^* Review, including congressional oversight, is further inhibited by a paucity of evaluative data — "most of these programs do not incorporate effective provisions for continuous collection, analysis, and dissemination to the public of data required to evaluate the contributions of the program to the advancement of the sciences or to promotion of cooperative international scientific activities." ^^' A number of factors militate against coordinated program planning. One of these is that U.S. international science programs and policies have not been fully- recognized as part of either foreign policy or science policy. A second is that while each program has a number of overlapping purposes, each is carried out under its own statutory authority and is reported to different congressional committees. A third is that some bilateral agreements provide for funding and program com- mitments which are rarely brought to the attention of Congress until they are a fait accompli. A fourth consideration which must minimize expectations of eJective coordi- nation is the unsuccessful history of actual attempts to provide this function. Two agencies have had responsibility in the past for coordinating, on a government- wide basis, international science poUcies and exchange pohcies. These are the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State.is" An account of the unsuccessful coordination efforts is given later in this commentary. But it is the problem of basic policies that should probably warrant greatest congressional attention. Along with exchange programs serv- ing the legitimate interests of detente, development, and science for the sake of science, is the United States placing enough emphasis on sending abroad persons qualified and alerted to identify and assess trends in both high and low technology^^^ from which U.S. industry and research laboratories could benefit? Do the exchange programs treat technology transfer as a two-way street? Is the ratio of applied to basic scientists in the programs commensurate with this purpose? How systematic is the search, in different technical fields, for oppor- tunities for significant transfers to as well as from the United States? In reviewing and considering relative priorities for the overall U.S. program of sending technical personnel abroad, are U.S. policj^makers giving thought to the appropriate balance among the disciplines, not for the present day but in terms of what will be needed in the United States 10 and 20 years in the future? In examining the three principal U.S. exchange programs and considering problems of direction, coordination, and review, this study also sets the stage for examining such broader policy questions as these. Importance of the Issue Weaknesses in administration and evaluation of exchange programs described in this study are symptomatic of a more important problem: a corresponding gap in U.S. international science policy and policy machinery. The programs are nominally governed by a collection of stated goals, but the goals sometimes conflict and do not add up to a coherent policy (and in any case are not systematically adhered to). Mechanisms and procedures for coordinated direction are lacking »'8 Ibid. 1" Ibid., p. 1023. '80 Ibid., pp. 102.")-1020. 181 See the essay on this subject which follows for an explanation of these terms. 1645 in the executive branch; reporting procedures are inadequate for review and evaluation; further obstacles to effective review exist in the complexity and variety of the programs and the manner of their administration in the executive branch, and in Congress in the fact that the programs relate to a number of different committee jurisdictions. Analysis of any governmental program area calls for attention to such questions as: What are these programs for? What are they accomplishing? But what gives the present issue special importance is that it tends to raise the more fundamental questions: What> in the large, are (or should be) U.S. purposes in today's world? How should the U.S. Government organize itself to seek answers to this question, and to take action accordingly? How the Issue Developed; U.S. Involvement As both this study and that on the Brain Drain (Issue Five) bring out, since antiquity scientists have been traveling to other countries to study and to teach — often under the sponsorship of governments. However, the official educational exchange programs of the United States are of recent origin. Before World War II they were small and confined largely to Latin America. During the war, educational and cultural exchange programs were replaced by informational and propaganda efforts. The immediate postwar period saw U.S. exchange and assistance activities characterized by mixed educational^ cultural, and informational aims. Such activities on a large scale be- came part of the 1945 occupation programs in Germany, Austria, and Japan. Beginning in 1947, technical assistance under the Marshall Plan had important educational and scientific aspects. The Point IV Program, initiated in 1950, was designed to provide American technical expertise to the developing countries.'^^ Since the late 1940s there has been an unprecedented expansion of activities involving international communication and movement by U.S. specialists, particularly in technical fields. At the private non- governmental level, scientists exchange information through the printed word, through channels increasingly provided by multina- tional corporations, and through personal visits and correspondence. Some Government programs send U.S. technical specialists abroad on official missions designed to obtain or disseminate information in support of national defense and security objectives or the maintenance- of U.S. mstallations abroad. Other official programs give substance to humanitarian objectives of U.S. foreign policy in such areas as de- velopment aid and disaster relief. Still others promote internationally sponsored cooperative research efforts. In all, they involve the move- ment abroad of thousands of U.S. personnel and the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.'^^ Many of those millions, and some hundreds of the persons, are involved in U.S. Government programs which support the activities in foreign countries of nongovernmental scientist and technologists. »" See Chapter Four— "The Point IV Program: Technological Transfer as the Basis of Aid to Developing- Countries"— in: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautfcs, Technical Information for Congress, prepared for the Sulicommittee on Science, Research, and Developm.ent by Genevieve J. Knezo, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington^ D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Apr. 25, 196'J (revised Apr. 15, 1971), pp. 61-96. '" A survey conducted in 1969 by HEW at the request of Congress found that 31 agencies of the Govern- ment vi'ere administering 159 programs for tviro-way exchanges of scholars or for other foreign or international education activities. These programs were authorized by 42 legislative acts and cost "somewhere between $400 and $800 million annually. "(Knezo, Scientists Abroad, vol. 11, p. 889.) 1646 The question of what role such programs do or should play as instru- ments of U.S. foreign policy and how they can best be managed represents a continuing issue. For purposes of manageability, the study focuses on the programs of three agencies, and mainly on the time period 1960-70. AGENCIES INVOLVED IN U.S. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS The three agencies are the Department of State, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council (NAS-NRC). The State Department is responsible for the Senior Fulbright-Hays Program. This program has been funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and administered by the Committee on the International Exchange of Persons (CIEP) of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, National AcademA^ of Sciences, in cooperation with binational commissions in host countries. It seeks to promote educa- tional exchange and cultural understanding as objectives of U.S. foreign policy; the concerns of science are secondary to the objectives of cooperation. The National Science Foundation administers four sets of exchange programs: (1) bilateral science agrocments with the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Asia; (2) programs supporting interna- tional travel and meetings of technical personnel; (3) National and Special Research Programs (major research efforts, often interdis- ciplinary, of very broad scope or relating to specific geographic areas and requiring extensive international and U.S. domestic coordination) ; and (4) awards tenable abroad under NSF's research and educational support programs. The NSF programs, designed originally to strengthen the Nation's domestic science base, have been broadened to include initiation and support of foreign and international science and tech- nology. They emphasize science for science's sake. The National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council programs implement bilateral inter-Academy agreements for scientific cooperation which are part of Cultural Relations Agreements signed by the United States with the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, and also support activities of the NAS-NRC-affiliated Committee on Scholarly Com- munication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC). The Soviet and East European exchange programs are funded by the NSF Office of International Programs and administered by the Section on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of the Commission on Inter- national Relations, NAS-NRC. These activities represent an attempt to establish fruitful scientific exchanges between States separated by wide differences in ideology. These three major program areas are representative of U.S. Government-sponsored activities for nongovernmental technical personnel abroad; they are the largest, oldest, and most publicized of such program areas, and have wide geographical distribution. Scientists Abroad describes each of the program areas in some detail.'®* 's< See the following sections of the study: II. The Fulbright-IIays Program for Senior-Level Exchanges (pp. 88'J-!)15); III. National Science Foundation Programs for Americans Abroad (pp. 91(1-981)); and 1\". United Stales and Soviet-Eastern European Inter-Academy Scientific Exchanges (pp. 982-1014). The study also contains a brief section on developing relations with the PRC: V. Scientific Exchanges with the People's Republic of China (pp. 142-148). 1647 Taking each in turn, this commentary will provide only such further description as seems essential to a general understanding of program goals, scope, activities, and management. The main purpose here is to highlight policy and administrative gaps or problems, as identified by the author of the study and as they may shed light on the inter- action of science, technology, and American diplomacy. As indicated earlier in this commentary, the undeniable advantages of foreign exchanges of scientific personnel should not be dismissed ; rather the purpose of the study was to suggest ways in which they could be maximized. The further point implicit in the study is that U.S. skills ^ in organization and management have been insuflBciently exploited in this area, and that a part of the task of U.S. diplomacy might be to correct this deficiency. THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS (STATE DEPARTMENT) PROGRAM 'The Nation's first large-scale legislative program for international educational and cultural exchange began in 1946 when Senator William Fulbright sponsored an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to authorize a mutual exchange of scholars with 22 coun- tries, financed by foreign countries derived from the role of surplus U.S. war materials abroad" : The Fulbright program differed significantly from previous overseas scholarship activities. These factors continue to characterize it today. First: The program was conceived so as to minimize involvement with prop- agenda and cultural imperialism and to insure bilateral cooperation, by, (a) requiring that the United States and each participating country sign formal exchange agreements to authorize the program, and (b) by establishing binational foundations or commissions, composed equally of U.S. citizens (including the U.S. Ambassador) and foreign nationals, who would assist in local program selec- tion and administration. Second: Architects of the program sought to establish an administrative frame- work neither too dependent nor too independent of foreign poUcy by, (a) Placing overall administrative responsibility for the program in the Department of State; but also by (b) establishing a Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) charged with selecting all participants and with general supervision of the program. Responsibility for administration and execution of the program was given to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in the Department of State, which also administers other U.S. exchange-of-persons programs. CU, acting under broad policy outlines set by the Board provides administrative staff and secretariat for the program, negotiates agreements covering educational inter- change with foreign governments, maintains liaison with U.S. embassies and consulates overseas, and in Washington cooperates with other U.S. Government and private agencies on particular aspects of the program.'^ According to one historian of this era: "The Fulbright program .' ' ". fitted perfectly the spirit of the times. International-minded academic and civic groups saw in it an appeahng and practical means to promote world understanding." ^^^ The program is not a massive one. The total number of lecturers and research scholars involved, in all geographic areas, was 1,229 in 1967-68, a peak year. Of the 1,229, 355 were in natural and applied sciences, 309 in social sciences. The cost of the entire program in 1967-68 was $33,722,523. 1S5 Ibid., p. 892. 'S8 Ibid. The quotation is from The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs, by Philip }l. Coombs. 1648 After its first few years of operation the Fulbright i)rogram came under increasing criticism. Some felt that it was too limited — limited to academic exchanges, to countries where the United States happened to own "excess foreign currencies," to payment of transportation costs of foreign students coming to the United States but not the costs of supporting them here, and so on. Other critics, including Members of Congress responding to the growing intensity of the cold war, wanted either to abolish the program or to link it more closely to U.S. informa- tion and propaganda activities. (Action taken after congressional debate on the aims of the program is mentioned in the following section on the Role oj Congress.) Lack oj Evaluation Procedures a Program Weakness A weakness of the ])rogram throughout its history has been a lack of adequate evaluation procedures. As a consequence, not enough attention has been given to systematic improvement of planning and programing. The author comments '^^ that the need to assess the effec- tiveness of the program has been pointed out repeatedly. According to the program's lirst advisory commission in 1961: "We still know too little about the processes of communication between cultures, of attitude formation, of educational development in relation to other aspects of national development." The successor advisory group, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, has repeatedly called for development of a research capability in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. For exam|)le, in its seventh annual report, A Afiilfitude of Counselors (1970), the Commission reiterated its recommendations: ". . . We believe that the development of a social science research capability in the Bureau is a functional and urgent management requirement. . . . Institutionalizing the evaluation and research function . . . would give it the staying power which 'contracting out' lacks. It would also provide the daily evaluation and research continuity which operators of the program cannot themselves provide." ^'^^ Because of this shortcoming, the scientific exchanges which con- stitute more than half of the Fulbright-Hays program ^^^ apparently have not been evaluated in depth by agencies administering the program : As a result, there are almost no appropriate measures of the impacts of scientific exchanges, that is, accomplishments of grantees with respect to both the advance of science and the promotion of scientific and political cooperation between the United States and the Fulbright-Hays host country. [The] little information that is available consists of unpublished reports prepared by the CIEP and annual reports prepared for the Congress by the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. ^°" Nevertheless, the Commission has been sufficiently persuaded of the program's effectiveness to describe it as ". . . tremendously successful and ... an important and significant element of American foreign relations" (sixth annual report to the Congress, 1969). The Commis- "7 Ibid., p. 898, Footnote 59. ■ '88 Ibid. •88 So known since passage of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (Public Law 87-2o<')) in September l'.)(;i. Sec further reference to the act in the section b(>low on the Role of Congress. i'" Knezo, op.cit. p. 89'J. (The CIEP is now called the Council for International Exchange of Scholars and is part of the NAS Commissiou on Human Resources.) 1649 sion also expressed concern over cuts which the program had suffered in recent years as part of a general retrenchment occasioned by budget and balance-of -payments problems. The author concludes her treatment of the Fulbright-Hays program with some questions: Would the quality and effectiveness of scientific participation in the program be improved if: (1) A science advisory apparatus were established in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs or in the Committee on the Exchange of Persons to provide for better coordination between the requirements of scientific scholarship and diplomatic objectives? (2) the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs undertook more comprehensive information gathering on the program, and sponsored more research and evaluation to improve program operations, continuity, and long-range in-country planning? and (3) field responsibilities were shifted from the cviltural affairs officer to an official more familiar with the require- ments of educational and scientific exchange, such as an educational officer or science attache? ^"^ Further, in reference to the related problem of attracting qualified and needed personnel in certain technical fields to serve overseas, especially in the less developed countries — she asks : In view of the difficulties encountered in finding scientific and technical per- sonnel to serve in the developing countries, would the objectives of the Fulbright- Hays program in these areas be better served if special inducements were made tc obtain qualified personnel willing to serve in technical assistance capacities; or if foreign government expectations for technical assistance were satisfied through other U.S. Government programs? '^^ NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION PROGRAMS "^ Most of the Nation's programs for sending U.S. nongovernmental scientists abroad are supported by the National Science Foundation and administered either directly by the Foundation or by the National Academy of Sciences with NSF funds. These programs have grown in both number and importance since the Foundation was established in 1950; they are responsible for sending more senior nongovernmental scientific and technical personnel abroad than any other U.S. pro- grams. (In the fiscal year 1970, for example, 886 recipients of NSF travel awards carried out activities in 75 countries for a total of 3,214 workdays; State Department programs sent 293 nongovernmental scientists and technicians to 64 countries for a total of 1,781 workdaj^s.) NSF obligations for international scientific activities totaled about $118 million in the fiscal year 1974; no cost breakout for programs which send nongovernmental technical personnel abroad is available but most NSF international activities involve exchanges. The purposes of NSF overseas programs are as diverse as their geographic distribution is widespread. Some programs support the accumulation of information to advance American science, or science for its own merits; some promote educational advancement of American and foreign scholars; some facilitate international cooperative research programs; and some serve political objectives through bilateral scientific com- munication. Those programs are increasing in number and importance, with respect to U.S. commitments for both science and foreign affairs.'"* »i /bid., p. 915. '"2 Ibid. "3 This section focusps mainly on the section entitled: "Conclusions: Some Illustrative Questions of Policy" at the end of the (iti page treatment of the subject in the basic study. The reader is referred to the latter (vol . II, pp. 'Jlii-'.i81) for details of the varied NSl' exchange programs themselves. "< Knezo, op. cit., p. [il'J. 1650 Congress did not give the Foundation explicit authority to carry out foreign and international scientific activities for their own merits, until 1968. Therefore most NvSF programs were justified in terms of their contribution to U.S. domestic science. Foreign exchange activi- ties are scattered throughout NSF divisions; the Foundation estab- lished an Ofhce for Foreign and International Science in 1955, but that office even toda}^ has relatively httle responsibility for overseas science programs. These circumstances probably account for the- seeming absence of clear-cut Foundation policies and internal pro- cedures providing for coordinated administration of the international programs. Fragmentation of NSF activities and lack of adequate reporting procedures make difficult the evaluation of Foundation programs. Apparently out of deference to scholarly sensitivities, the Foundation has not required grantees in most programs to report on their inter- national or foreign activities or to make suggestions for improving the programs. "Only in fiscal year 1970 did the Foundation begin to attempt to collect data, and then only in perfunctory fashion, on overseas activities undertaken with NSF funds." ^^^ These factors have, . . . kept the Foundation from defining and developing a role as a lead U.S. agency in support of international science and scientific exchange activities. While a number of these programs very probably have advanced the cause of inter- national science and international politics, there is little information on their achievements or impacts. The absence of both data and a mechanism to plan programs on a Foundation-wide basis undermines NSF's responsibility for deter- mining program priorities in both the short- and long-range future. Systematic determination of priorities, both within and among programs, seems to be reqvured since the programs are both increasing and becoming more significant as tools of foreign policy. '"^ An additional problem is that a number of NSF programs suffer' from poor participation rates by U.S. scientists. U.S. scientific partici- pation is circumscribed by language barriers and sometimes by insufficient scientific challenge. "It is conceivable that NSF could design programs which would satisfy more easily criteria for U.S. scientific participation and for country planning needed to develop the science infrastructure for developing countries. For example, the Foundation might insist on better evaluation of the experiences of the programs it supports, better reporting, improved in-house evalua- tion of reports and of program accomplishments and problems, and more attention to requirements for effective performance." '^^ The author concludes the section on the Foundation's exchange programs with some comments and questions which have been partly overtaken by events but appear to remain essentially valid : . . . the Foundation's responsibilities for foreign and international science were expanded under terms of President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 1, which took effect on July 1, 1973. This action transfers to NSF some Executive Office functions for determining of domestic and foreign science policies and for interagency coordination. It also designates the Foundation's Director as the President's Science Adviser and personal representative for foreign scientific afifairs. It is an open question whether the Foundation's organization for foreign and international science can meet the needs imposed by these expanded re- sponsibilities. i»5/6!d., p. 980. i«« Ibid. "' Ibid. 1651 Other specific questions might be asked: Should the Foundation enlarge its overseas science staff? Should the Foundation evaluate the merits of delegating to the NAS increasing responsibilities in international science? Should the Foundation improve in-house reporting requirements and coordina- tion of foreign and international activities? Should the Foundation reestablish the International Science Advisory Com- mittee? Should the Foundation require more systematic evaluation of it> far-flung support activities, especially in examining apparent inadequacies of some bilateral technology-assistance programs? Should the Foundation provide for more systematic coordination with the activities of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ- mental and Scientific Affairs)? '"* THE NAS-NRC INTER-ACADEMY EXCHANGES "The NAS-NRC exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe ilhistrate a unique dimension of programs which support nongovernmental scientists abroad. . . ." ^^^ These poUti- cally sensitive programs call for high-caliber nongovernmental scientific participation in planning and execution. Before 1959, Americans were not permitted to participate in any scientific activities in the Soviet Union. Even today all Government- funded exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union are conducted under formal, rigidly enforced, official treaties and quid pro quo exchange agreements. The first of these was signed in 1959 between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.; it has been renewed every 2 years since and now takes the form of an annex to the biennially renewed Cultural Relations Treaty between the two countries. The inter- Academy agreements specify reciprocity in numbers, subjects, and duration of exchanges. The inter-Academy agreement of 1959 provided for a sn^.ai! 2-year program. Subsequent agreements have gradually expanded the scientific exchange. As the then NAS Foreign Secretary, Dr. Harrison Brown, described the program in the May 1971 Heatings of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (published as^l General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space) : The inter-Academj^ exchange commenced with provision for 44 scientists of each country to visit the other for a total of 70 months over a period of 2 years, an extremely modest beginning which .stressed short visits of 1 month. In 1962, when the program was renegotiated, the NAS took the initiative to adjust the balance away from the short survey visits in the direction of the longer research visits, for w'hich Americans at least took their families along to participate in the new experience. In 1962 a new pattern was established which has continued more or less up to the present: 30 lecture-survey visits of 1 month; 26 research visits totalling 160 months for the biennium, with more emphasis placed on the longer research visits.^"" The 1970-71 inter-Academy agreement made provision for the two Governments to facilitate exchanges of professors to lecture in the natural, technical, and social sciences and the humanities. The 1972-73 agreement expanded the permissible volume of exchange i»8 /6id.,p. 981. iM Ibid., p. 870. 200 /()id.,p. 991. 1652 to 190 man-months on each side. Terms of the latter agreement may be summarized as follows: 1. Number and duration of exchanges. — a. Exchanges of 12 prominent scientists, at least half of them to be members of the respective Academy, for periods up to 1 month to lecture, conduct seminars, or famiUarize themselves with scientific research; b. Exchanges of a maximum of 14 scientists from each country, for 1 month visits for the familiarization with research ; c. Exchanges of a maximum of 35 scientists, with total visits not to exceed 190 man-months, to conduct scientific research or to pursue advanced study; visits to last from 3-10 months; 2. Nomination and selection. — Nominees to be approved by both Academies. Scientists are evahaated on education, professional employment, scientific spe- cialization, publications, location of proposed visit, knowledge of foreign language, and title of lectures; 3. Additional exchanges. — Which permit revisions of the agreed upon terms as well as provision for visits for scientific conferences; 4. Program review. — Both Academies are to exchange small delegations each year to review the inter- Academy exchange program "at the policy level;" 5. Financing and administrative arrangements. — The sending Academy is to provide round trip transportation and salaries for its scientists; the receiving Academy to provide in-country transportation costs, living quarters, medical ex- penses, special allowances, and reimbursement for research equipment expenses.^oi As the figures indicate, the inter-Academy program is a modest one. The total number of American scientists visiting the Soviet Union' between 1959 and 1970 under the agreements was 224, for a total time of 666 months; corresponding figures for Soviet scientists visiting the United States were 234 and 696 months. The average cost of a visit by a U.S. scientist was $7,300. Inter-Academy scientific exchange programs with East European countries are carried out, in general, not through formal intergovern- mental agreements but under memoranda of understanding between national academies. This statement applies to agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia (all concluded in 1966), and Bulgaria (concluded in 1970). An Academy-to-Academy exchange agreement with Romania was arranged in 1964 on the basis of an intergovernmental exchange of notes. The program of intcr-Academy exchanges with East European countries has been very small, totaling, for the 5-year period 1966-70, only 106 East European scientists visiting the United States (33 from Czechoslovakia, 44 from Poland, 45 from Romania, and 19 from Yugoslavia) and 147 U.S. scientists visiting Eastern Europe. Despite the need for close attention to the details of arrangements in the scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and East European countries occasioned by the political context, there is lacking in these programs — as in the Fulbright and NSF exchanges — the kind of information in depth which would permit assessment of experiences, problems, and achievements: Evaluation is . . . hampered by the absence of reliable and public information on annual activities. The NSF, which funds these programs, is under statutory ol:)ligation to report annually to the Congress in authorization and appropriations hearings and also in annual reports of grants awarded. However, the Foundation gives superficial details of the Soviet and Eastern European exchanges; gross financial data; and some descriptive material citing especially meritorious activi- ties. It has not made a systematic attempt to provide the Congress with a detailed summary of activities and problems culled fron^ materials available from the National Academy of Sciences.^''^ 2«i Ibid., pp. 991-992. -"■- Ibid., pp. 987-988. 1653 The Academy is a quasi-public scientific advisory group chartered by Congress to provide advice to the Government on matters involv- ing science, technology, research, and development. It is not subject to annual authorization and appropriations oversight. It does prepare annual reports for Congress, but these are generally published several years after the fact. Role of Congress Post-World War II scientific exchange programs have attracted sustained congressional interest and frequent legislative activit}^ but have not been attended by oversight and evaluation efforts of real depth and persistence. Some of the important dates in that history are the following: FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM 19Jf6 — Adoption of the aforementioned Fulbright amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944, authorizing an exchange of scholars to be financed b}' foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus war materials abroad. 19^8 — Passage, after long and heated debate on the relationship of educational exchange to foreign policy, of the U.S. Information and Education (Smith -Mundt) Act, Public Law 80-402. ^o* The provisions of this act reflected a desire to maintain a relative inde- pendence of educational and cultural affairs from foreign policy. The foreign policy purpose was served by establishing an information service separate from educational activities. The latter, under the Fulbright program, were strengthened by: (1) authorizing some educational exchange in countries other than those whose governments had signed educational exchange agreements; (2) enabling Fulbright scholars to receive some supplementary dollar support; (3) requiring the State Department to use private organizations wherever possible in carrying out the operations and objectives of the program; (4) authorizing the inclusion of technical assistance activities under the concept of educational interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills authorized by the program; and (5) further expanding the concept of educational exchange hy authorizing the Secretary of State to support the exchange of educational materials, and to extend grants to American-sponsored schools, libraries, private universities, and other organizations to further the aims of the educational and cultural exchange pro- grams. The act also created the Presidentially appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange to appraise the effectiveness of the exchange program semiannually and recommend legislative improvement. 195Jf — Adoption of an amendment (Public Law 83-480) to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, author- izing U.S.-owTied foreign currencies from any source, including the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad, to finance educational exchange. The amendment was proposed by Senator Fulbright when the earlier source of funds — sales of surplus war materiel — began to dry up. 1961 — Passage of the Fulbright-Hays act (Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, Public Law 87-256). This was the original 203 Ibid., p. 893. 1654 authorizing legislation for present educational and cultural exchange programs. It had wide support in the Congress and was adopted in the House 378 to 32, in the Senate 79 to 5. Among other things, the Fulbright-Hays act : — made financial arrangements more flexible to support long-range bina- tional planning and financing by permitting reservation of foreign currencies in advance, dollar financing, interagency transfer of funds for programs, and the extension of support to individuals as well as to institutions; — authorized private sector evaluation research on educational and cultural exchange; — expanded the program to include U.S. and foreign participation in international educational and scientific meetings and created additional centers of technical and cultural interchange, such as the East- West Center in Hawaii; and — refined and strengthened binational program planning and the role of private advisory groups in administering the program. ^'^^ NSF PROGRAMS 1950 — Establishment of the NSF by the National Science Founda- tion Act of 1950; NSF given limited authority for international science activities, but only to support U.S. domestic science. 1958 — NSF authority to foster interchange of information among U.S. and foreign scientists broadened by passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. 1959 — NSF enabling legislation amended to read "international science activities" instead of the more limited "international science research activities." Mid-1960s — Congress "gave critical attention to further expansion of the agency's mandate. Three areas received major concern: social science research, applied research, and international science." ^°^ 1968 — Legislation proposed by Science, Research, and Development Subcommittee Chairman Emilio Q. Daddario enacted, expanding the Foundation's mandate to "initiate and support specific scientific activities in connection -with matters relating to international coopera- tion," on their own merits and not just in relation to domestic science. The NSF amendments of 1968 also expanded the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development to authorize appropriations for the NSF. 1971 — NSF requested by House Committee on Science and Astro- nautics to furnish Congress with a line item budget. In response, NSF began to use a consistent format for reporting international science activities, NAS-NRC PROGRAMS The area of congressional oversight responsibility includes the National Science Foundation but only indirectly, through the NSF, that of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. Apart from references to the wide-ranging hearings of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in May 1971 on A General Beview of International Cooperation in Science and Space, mention in the study of congressional interest in the inter-Academy exchanges 2(x Jbid., p. 895. 205 Ibid., p. 919. 1655 is limited to references to NSF authorization and appropriations actions and to a footnote (page 111) on the 1972 accord with the U.S.S.R. The accord had been reviewed by the Subcommittee on International Science and Space of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in hearings on U.S.-U.S.S.E. Cooperative Agree- ments and in a subcommittee report on the same subject (August 1972). It is noted repeatedly throughout the study that the three major exchange programs are deficient in arrangements for program analysis, evaluation of effectiveness, and related factual reporting. As the author observes of one of the three : Throughout its history the Fulbright-Hays program has lacked both appro- priate data collection and evaluation procedures; consequently there has been insufficient attention to systematic improvement of planning and program operations. Scientific exchanges constituting more than half of the Fulbright-Hays program, apparently have not received indepth evaluation by agencies administer- ing the program. 2"* With the exception of a detailed review that Congress made of exchange programs when it was considering the Fulbright-Hays legislation in 1961, congressional consideration of these programs has been limited essentially to annual Appropriations Committee review of the State Department's mutual educational and cultural exchange program. A search of congressional hearings and literature for the period 1960-70 yielded nothing which focused especially on the Fulbright-Hays program. ^^^ Status of the Issue; Prospects and Options A second major problem in the administration of exchange programs, along with reporting and evaluation, is that of coordinated program planning. It was noted earlier that two agencies have had some responsibihty for trying to coordinate the U.S. Government's inter- national science policies and programs: the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology (IC, FCST — subsequently transferred to the aegis of the Department of State), and the Bureau of International and Scientific Affairs (SCI), Depart- ment of State ^°* (now the Bureau of Oceans and International Envi- ronmental and Scientific Affairs — OES). The author comments tliat although no in-depth evaluation of SCI and its work is available, "Several critiques indicate that because of political and organizational constraints, SCI has been less than effective in coordinating U.S. science policies abroad." -°^ According 20« Ibid., pp. 898-899. 21" Ibid., p. 898, footnote 58. 2"* The point bein;; made by the author of the present study is reinforced by the observation in a lat?r (June igV.Tt study in this series, Scienc and Technology in th' Dcpartmrnt of State, that "... pending action on the Presidential science policy system, the current situation is that aspects of international science and technolotry policy, in the upper reaches of policymakinf; are spread anion;;: —The Bureau of Oceans and International Knvironmental and Scientific Affairs; —The State Department Policy Plaunin? Stall; — The immediate staff of the Soeretary of State; — The National Security Council, and the Under Secretaries Committee; —The Director of NSF and the Science and Teehnolo;;y Planning Office; and — Council on International Eccnoniic Policy. Precisely how policy initiatives can evolve out of this rather complex conzeries of hiph level institutions is not clear." (U.S. Consjress, House, Committee on Internationa! Relations, Srj'icr mji Techndng-i in I h" £>cpart)iieiil of State, a study in tlie series on Science, Technolosv, and Am-ric:ni Diulcinacy preiiarcd fo'- the Subcommittee on International S.:>curity ajid .Sci^ntiric .\fiurs" by Frank'iu P. Huddle, seni.ir sp?c;.-iUit in science and technolosv. Congressional Res<' irch Service, L'bi'ary of Congress. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., June 197.5. See vol. II, p. 1498. 2»» Knezo, op. cit., vol. II, p. 1020. 1656 to one widely traveled U.S. scientist, Roger Revelle, the cause of this shortcoming is that the Department of State is constrained from taking the initiative in designing policies for science and technolo^. RevelTe states that "one reason for this deficiency may be a feeling among the leaders of the Department that the changes "brought about by [scientific] developments will be slow to take effect and can be [managed] as they emerge by conventional diplomatic means." Another critic, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "faults the Bureau with concern for minor tasks and deferring respon- sibility for guiding major international scientific and technological policies and programs to the White House. . . ." ^*" FCST EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF U.S. EXCHANGE PROGRAMS FCST, composed of representatives of all relevant Government agencies, was established in 1959 ". . . to promote closer cooperation among Federal agencies, ... to irrrfM-ove planning and management in science and technology, and to advise and assist the President regard- ing Federal programs affecting more than one agency. The Inter- national Committee of the FCST was created, also in 1959, to recom- mend "measures to promote and enhance U.S. participation in and support for international scientific activities compatible with our foreign policy." ^" The Committee made several abortive attempts to improve and coordinate governmental activities relating to foreign and international exchanges. For example, in 1961, at the request of Presidential science adviser George Kistiakowsky, it undertook a review of the international scientific activities of all Federal agencies which resulted in a report. International Scientific and Technological Activities, which called on the NSF to provide better information on exchange activities. The Foundation never responded to the recom- mendation. In 1968 the IC, FCST, prepared, in collaboration with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a set of guidelines which contained the recommendation that "each agency concerned provide the IC, FCST, with an annual report on its exchange programs and the steps which are consistent with these Guidelines." ''^ The agencies failed to respond and the effort was dropped. The IC, FCST, made another attempt beginning in 1970 to catalog U.S. Government relationships in international science and tech- nology. The committee requested agencies to supply it with: (a) Brief description of agency's international scientific programs and projects; (b) Their relation to past size during the 1960s and to the vigor, need and demand for programs; (c) . . . Missed opijortunities which might have been developed under more favorable circumstances; (d) Legislative authorities and restrictions within which programs-projects are carried forward; (e) The ngency [view of thel programs' utility. Identification of specific instances in which the cooperative programs with other nations have resulted in savings of time or money or in other direct benefits to the U.S.; and (f) Observations which may serve to clarify the data given.*'* "• Ibid., p. 1020. 2" Ibid., p. 1027. 2" Ibid., p. 1030. sn Ibid., p. 1031. 1657 The review was never completed. According to the IC, FCST, "preparation of the report has posed far more difficulties than had been foreseen. Among the difficulties . . . [was] the lack of compara- bility between the submissions of various agencies. . . ." At the beginning of this commentary on Scientists Abroad it was suggested that an even more important problem than those of the direction, coordination, and evaluation of technical exchange pro- grams might be the antecedent problem of providing a coherent policy context. An example of such a context with respect to U.S. scientific programs in Europe is provided by Victor Basiuk, writing in 1972: Present American scientific and technological policy ... is largely ad hoc and unfocused. There is concentration on individual countries and programs, on tar- gets of opportunity. But there is no overall view which would take into consider- ation the nature and requirements of upcoming technologies, especially their large scale and high cost. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the direction of bilateral cooperation with European nations. . . . This course is not adequate. To meet the requirements of the large-scale technology of the future and of the immense costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a large market and cohesive internal institution. Compartmentalized bilateral relation- ships between the United States and individual Western European nations bypass this objective.2i* Basiuk concludes that the absence of multilateral cooperative? scientific relationships with Europe imperils transatlantic security: If Washington does not soon develop a concerted science and technology policy, it is foreclosing options for the late 1970s and early 1980s in a way that almost guarantees insecurity in Europe. The enormous complexity of the task is no excuse for not addressing it. Small-scale, bilateral cooperation may postpone the peril, but it cannot in the end avert it.^'* In a statement to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in January 1971, Chairman Daddario of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development addressed the same theme, but more broadly : ... It has become evident that the concept of sovereignty and the traditional means of conducting relations between nations are no longer sufficient. The reason for this is that technology has largely changed the world, and in doing so it has rendered the old framework very vulnerable. Today, we are witnessing an in- creasinglj'^ rapid compression of both time and space. . . . This has led to the con- temporary paradox whereby the human race is simultaneously becoming more unified and more fragmented. We now seem to have a dichotomy on our hands — ■ either lasting cooperation or complete political dissolution — the potential for either being greater than in any previous period in human history.21* Daddario suggested that the development of individual national science policies is no longer enough to meet today's foreign policy and — a consensus must be readied on developing integrated policies for a technologically interdependent world : . . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanism? Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term locaHzed prob- lems and long-term global problems? ^^ 2i< Ibid., p. 1033. 2'5 Ibid., p. 1034. 216 Ibid. 2" Ibid. 1658 Author^ s Reassessment as of January 1976 In early 1976, 2 years after preparing the Scientists Abroad study, author Genevieve J. Knezo commented on it as follows: — That exchange programs are becoming an increasingly impor- tant tool of U.S. foreign policy is evidenced by the recent prolifera- tion of bilateral scientific and technical agreements signed by the United States. Most of these provide almost exclusively for exchange. These developments foreshadow the future importance of related considerations: an enhanced desire by other nations to share in the benefits of U.S. scientific and technical excellence, an ever-accelerating requirement for the United States to recognize and share in the technical knowledge and breakthroughs of its technologically advanced neighbors, and the enlargement of the scope and objectives of foreign policy to include consideration of more substantive scientific and technical issues. CONTINUING NEED FOR BETTER DIRECTION AND COORDINATION — It seems abundantly clear from the study that if exchange programs are to meet more eft'ectively the requirements of a world increasingly dependent upon science and technology, better direction, review, and coordination of exchange programs will be needed. Attention is also drawn in the study to the need to consider the merits of a multilateral alternative for some pro- grams. It was also noted that complementing agencies do not always tell the Congress about many of the deficiencies of these programs. — The issue of the need for better formulation and coordination of foreign policy with a scientific and technical content was raised in the National Academy of Sciences study, Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking, pp. 43-45.^^^ The authors of the report recommended a strong role for the proposed Presidential Council for Science and Technology in ". . . areas of foreign policy strongly affected by scientific and technical considerations." — The number of science and technology agreements with other nations is increasing. Legislative interest in overseeing these agreements and their content similarly is increasing. See: "Joint Commissions with Foreign Countries," statement of the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record, January 23, 1975: E146-E148. — Rep. Zablocki has proposed creation of a Joint Committee on National Security to reassert the legislative role and respon- sibility in the conduct of foreign policy. (Sec Congressional Record, January 14, 1975: H39-H40.f — Several issues which were raised in the study are now being considered by the agencies involved. These include: — the'pros and cons of USIA field administration and over- sight, as contrasted with educational affairs officer oversight, 218 National Academv of Sciences, Science and Technnloav in Presidential Policymakim: A Proposal, Rpport of the Ad Hoc Conoiiittee on Science and Technology, Wiishington, B.C., June 1974, 06 pp. (This study was prepared in part for use by CoJigress in ils consideration of reestablishing an executive brunch science ad- visory ollice.) 1659 of field operations of the Fiilbriglit-Iiays program. A study i* being done by the U.S. Advi.-ory Commission on Inter- national Educational and Cuit'.irarAffairs.^i'J — two separate studies in ureas which warrant review for scientific and technical educational exchange programs, commissioned by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs: (1) "An investigation of the consequences of inter- national educational exchange," and (2) "^.lental Health in international educational exchanges: a study of coping behavior in a cultural environment." ^^° — the merits of team exchanges and multilateral vehicles for exchange for the Fulbright-Hays program. Efforts are now underway by the Board of Foreign Scholarships to examine this issue. — I believe in retrospect that the report gave a valid and balanced perspective to the exchanges. However, if time had permitted, I should have attempted a more detailed analysis of the impacts of the programs or their contributions to the advance- ment of science and technology. Also, I should like to have assessed the quality of technical information transferred in relation to the level of development of the science and technology infrastructure of a recipient country. An attempt might also have been made to assess these programs in light of the origins, pur- poses, and activities of programs wdiich send governmental staff scientists abroad under exchange programs or bilateral or multi- lateral agreements. — There seems to be little attention in Congress now to review- ing and improving federally funded nongovernmental scientific and technical exchange programs. In the course of implementing new budget review and oversight responsibilities Congress might give more attention to this topic. The General Accounting Office and the House Committee on Science and Technology have recently conducted oversight reviews of the objectives and con- tent of Soviet-American cooperative agreements, including those for science and technology.^^^ Some Illustrative Questions The author has posed many questions in the study itself; some have been incorporated in the preceding text of this commentar3^ Others follow : In the new science policy structure at the national level is adequate provision being made for coordinated planning and direction of ex- change programs in relation to foreign policy goals and priorities? For follow-through of evaluation efforts, with reporting of findings to the President and Congress ? "« The sturly was described by W. E. Weld, Jr., staff director, in a letter to the author of Mar. 3, 1075. "0 These studies are described in "Measuring the impact of academic exchange," FAR Hornons, v. 7, no. 2, Spring 1974: 5-7. 22' The resulting GAO report is: U.S. General Accounting Office. A Progress Report on United States-Soviet Union Cooperative Programs. A report to Coneress, Washington, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1975. 98 p. The House Committee review is summarized in: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning and Analysis. Background Materials on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agrefments in Science and Technology. Reoort prepared by Claire Riley Geier, of the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress . 94th Co.igress, First session, December 1975. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 93. p. 1660 Is the emphasis in U.S. programs for exchange of technical person- nel too exclusively bilateral? Should multilateral alternatives be pur- sued? Through what channels: in existing international and regional organizations, ad hoc groupings of countries with related interests, or a new international mechanism established for the purpose? In its examination of the three major exchange programs the study frequently touches on the theme that, "If they are to meet more effec- tively requirements of a world increasingly dependent on science and technology, and especially if they are to help significantly in recon- ciling the often incompatible requirements of science and diplomacy, better direction, coordination and review will be needed." ^^^ What, in the light of failures to date, will it take to meet this need? How can it be met without resort to massive bureaucratic methods? How incompatible, in fact, are the requirements of science and di- plomacy? Can competent scientists and technologists serve forthright national purposes — assuming that the}^ do not become involved in the immediacies of international politics — without compromising scientific integrity? Is the answer to tliis question partly a matter of the world view of the President and his key science advisers, and of the profes- sional qualifications of the latter? Is it perhaps the diplomats, with their predilection for seat-of-the- panis deciionmakirig and their traditional aversion to research, rather than the scientists and technologists, with their disciplined ac- ceptance of the systems approach and meticulous documentation, who are responsible for persistent failures in reporting, review, and evalua- tion? In developing reporting and evaluation s} stems for the various exchange programs, would it be useful to seek the recommendations of teams of representative scientists and technologists on ways to exploit (a) the disciplined habits of scientists and technologists, (b) the organizational know-how of most technologists, and (c) the sensi- tivity as to political non-involvement of many scientists? One observer with outstanding qualifications for judging the success or failure of scientific exchanges — Dr. Harrison Brown, longtime Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences who retired from that post in 1974 — has said of the U.S. -Soviet exchanges: ... As a result of contacts between Soviet scientists and American scientists there have been some rather extraordinary foreign policy changes. I have seen attitudes of the scientists of one country change enormously as a result of these contacts. I have seen people come to the United States who had preconceived concepts . . . which were dramatically changed during their visit. I would say that if it had not been for these contacts we would not today have a Test Ban Treaty . . . nor would we be as far along the path toward the eventual signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty; nor would we have the SALT talks. . . .^^^ Are broad evaluations like this by knowledgeable persons perhaps more nformative than elaborate built-in systems of detailed reporting and analysis? If systematically conducted, could they substitute for the latter? Would a combination of the two evaluation methods be preferable to reliance on either one alone? How important is it that the American public be informed about the various exchange programs — their purposes, scope, problems, and accomplishments? Should the executive branch make more of an -22 Knezo, Scientists Abroad, vol. II, p. 1021. 223 /bid., p. 1011. 1661 effort to disseminate information about them (presumably in the form of human interest stories as well as statistics)? Should Congress on a contimious or periodic basis publicize the programs and call attention to their role in furthering U.o. foreign policy goals? ISSUE FIVE— BRAIN DRAIN: A STUDY OF THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC MOBILITY"* Staiement of the Issue December 1975 : "The loss of domestic intellectuals and academically trained individuals is becoming a serious problem for a number of African governments. Despite the often catastrophic shortage of skilled personnel in their homelands, a large number of African students studying at West European and American countries choose to remain abroad after graduation. "The number of Nigeiian university graduates who have remained in the United States, for example, is estimated at 8,000. . . . " 225 Items like this have been common in the world press for more than a decade. They illustrate a problem which has been critical for many of the less-developed countries (LDCs) of Africa, Latin America, and — most of all — Asia. Paradoxically, however, that problem has virtually been dropped from the agenda of the governments of the developed countries gaining the skilled personnel; in those countries (though not in the losing countries) it has almost lost official and political visibility. The issue has both substantive and procedural importance. The substantive factor may be stated about as follows: The "have" countries attract educated talent away from the "have- not" countries, thereby hampering the development process of the latter and tending to offset the development aid which the latter receive from them. The procedural might be put in question form: How is it possible for a problem or issue which exists, and which has been the subject of emotional debates in major and minor world forums (the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, the British Parlia- ment, the parliamentary organs of dozens of other developed and * U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Brain Drain. A Study of the PertltUnt Is»ve of International Scientific Mobility," in the series on Scietic*, Teclinology, and American Diplomacy; prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Pohcy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Joseph O. Whelan, senior specialist in international affairs, Congressional Resenrch Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1974. See vol. II, pp. 1037-1318. «» Peter Seidlitz, "The African Brain Drain," Swiss Review of World Affairs, December 1975, p. 11. 1662 issue of international development as related to U.S. economic health And national security" : ^^^ Brain drain is a symptom of underdevelopment; solutions lie largely in the realm of international development; the most essential mechanism is nation- .building through science and technology. As a foreign policy problem, therefore, .brain drain raises the basic question of this Nation's stance toward international ■development. Brain drain is essentially a foreign policy problem of low visibility; but even so, it is a testing ground for the vitality of a policy of much larger significance, namely, the Nation's commitment to development. Solutions for brain drain may be the primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of institution-building .and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology as the basis for modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor development goals ■achieved without assistance'trom the advanced countries like the United States.-^" In parallel with the American humanitarian tradition of helping others to help themselves, it is necessary to comprehend — the author continues — that political realism alone requires a continuing U.S. -commitment to development: It would seem beyond dispute that the LDCs, long the cockpit of international tension and conflict in which the United States has not been able to stand aside ■uninvolved, hold the potentialities for even deeper and more dangerous involve- ment. War in South and Southeast Asia, recurring crises in the Middle East, famine and tribal strife in Africa, are only recent illustrations of the problems that have been shaking the foundations of this volatile^ troubled Third World. Eco- nomic development, it is argued, offers perhaps the best prospects for peace and stability. Thus the increasingly compelling requirements of political interdepend- ence bind all nations, advanced and underdeveloped, in a common search for peace through economic development. American dependence on mineral resources largely under the control of the LDCs, as development specialists are quick to indicate, points to a new vulner- rability for the United States. Awareness of this problem comes at the height of the -current energy crisis and suggests what may be a scenario for things to come with ■growing cartelization of world mineral resources and growing consciousness of in- creased leverage among the LDCs to be used against the advanced industrial nations. Reasons of self-interest appear to warrant a reappraisal of the Nation's f)osture towards the LDCs and the affirmation of a policy of interdependence.^-* To summarize: ". . . in the judgment of students of development and brain drain, one of the major challenges to mankind remains the chal- lenge of finding ways to put the LDCs on a course leading to a self- reinforcing upward spiral of social and economic progress." The im- portance of the brain drain issue is that resolving it for any given LDC or group of LDCs would be one of the critical ways of putting the ■countries concerned on such a course — and to that extent contributing to the ultimate diplomatic goal of "a world in balance, with social and economic opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense of hope in all nations." ^^' . / How the Issue Developed The international migration of talent is hot a new historical phe- :nomepon.^^° Of primary concern in the context of the Science, Tech- nology, and American Diploniacy study series, however, is its current manifestation as the "brain drain" from countries in need of educated talent (the less developed countries, or LDCs) to those ' already rich in such talent^ — especially the United States, "6 Whelan, Brain Drain, vol. U, p. 1314. 22' Ibid., p. 1316. 228 Ibid., pp. 1316-1317. ■'■^^Ibid., p. 1318. 230 For ail account of the migrations of talent from ancient times until the recent past, including their role in the spread of science and technology throughout the ages and in the development of Colonial America, see ibid., "Brain Drain in Historical Perspective," pp. 1064-1076. 1663 As a contemporary international problem, the study observes, the brain drain phenomenon "has its roots in the profound changes in the political structure of international relations that have been brought about as a consequence of World War II. These changes were to have a marked bearing on patterns of migration in the postwar era." ^^^ THE HEIGHTENED HUMAN MOBILITY OF MODERN TIMES Human mobility has been a salient characteristic of this new era. Much of it was in the form of forced migrations. "Programs of repa- triation or settlement of those dislocated by World War II, and pop- ulation transfers resulting from the creatioi^ of newly independent states or the outbreak of wars, involved millions of people": Migrations on this vast scale tended to overshadow the normal free movement of peoples. The turbulence of the era is seen in the statistics. After World War II, 18,000,000 people were uprooted by the partition of India and Pakistan; West Germany accepted 12,000,000 refugees dislocated during the war; Japan resettled 6,300,000; South Korea absorbed 4,000,000 and Hong Kong 1,300,000. In Israel, 1,000,000 Jews found refuge in a new homeland, while more than 1,000,000 Palestinian Arabs fled the country. Ultimately, the International Refugee Orga- nization and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration settled 1,300,000 refugees overseas. These statistics do not include the movement of people in the Soviet and Chinese areas, but even this limited survey produces a total of 45,000,000 forced emigrants. Thus in one decade the number of people compelled to move across frontiers was equal to the entire movement of free emigrants across the Atlantic in the century ending in 19 IS.^** These forced migrations were followed by accelerating flows of free emigrants, smaller in number and different in kind. Conditioning and characterizing the free emigration were an evolving internationalism, the process of decolonization, and the reordering of priorities in U.S. immigration by establishment of the criterion of quality rather than quantity. This new internationalism, the author observes, was characterized in the political sphere partly by the establishment of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations which gave organizational structure to world politics, and partly by the growing tendency of peoples everywhere to think and act in a global context which made migration less formidable psychologically. In the economic sphere, the trend toward closer integration of the world economy has a direct effect on the migration of talent. The market for educated professional people has become increasingly international as a result of such developments as the reduction of barriers to international trade, increasing integration of national capital markets of the advanced countries into a world capital market, the growth of direct foreign investment in modern technology from country to country, and the modernization of traditional class- and status-oriented societies. "Contributing to the integration of the world economy which pro- duced this special eflFect on emigration are two main forces in the mod- ern world . . . : the worldwide spread of the Industrial Revolution, and the movement of advanced Western societies into the post-industrial era. Both forces have created special needs, particularly a need for 231 Ibid., p. 1077. 232 Ibid. 1664 talent." Affecting this need have been such post-World War II phenomena a>: — The great upsurge in world education, augmenting substantially the talent market; — The movement, internally as well as externallj^, towards urban and metropolitan centers which industrialization has fed. . . . — Far-reaching improvements in transportation and communications, facilitating mobility and making information on job opportunities readily available; — The standardization of professional training, easing lateral movement across national boundaries; and — Official encouragement of preference provisions, work permits, and other provisions in state-regulated immigration laws designed to attract talent from this new world market.^^^ IMPACT OF DECOLONIZATION ON BRAIN DRAIN The process of decolonization has, by ironic mischance, had nega- tive consequences for the brain drain problem. In its most serious manifestations, the problem largely involves emigration from the former colonial areas of Asia and Africa. By virtue of the former colonial-imperial link the emigrant moves into what he believes to be familiar circles. This familiarity eases the burden of transition between two essentially different cultures. The imperial tradition may also en- gender a belief that by migrating to the imperial center, the former colonial is moving up into a superior and more exciting culture. The attraction is often so alluring that the former colonial remains, to the loss of his developing native country. ^3* This form of brain drain arises out of what tend to be self-defeating contradictions in policies of the erstwhile imperial powers and other advantaged countries which seek to assist the development process in the disadvantaged former colonies through programs of foreign aid. Such efforts, the study notes, are often offset by the movement of "human capital" in the opposite direction. Concern for this problem has increased with a growing awareness that develop- ment cannot be effectively stimulated simply by the flow of money to the LDCs and that an equally vital role must be played by local Deoole with skills and ex- pertise to carry out development programs. The United States becomes involved in this problem in that former colonials immigrate to the United States through the former imperial centers in Europe ; they come directly from their na- tive country; and the United States has been a long time advocate and practi- tioner of foreign aid as a means of development. . . . What makes this matter particularly important for international relations today is that the LDCs constitute a vast configuration of political power: they have a voice; and they make known their complaints. No longer are they willing to remain silent while their interests are being ignored.^^* EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES The effects of the reorder ng of immigration priorities on the brain drain problem, especially in relation to the LDCs, have been far- reaching. New criteria of quality and selectivity invited emigration of the professionals, the intellectuals, and the technically skilled. Along with the lowering of racial restrictions in the economically advanced countries, these new criteria had a special appeal for the LDCs. 233 Ibid., pp. 1078-1079. 234/6td.,p. 1079. 23« Ibid., p. 1080. 1665 "Paradox'cally, attempts to right an injustice of discriminatoi\y quota systems created a new and unintended problem: a powerful incentive was now given to the professionals in the LDCs to emigrate and thus deprive their developing countries of much needed professional manpower": A survey of professional emigration from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey showed that 50 percent of all their scientists trained abroad did not return home. Another showed that Argentina lost 5,000 engineers through emigration in recent years. And 58 percent of those emigrating from the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) were scientists; 70 percent held Ph. D. degrees.^^^ The most serious professional manpower drain is represented by nonreturning students: According to a United Nations manpower report, the number of foreign students studying in advanced countries has shown a "steep annual increase." In 1967, it said, 100,262 foreign students were enrolled in American institutions of higher learning; an estimated 70 percent were from the LDCs. According to estimates by Prof. Robert Myers of the University of Chicago, described by Dr. John C. Shearer, Director, Manpower Research and Training Center at Oklahoma State University, as the "best overall measures of the foreign student brain drain," the overall nonreturn rate is between 15 and 25 percent rather than the semiofficial 8 to 10 percent frequently quoted. Leakage among nonreturning doctoral students has ranged from a high of 90 percent for Taiwan to a low of 14 percent for Pakistan. 2" Another aspect of the shift in immigration criteria was competition among the developed countries for professional and skilled manpower. This competition was especially keen in the medical, engineering, and scientific professions. As Canada's Minister of Manpower and Im- migration put it: "The high cost of training professional and skilled people ... is a measure of the benefit derived [by] Canada. . . . Other countries are in competition with us for immigrants." ^^^ Still another effect of the change in criteria has been to make skilled manpower more mobile and unskilled manpower less so. In the international debates of the mid-1960s, the United States and its economic policies and practices were singled out as a main cause of brain drain from the developing countries. However, the author com- ments, later studies revealed new evidence suggesting what Ambas- sador Nun Eren of Turkey has called "universal culpability" — All the great industrial powers of the West were shown to have been acting as centers of attraction for scientists, engineers, [and] doctors . . .